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 Abstract 
Entering new product markets on the basis of an existing technological competence is 
an important possible source of growth for technology intensive companies. The 
resource-based view explains resource-based growth in general. Diversification research 
has studied patterns of technology-based new product market entries. More research is, 
however, needed on managerial and decision-making process factors impacting the 
success of technology-based product market entries. 
The findings of this dissertation contribute to the knowledge on technology-based new 
product market entries. A framework is developed and tested, which explains the impact 
of managerial resources and decision-making process characteristics on the success of 
technology-based product market entries. Hypotheses are derived from the resource-
based view and decision-making research. The main research question is: Which levers 
does the management control that help promote technology-based growth into new 
product markets? This question is further broken down into the following three 
questions covering the three hypothesized main levers:  Do the managerial resources 
invested in generating technology-based growth impact the success of technology-based 
product market entries? What is the impact of operational capabilities on the success of 
individual technology-based product market entries? What is the impact of decision-
making process characteristics on the success of individual technology-based product 
market entries?  
The framework and the underlying hypotheses are examined in the light of data 
collected with a survey of 63 companies. The framework and the survey questionnaire 
were developed on the basis of interviews with nine companies as well as a literature 
review of previous empirical research on diversification and research on new product 
development. The empirical data support the main arguments of the framework. In order 
to further examine the conclusions from the analysis of the survey data, five of the 
survey respondent-companies were engaged in deepening case studies.   
   2 
Several theoretical contributions are identified and managerial implications are derived. 
Primarily, this dissertation contributes to the literature on technology-based product 
market entries by creating a better understanding of the managerial levers for promoting 
success. Chosen process, management and capability-related factors are studied. The 
dissertation contributes to diversification research by examining on the project level the 
process, organizational, and managerial components of diversification. The main 
contribution related to the resource-based view is further clarification concerning the 
role and support to the importance of managerial services in resource-based growth. 
Aspects of successful management of technology-based market entry projects are 
pointed out. The impact of familiarity with the new product markets on success of the 
entry receives support. Further insights are generated on the complex social 
phenomenon of participating in a project team with the challenging task of 
implementing a technology-based product market entry.   
The most important managerial implication is that certain managerial levers are more 
effective than others in promoting the success of a growth strategy consisting of 
technology-based product-market entries. The findings give an indication of certain 
risks and uncertainties related to individual leveraging projects, which managers should 
take into account.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Finding opportunities for profitable growth is one of the main levers that companies 
have for shareholder value creation1. For technology-intensive firms, entries into new 
product markets are a potential source of business growth. If the company’s current 
market is mature, and its market share already globally large, one of the few possibilities 
to find significant growth opportunities may be entering new product-markets. Related 
diversification has been found to offer a higher likelihood of succeeding in new markets 
than unrelated diversification 2 3 4 5 6 7 8. Related diversification9 10 is usually understood as 
involving the application of the firm’s existing competencies or knowledge in new 
markets. Two most commonly noted bases of related diversification are knowledge of 
the needs of certain customer groups and a technological competence11.  Additionally, 
related diversification can be based on competencies as specific as, for example, the 
ability to manage franchises, distribution capability, manufacturing capability or fast 
                                                 
1  Copeland, T., Koller, T. & Murrin, J.  1994. Valuation: Measuring and managing the value of 
companies. John Wiley & Sons, New York, USA.  
2  Rumelt, R. P. 1974. Strategy, structure, and economic performance. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusettes, USA. 
3  Montgomery, C. A. 1979. Diversification, market structure, and performance: an extension of 
Rumelt’s work. Doctoral dissertation, Purdue University 
4 Palepu, K. 1985. Diversification strategy, profit performance, and the entrophy measure. Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 6, pp. 239-255. 
5  Simmonds, P. G. 1990. The combined diversification breadth and mode dimensions and the 
performance of large firms. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 11, pp. 399-410. 
6  Chatterjee, S. & Wernerfelt, B. 1991. The link between resources and the type of diversification – 
theory and evidence. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 33-48. 
7  Singh, H. & Montgomery, C. 1987. Corporate acquisition strategies and economic performance. 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 377-386. 
8  Bettis, R. 1991. Performance differences in related and unrelated diversified firms. Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 379-394. 
9  Prahalad, C. K. & Bettis, R A.  1986. The dominant logic: a new linkage between diversity and 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 7, No. 6, pp. 485-501. 
10  Grant, R. M. 1988. On 'Dominant Logic', Relatedness And The Link Between Diversification. 
Strategic Management Journal, Nov/Dec, Vol. 9, No. 6, pp. 693-643. 
11  Goold, M., Campbell, A. & Alexander, M. 1997. Leveraging competencies across business. In: 
Core-competency based strategy. Campbell, A. & Sommers Luchs, K. Thomson Business Press, 
UK. 
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new product introduction12. Growth strategy based on related diversification has also 
been called competence leveraging13 14 15 16.  
Examples exist of successful companies that have grown on the basis of their 
technological competencies gradually extending into several additional product-markets. 
They have often learned new supporting technologies as a necessity of an entry into a 
new product market. Later, companies have utilized also the newly learned technologies 
to enter additional product-markets. Examples of companies that have diversified into 
new product-markets in order to utilize their technological competencies include 
General Electric17, Texas Instruments18, DuPont19, HewlettPackard20, Eastman Kodak21, 
Canon22 23, Toray Carbon Fibers24, and 3M25.  
There are several constraints to technology-based product market entries. The 
management does not discover all opportunities in new product-markets. The practical 
implementation of a growth project taking advantage of an identified opportunity may 
be characterized by significant uncertainties. Some constraints on technology-based 
                                                 
12  Conrad, G. R. 1997. Unexplored assets for diversification. In: Core-competency based strategy. 
Campbell, A. & Sommers Luchs, K. Thomson Business Press, UK. 
13  Prahalad, C. K. & Hamel, G. 1996. The core competence of the corporation. In: Burgelman, R. A., 
Maidique, M. A. & Wheelwright, S.C. 1996. Strategic management of technology and innovation. 
Times Mirror Higher Education Group, USA. 
14  Hamel, G. & Prahalad, C. K. 1994. Competing for the future. Harvard Business School Press, 
USA. 
15  Hamel, G. 1994. The concept of core competence. In: Hamel, G. & Heene, A. (Eds.). Competence-
based competition. John Wiley & Sons, UK. 
16  Sanchez, R., Heene, A. & Thomas, H. 1997. Introduction: towards the theory and practice of 
competence-based competition. In:Dynamics of competence-based competition. Pergamon, UK.  
17  Abetti, P. A. Convergent and divergent technological and market strategies for global leadership. 
International Journal of Technology Management, Vol. 14, No. 6/7/8, pp. 635-657. 
18  Frantz, G. A. 1998. From risky business to big business. Research Technology Management, 
Washington, Jul/Aug. 
19  O’Brien, T. C. & Fadem, J. T. 1999. Identifying new business opportunities. Research Technology 
Management,  Washington, Sep/Oct, pp. 15-19. 
20  Barnholt, E. W. 1997. Research Technology Management, Washington, Mar/Apr. 
21  Peteraf, M. 1993. The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based view. Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 179-191. 
22  Markides, C. C. & Williamson, P. J. 1994. Related diversification, core competencies and 
corporate performance. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15, pp. 149-165 
23  Chiesa, V. & Manzini, R. 1997. Competence-based diversification. Long range planning, Vol. 30, 
no. 2, pp. 209-217. 
24  Abetti, P. A. Convergent and divergent technological and market strategies for global leadership. 
International Journal of Technology Management, Vol. 14, No. 6/7/8, pp. 635-657. 
25  Goold, M., Campbell, A. & Alexander, M. 1997. Leveraging competencies across business. In: 
Core-competency based strategy. Campbell, A. & Sommers Luchs, K. Thomson Business Press, 
UK. 
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product-market entries could be becoming less restrictive; Stankiewicz26, Kodama27, as 
well as Langlois and Robertson28 have written about the scientificness, modularity and 
fusibility of technologies, which they claim to be increasingly common features of 
technologies. These features, according to Stankiewicz, make technologies increasingly 
generic, which implies a larger possible range of applications. Another development that 
may diminish constraints on technology-based product market entries is that a business 
model relying on a network of subcontractors has become increasingly viable mainly 
due to a decrease in information processing costs29 30 31. Such a networked business 
model may, depending on the situation and on the industry, help overcome some of the 
operative constraints on entering a new market. Such operative constraints may be, for 
example, production capacity or marketing channels needed in order to enter a new 
market.  
One area of focus in diversification research is the kinds of strategies firms in general 
should follow in their technology-based growth. One of the questions that have received 
a lot of attention is according to what logic should firms choose the markets to enter. 
Further, diversification research has tried to explain companies’ growth paths’ impact 
on financial performance. Companies’ membership in industries has often been modeled 
using industry classification codes32. In general, diversification research has mainly 
                                                 
26 See, for example, Stankiewicz, R. Basic technologies and the innovation process. In: Sigurdson, J. 
(Ed.). Measuring the dynamics of technological change.  
27  See, for example, Kodama, F. 1992. Technology fusion and the new R&D. Harvard Business 
Review, Jul-Aug, pp. 70-78. 
28  Langlois, R. N. & Robertson, P. L. 1992. Networks and innovation in a modular system: Lessons 
from the microcomputer and stereo component industries. Research Policy, Vol. 21, pp. 297-313. 
29  For more on the reasons for operating as an integrated value chain versus employing resources 
within a market relationship, see for example  
 Coase, R. 1990. The firm, the market and the law. University of Chicago Press, USA. 
 Williamson, O. 1983. Markets and hierarchies. Free Press, USA. 
 Evans, P. & Wursterer, T. S. 1999. Blown to bits: How the new economics of information 
transforms strategy. Harvard Business School Press, Massachusettes, USA. 
30  Sampler, J. L. 1998. Redefining industry structure for the information age. Strategic Management 
Journal, Chichester, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 343-355. 
31  Hitt, L. M. 1999. Information technology and firm boundaries: Evidence from panel data. 
Information Systems Research, Providence, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 134-149 
32  Silverman, B. S. 1999. Technological resources and the direction of corporate diversification: 
toward an integration of the resource-based view and transaction cost economies. Management 
Science, pp. 1109-1124. 
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concentrated on topics that can be researched using large, existing databases33. 
Silverman34 has recently suggested that more research is needed into the process of 
diversifying and the role of managerial resources in this process. In his view, company 
internal management, competence and organizational factors lack research, although 
they all would seem very important for explaining diversification choices and success. 
Resource-based view proposes that the availability of managerial resources is even the 
most important restriction to growth35.   
In addition, other streams of research have pointed out the importance of clarifying the 
management component in technology-based product market entries. For example, 
research on effectiveness of research and development investments has identified the 
importance of a strategy for leveraging technology, but has not elaborated further on the 
possible criteria for a good strategy for technology-based product market entries. 
Neither has it elaborated on what it takes to implement the strategy.36 37 38 39 Further, 
researchers of new product development have suggested40 that future research should 
concentrate on antecedents to development performance such as project leader 
characteristics, competitive market intelligence, market orientation, market 
attractiveness, resource uncertainty, competitive intensity, market and technological 
uncertainty, and project task characteristics such as project complexity. According to the 
researchers of new product development, the focus of future research should be on 
                                                 
33  Silverman, B. S. 1999. Technological resources and the direction of corporate diversification: 
toward an integration of the resource-based view and transaction cost economies. Management 
Science, pp. 1109-1124. 
34  Silverman, B. S. 1999. Technological resources and the direction of corporate diversification: 
toward an integration of the resource-based view and transaction cost economies. Management 
Science, pp. 1109-1124. 
35  Penrose, E. 1972 (orig. publ. 1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. Basil Blackwell and 
Mott, Oxford, 5th edition.  
36  Bean, A. S. 1995. Why some R&D organizations are more productive than others. Research 
Technology Management, Washington, Jan/Feb, pp. 25-.37 
37  Bean, A. S., Einolf, K. & Russo, M. J. 1999. Benchmarking your R&D: Results from IRI/CIMS 
annual R&D survey for FY ’97. Research Technology Management, Washington, Jan/Feb, pp. 24-
34.  
38  Bean, A. S., Russo, M. J. & Whiteley, R. L. 2000. Benchmarking your R&D: Results from 
IRI/CIMS annual R&D survey for FY ’98. Research Technology Management, Washington, 
Jan/Feb, pp. 16-24. 
39  Roberts, E. B. 1995. Benchmarking the strategic management of technology – II. Research 
Technology management, Washington, Mar / Apr, pp. 18-.. 
40  Tatikonda, M. V. & Montoya-Weiss, M. M. 2001. Integrating operational and marketing 
perspectives of product innovation: The influence of organizational process factors and capabilities 
on development performance. Management Science, January, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 151-172. 
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project planning rather than project execution, as project execution has been extensively 
researched previously. Project planning is important because during this phase of the 
project organizational process factors and operational outcome targets are set, 
technology alternatives investigated, and important product market choices made. The 
uncertainties that a development project faces in its implementation depend on the 
choices made in project planning. Organizational process factors and targets set for 
development outcomes are key managerial decision variables. Therefore, according to 
the researchers of this stream, future research is needed to investigate which groups of 
employees or which organizational levels in firms make these decisions, and what the 
nature of their influence is on the decision-making process41.  
Different aspects of technology-based product market entries have been discussed by 
such streams of research as diversification research, research discussing leveraging 
technological competencies, research on new product development, research on 
effectiveness of research and development investments, as well as the resource-based 
view. However, these streams have been lacking in explanations as to the management 
of the process of technology-based product market entries. 
This study adopts a managerial choice perspective on technology-based product market 
entries, concentrating on the levers the management controls that can promote the 
success of a firm’s leveraging activities. Two streams of research are used to form a 
basis for understanding issues related to technology-based product market entries. These 
streams are the resource-based view of strategy and decision-making research. The 
resource-based view emphasizes the importance of the availability of managerial 
resources for growth, specifying that managerial resources are consumed especially in 
identifying and planning growth projects, as well as in managing the risk and 
uncertainty related to implementing individual growth projects42. Decision-making 
research helps identify in more detail where the management capacity in technology 
leveraging projects is consumed, as managing is for a large part executed through 
                                                 
41  Tatikonda, M. V. & Montoya-Weiss, M. M. 2001. Integrating operational and marketing 
perspectives of product innovation: The influence of organizational process factors and capabilities 
on development performance. Management Science, January, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 151-172. 
42  Penrose, E. 1972 (orig. publ. 1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. Basil Blackwell and 
Mott, Oxford, 5th edition.  
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decision-making. In addition, research on technology-based diversification is used to 
gain further understanding of the phenomenon. Diversification has traditionally been 
studied from the perspective of the industrial organization view. There is, however, also 
diversification research building on the resource-based view.  
The resource-based view of strategy has been a popular topic in the nineties, but it has 
been blamed for a lack of empirically founded and detailed academic research on the 
operationalization of resources and resource-based strategies at the firm level. The 
concept of organizational capabilities has been accused of being too vague for empirical 
analysis43. Meanwhile, the focal concepts have received a lot of attention and have been 
more clearly defined. Some of the focal themes have gained considerable empirical 
support, as well as managerial approval44. One of the themes that have received 
empirical support is the proposition that resources matter; the most important strategic 
constraints seem to arise from the unique resources and actions of individual 
corporations or business units, instead of arising from the industry characteristics45 46. 
Another central theme that has been empirically addressed is the question of how to 
identify the firm level investments in resources and capabilities that generate above 
average returns from the market47. The empirical findings in this area show, for 
example, that information routines are positively linked to performance48 49 50.  
Experience in product development has been found to influence the financial 
                                                 
43  Kogut, B. & Kulatilaka, N. 1994. Options thinking and platform investments: investing in 
opportunity. California Management Review, Berkeley, Winter, pp. 52-. 
44  Peteraf, M. A. 1993. The cornerstones of  competitive advantage: A resource-based view. Strategic 
Management Journal, Chichester, March, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 179-192. 
45  Rumelt, R. P. 1991. How Much Does Industry Matter? Strategic Management Journal, Chichester, 
March, Vol. 12, No. 3, 167-185. 
46  Hansen, G. S. & Wernerfelt, B. 1989. Determinants of Firm Performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, Chichester, Sep/Oct, Vol. 10, No. 5, pp. 399-411. 
47  Moorman, C. & Slotegraaf, R. J. 1999. The contingency value of complementary capabilities in 
product development. Journal of Marketing Research, Chicago, May, pp. 239-257.  
48  Jaworski, B. J. & Kohli A. K. 1993. Market Orientation: Antecedents and Consequences. Journal 
of Marketing, Vol. 57, July, pp. 53-71.  
49  Moorman, C. 1995. Organizational Market Information Processes: Cultural Antecedents and New 
Product Outcomes. Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 32, August, pp. 318-35. 
50  Narver, J. C. & Slater, S. F. 1990. The Effect of a Market Orientation on Business Profitability. 
Journal of Marketing, Vol. 54, October, pp. 20-35. 
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performance of new products 51 52. Different skill sets are required from market pioneers, 
early followers, and late entrants 53 54. 
A large part of diversification research has been based on analyzing databases of 
industry entry and exit information. Therefore, the process of diversifying is relatively 
unknown from a company-internal perspective. The operationalization of the resource-
based view of diversification has mostly been limited to broad categorizations of 
resources and the industries in which they might be applicable.55 Within the resource-
based view, little research has focused on the process of leveraging resources. The lack 
of knowledge of the process and factors affecting it can even be suspected to be a reason 
for under-utilizing this growth opportunity, as managers may shun undertaking 
technology-based growth projects to new product markets on the grounds that they are 
unknown and risky. Possible factors affecting the process could be, for example, the 
strength of technological competence to be leveraged relative to other firms, the scope 
of applicability of the technological competence, management’s perception of the 
growth opportunities, and the capability to execute an entry into a new market.  
Technology-based product market entry is an important theme for technology intensive 
firms. Therefore, generating a deeper understanding on this theme is essential. Many 
companies appear not to have systemized their approaches to utilizing technology-based 
growth opportunities according to the author’s consulting experience and the empirical 
research conducted for this research. Differences seem to lie in how much managerial 
time is invested into generating technology-based growth, and how well the entry 
projects are managed. As discussed above, previous research has not focused on these 
topics. This dissertation aims at contributing to the understanding of firm growth 
through technology-based product market entries and to the understanding of how this 
                                                 
51  Moorman, C. & Miner, A. S. 1997. The Role of Organizational Memory in New Product 
Performance and Creativity. Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 34, February, pp. 91-106. 
52  Song, Z. M. & Parry, M. E. 1997. The Determinants of Japanese New Product Successes. Journal 
of Marketing Research, Vol. 34, February, pp. 64-76. 
53  Bowman, D. & Gatignon, H. 1995. Determinants of Competitor Response Time to a New Product 
Introduction. Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 32, February, pp. 30-41. 
54  Kalyanaram, G., Robinson, W. T. & Urban, G. L. 1995. Order of Market Entry: Established 
Empirical Generalizations, Emerging Empirical Generalizations, and Future Research. Marketing 
Science, Vol. 14, Summer, pp. 212-221. 
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growth opportunity could be exploited more. Furthermore, this dissertation aims at 
contributing to the body of research on technology-based growth as seen in the resource-
based view. In addition, the study will contribute to the body of research on technology-
based diversification and understanding of diversification processes, as a part of the 
diversification research. 
1.2 Research questions 
Entries into new product markets represent a potential growth opportunity for 
technology intensive firms. Being able to develop profitable business on the basis of 
technological competence is often important for justifying further investments in 
technological competencies. Many streams of empirical research explain some aspects 
of technology-based product market entries. Such streams of research are diversification 
research, as well as research streams that discuss competence leveraging, new product 
development, effectiveness of research and development investments, and 
entrepreneurship and corporate venturing. However, as of yet, research clarifying the 
role of managerial resources, operational capabilities and decision-making process 
characteristics in technology-based diversification, in new product development, or with 
regard to the effectiveness of research and development investments has been rare. This 
study aims at clarifying these aspects of technology-based growth through answering the 
following four research questions. The main research question is as follows: 
Research question 1: 
Which levers does the management control that help to promote technology-
based growth into new product markets? 
It is important to understand to what degree the efforts of management can increase the 
number and the success of technology-based product market entries. Several research 
streams emphasize the strength of environmental conditions, contextual factors and path 
dependencies over managerial choice. With regard to technology-based product market 
                                                                                                                                               
55  Silverman, B. S. 1999. Technological resources and the direction of corporate diversification: 
toward an integration of the resource-based view and transaction cost economies. Management 
Science, pp. 1109-1124. 
   9 
entries, these can hinder the management in its efforts to find many of the growth 
opportunities. They can also reduce the applicability of the technological competence 
outside the context where it was originally applied and can render the management 
unwilling to start technology-based growth projects leading to new product-markets due 
to their perceived high risk of failure. These are relevant constraints to technology-based 
product market entries. An important question is how much the management can impact 
the success of technology-based product market entries thorough its own efforts, and 
how much it is determined by factors outside the control of the management. A 
following important question is what the managerial efforts, if any, are that can impact 
the success of technology-based product market entries. Therefore, the main research 
question is further specified in three questions as follows: 
Research question 2: 
Do the managerial resources invested in generating technology-based growth 
impact the success of technology-based product market entries? 
The second research question is important for more concretely assessing the impact of 
managerial effort on success of technology-based product market entries. 
Research question 3: 
What is the impact of operational capabilities on the success of individual 
technology-based product market entries? 
The third research question is important for dealing with the issue of whether 
management can through its efforts in carefully choosing the markets for technology-
based growth increase the chance of success and decrease the influence of negative 
environmental and contextual factors. Specifically, the third research question 
concentrates on the impact of choosing markets that are as familiar as possible.  
Research question 4: 
What is the impact of decision-making process characteristics on the success of 
individual technology-based product market entries? 
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The fourth research question is important for assessing the significance of managerial 
efforts to assure the best possible conditions for the success of technology-based growth 
projects to new product-markets. These efforts are directed towards overcoming the 
organizational, contextual and environmental factors that could negatively impact the 
implementation of a leveraging project. More specifically, these efforts will be studied 
through the characteristics of the decision-making process, because decision-making 
processes are among the most concrete instances of managerial action. 
1.3 Scope of the research 
The objects of analysis in this research are technology leveraging projects in individual 
companies, that is, the research aims at explaining the factors affecting technology-
based product market entries from the point of view of individual companies. The focus 
of the research is on technology-based product market entries. Creating the 
technological competencies for firms is not studied. However, technology-based product 
market entries very often also require some new technological competencies to be 
developed. This competence development can play an important role in the success of 
such growth projects, and will be taken into account in discussing factors affecting the 
success of the projects. The distinction of competence development and competence 
leveraging can be compared to the difference between technology diversification, that is, 
acquiring new technological skills, and business diversification, that is, growing into 
new geographical or product-markets on the basis of those skills56. Technology 
diversification has been defined as increasing the width of the corporate technology base 
over time57. This definition is not widely used, however. The definition of technology 
diversification as increasing the width of the corporate technology base will be used 
here because of the usefulness of distinguishing between technology diversification and 
business diversification. The corporate technology base consists of the technological 
competencies that a company possesses, as well as the technologies acquired in the form 
of, for example, patents. In multi-technology companies, that is technologically 
                                                 
56  Granstrand, O. 1998. Towards a theory of the technology-based firm. Research Policy, September, 
pp. 465-489. 
57  Oskarsson, C. 1993. Technology diversification: The phenomenon, its causes and effects. 
Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden. 
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diversified companies, the technology base has been defined to consist of at least three 
different generic technologies.58  
Technology and business diversification have often been found to follow each other’s 
development. This means that, in order to enter a new product-market, a firm often 
needs to acquire some new technological competencies even if the main basis for 
entering the market is an existing technological competence. Therefore, one can say that 
business diversification often causes technology diversification59. In addition, 
technology diversification often causes further business diversification, as the firm 
searches for higher returns on its technology investments by leveraging them in new 
markets. Realizing that these two processes are intertwined, or even take place in 
parallel, this study focuses only on the factors that contribute to the success of business 
diversification. However, the linkage is kept in mind all along, as the two processes may 
influence each other so much that they cannot be considered fully separately.  
Geographically, the empirical part of the study will concentrate on Finland and Sweden. 
The inclusion of both countries is necessary in order to achieve a sufficient sample size, 
and this should not create comparison problems due to the similarity of the economic 
systems of the countries. The industries included are manufacturing industries in which 
product technology is one of the main ways for firms to differentiate their products. This 
leaves, for example, industries where differentiation is achieved on the basis of brand or 
visual appeal alone outside the scope of this study. Furthermore, industries clearly 
differentiating only on the basis of process technology are left out. This delineation was 
made in order to make the identification of technology leveraging cases easier. Thus in 
practice, the largest included industries in Finland and Sweden are electronics, industrial 
goods, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, materials, cable, software, and metal industries. 
Firms younger than five years are not included, as they are not considered likely to have 
yet proceeded with technology-based product market entries to the point at which their 
results could be assessed. The types of firms in the sample are discussed in more detail 
in a later chapter covering the descriptive statistics of the study. The industries, 
                                                 
58  Granstrand, O. & Sjölander, S. 1990. Managing inovation in multi-technology corporations. 
Research Policy, Feb. 
59  Granstrand, O. & Sjölander, S. 1990. Managing inovation in multi-technology corporations. 
Research Policy, Feb. 
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countries and firm sizes are included in the analyses as control variables, but explaining 
why technology leveraging strategies or success may vary between industries, countries 
or firm size classes is outside the scope of this study.  
1.4 Structure of the dissertation and research methods 
The following chapter, Chapter 2 presents an analysis and definitions of the main 
concepts of the study, ending with a definition of the object of interest, technology-
based product market entries.  
In Chapter 3, research streams discussing technology-based product market entries are 
reviewed. First, diversification research is discussed. Starting with the classic writings 
on diversification research, research in this area, including related diversification and 
technology diversification, is reviewed. Second, research on new product development 
and the effectiveness of research and development investments is summarized. 
Chapter 4 reviews the theoretical approaches used in this dissertation. These are based 
on the resource-based view and decision-making research. Hypotheses based on the 
theoretical approaches are presented. The topics within the resource-based view that are 
discussed relate to the amount of managerial resources available for growth, other firm 
level growth constraints, knowledge concerning growth, and risk and uncertainty related 
to individual technology-leveraging projects. The topics within decision-making 
research that are discussed relate to strategic decision-making processes in general and 
the impact of the decision-making context and process on results. At the end of the 
chapter, a hypothetical model of factors affecting technology-based product market 
entries is presented, as well as a summary of hypotheses. 
Chapter 5 presents the methodology used in this study. Data for the empirical testing of 
the hypotheses was collected with a mail survey. A careful identification of respondents 
was carried out through multiple telephone discussions with representatives of the firm. 
The respondent finally identified was contacted via telephone prior to sending the 
questionnaire in order to explain the background of the study and questionnaire and 
receive his or her agreement to return the questionnaire. This way, it was assured that 
the questions were understood correctly and that the response rate was increased through 
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higher motivation. Follow-up telephone calls and mailings were also made. In Chapter 
5, the population, sample and response patterns are presented. The statistical methods 
used for the analysis of the empirical data are discussed. Confirmatory factor analysis is 
used for testing the reliability and validity of the constructs. Multiple linear regression 
analysis is conducted for testing the hypotheses. Structural equation modeling is used to 
further verify the model.  
Theoretical constructs are operationalized by adopting and adapting measures used in 
previous studies, or by deriving new measures based on the applied theoretical 
perspectives of previous research, or on exploratory interviews with nine companies. In 
Chapter 5, the operationalization of the variables measured is also discussed. The 
variables include managerial services available for growth, other firm level growth 
constraints, characteristics of the decision-making process, applicability of existing 
operational capabilities in the new market, and several control variables. The reliability 
and validity of the measures is discussed. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the statistical analysis, beginning with a descriptive 
data analysis.  The results are presented at two levels, at the firm level and the project 
level after first analyzing the firm level context to the growth projects. First, the 
correlations between variables are presented, then the regression analysis results, and 
finally a structural equation model. Chapter 7 deepens the analysis with the help of five 
case analyses.  
Finally, in Chapter 8 the conclusions of the dissertation are analyzed with regard to 
theoretical and empirical contributions, managerial implications, as well as limitations 
and suggestions for further research. 
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2 DISCUSSION AND DEFINITION OF THE MAIN CONCEPTS 
In this chapter, the key concepts of this dissertation are discussed. These include the 
following concepts: the concept of “technology”, several concepts from the resource-
based view and technology related diversification, as well as technology-based product 
market entries.  
2.1 Technology60 
Technology is a multi-faceted concept that, for the purposes of this dissertation, is best 
described with the help of its dimensions and qualities. Stankiewicz has suggested that 
the more “generic” a technology, the wider the range of its possible applications61. He 
names as examples of generic technologies laser technology, nuclear technology, protein 
engineering, and material technology. According to Stankiewicz, the generity of 
technology can be explained in more detail through two other characteristics: the 
fusibility and the modularity of technology. The fusibility of technology can be defined 
as the degree to which a technological innovation can be fused with other technologies 
to form new, hybrid technologies62. Modularity of technology can be defined as the 
degree to which a technological innovation can be modularized, thereby forming a 
platform with standardized interfaces upon which diverse systems can be built based on 
different combinations of modules63. According to Stankiewicz, both the fusibility and 
modularity of technology increase its generity.  
In addition to generity, several other dimensions of technology have also been identified 
in previous literature. Some of these dimensions are relevant when defining technology 
                                                 
60  For an extensive discussion on the many components and dimensions of technology, see Autio, E. 
1995. Symplectic and generative impacts of new, technology-based firms in innovation networks: 
An international comparative study. Doctoral dissertation, Helsinki University of Technology, 
Finland.  
61  Stankiewicz, R. Basic technologies and the innovation process. In: Sigurdson, J, (Ed.), Measuring 
the dynamics of technological change.  
62  See, for example, Kodama, F. 1992. Technology fusion and the new R&D. Harvard Business 
Review, Jul-Aug, pp. 70-78. 
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for the purpose of conceptualizing technology leveraging. The dimensions are related to 
possible restricting and enabling features in the transferability and extendability of 
different technologies into new product-markets. Such dimensions of technology 
include, for example64 whether technology is tacit or articulable, independent or an 
element of a system, and teachable or not teachable. Application specificity may be an 
important constraint to growth to new product markets. One form of this application 
specificity has been named in previous research as “technological embeddedness”65, 
which means that a firm’s technological competence is so tightly linked to its original 
context or applications that it has little or no value outside the original context or 
applications. 
Defining the boundaries of a technology area is difficult, as technologies are often a 
fusion of many component technologies. Sometimes the boundaries can be set according 
to the boundaries of an industry or a block of related industries, or alternatively they can 
be defined according to the boundaries of a certain technology as an academic 
discipline66. Scholarly interest towards “technological opportunities” is summarized in 
the following table. 
                                                                                                                                               
63  See, for example, Langlois, R. N. & Robertson, P. L. 1992. Networks and innovation in a modular 
system: Lessons from the microcomputer and stereo component industries. Research Policy, Vol. 
21, pp. 297-313. 
64  Autio, E. 1995. Symplectic and generative impacts of new, technology-based firms in innovation 
networks: An international comparative study. Doctoral dissertation, Helsinki University of 
Technology, Finland. 
65  Autio, E. 1996. In: Kuusi, O. (Ed.) Innovation systems and competitiveness. Taloustieto Oy, 
Helsinki, Finland 
66  Autio, E. 1995. Symplectic and generative impacts of new, technology-based firms in innovation 
networks: An international comparative study. Doctoral dissertation, Helsinki University of 
Technology, Finland. 
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Table 1: Technological opportunities 
Author Contribution 
Schumpeter67 The notion of a set of investment opportunities vanishing over time can be discarded because of ever-changing capital-consuming technology 
Penrose68 Technology and industrial research and development are one of several important sources of new opportunities for product diversification  
Scherer69 Technological opportunity is the most important factor behind differences in innovativeness between different industries  
Jaffe70 
In attempting to quantify technological opportunities, research and 
development and technology must be looked upon as consisting of a number 
of distinct technological areas 
Granstrand & 
Sjölander71 
Multi-technology companies acquire and exploit a variety of technologies, and 
in combining them create new opportunities  
The "technological area" or "technology domain" of a firm has been proposed to largely 
determine the technological and market opportunities that the firm has 72 73 74. The 
"technological trajectory" means the development path of a technological area; for 
example, sometimes a technological area may develop in such a way that market 
opportunities based on technology increase dramatically when applications of 
technology, which become large markets, are invented.75 
2.2 Concepts of the resource-based view 
In this chapter, concepts of the resource-based view that are important in this 
dissertation are defined. Some of these concepts have previously been defined in various 
ways, giving rise to definitions by different authors that are not always easily 
                                                 
67  Schumpeter, J. A. 1976 (orig. publ. 1943). Capitalism, socialism and democracy, George Allen and 
Unwin, London, UK.  
68  Penrose, E. 1972 (orig. publ. 1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. Basil Blackwell and 
Mott, Oxford, 5th edition.  
69  Scherer, F. M. 1980. Industrial market structure and economic performance. 2nd edition. 
Cambridge Massachusettes, USA. 
70  Jaffe, A. 1989. Characterizing the technological position of firms, with application to quantifying 
technological opportunity and research spillovers. Research Policy, Vol. 18, pp. 87-97. 
71  Granstrand, O. & Sjölander, S. 1990. Managing inovation in multi-technology corporations. 
Research Policy, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 35-60. 
72 Jaffe, A. 1989. Characterizing the technological position of firms with application to quantifying 
technological opportunity and research spillovers. Research Policy, Vol. 18, pp. 87-97. 
73  Rosenberg, N. 1984. Science, invention and economic growth, Economic Journal. 
74  Scherer, F. M. 1980. Industrial market structure and economic performance. 2nd edition. 
Cambridge, Massachusettes. 
75  Jaffe, A. 1989. Characterizing the technological position of firms, with application to quantifying 
technological opportunity and research spillovers. Research Policy, Vol. 18, pp. 87-97. 
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comparable. However, the main concepts have already been defined in ways approved 
by several of the key scholars in the field. The concepts discussed are productive 
opportunity, resources, competence, and capabilities.  
Productive opportunity 
The growth of a firm is limited by its productive opportunity and also by the productive 
objective subjectively defined by entrepreneurs. Productive opportunity consists of all 
productive possibilities that entrepreneurs see and are able and willing to take advantage 
of. Thus not seeing the opportunities, and being unable or unwilling to respond to them, 
restricts firm growth. 76 
Resources  
According to the resource-based view, a firm is a collection of resources and a set of 
functions to convert resources into competitive advantage77. While Penrose referred to 
resources as tangible and human78, Wernerfelt meant anything that could be a strength or 
weakness of a firm, that is, tangible or intangible assets tied semi-permanently to the 
firm. Within Wernerfelt's definition, the intangible assets would also include, for 
example, the organization’s values79. Barney reduced the definition to exclude the 
weaknesses of a firm; in his definition, resources are all those assets controlled by a firm 
that enable it to improve efficiency and effectiveness80. Sanchez et al. define resources 
in a similar way, as assets that are available and useful in detecting and responding to 
market opportunities and threats, but they refine the definition somewhat to further 
clarify the point that it includes capabilities as well as other forms of useful and 
available assets81.   
                                                 
76  Penrose, E. 1972 (orig. publ. 1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. Basil Blackwell and 
Mott, Oxford, 5th edition.  
77  Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 
Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 99-120. 
78  Penrose, E. 1972 (orig. publ. 1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. Basil Blackwell and 
Mott, Oxford, 5th edition.  
79  Wernerfelt, B. A. 1984. Resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 5, 
pp. 171-180. 
80  Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 
Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 99-120. 
81  Sanchez, R., Heene, A. & Thomas, H. 1997. Introduction: towards the theory and practice of 
competence-based competition. In:Dynamics of competence-based competition. Pergamon, UK.  
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Amit and Schoemaker refrain from attempting to identify which resources are actually 
useful and which not. According to them, resources can be defined as stocks of available 
factors that are owned or controlled by the firm82. In addition, these stocks or factors  
− can be converted into final products by using a wide range of other firm assets 
and bonding mechanisms such as technology, management information systems, 
incentive systems, trust between management and labor, and others 
− consist of, for example, knowledge that can be traded, such as patents and 
licenses, as well as financial and physical assets, such as property, plant, 
equipment, human capital, and so on 
− are externally available and transferable, owned or controlled by the firm, and 
convertible. 
This is in line with the systems view set out in competence literature, according to 
which the strategic usefulness of a resource depends on the way it is combined, 
coordinated, and deployed with other firm-specific and firm-addressable resources83. 
The above definition of Amit and Schoemaker is used in this dissertation as the 
definition of resources. The “stocks of factors” mentioned in the definition are here also 
defined to include all knowledge, and therefore tacit knowledge in addition to tradable 
knowledge. Penrose defines "resource" as a bundle of possible services. According to 
Penrose, resources that are not fully utilized in current operations, or that could be more 
profitably exploited through expansion, represent “unused productive services”. Unused 
productive services provide an incentive to grow, and the existing resources often set the 
direction of growth. 84  
                                                 
82  Amit, R. & Schoemaker, P. J. H. 1993. Strategic assets and organizational rent. Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 33-46. 
83  Sanchez, R. & Heene, A. 1997. Competence-based strategic management: Concepts and issues for 
theory, research, and practice. In: Sanchez, R. & Heene, A. Competence-based strategic 
management. John Wiley & Sons, UK. 
84  Penrose, E. 1972 (orig. publ. 1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. Basil Blackwell and 
Mott, Oxford, 5th edition.  
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Competence 
According to Teece, a competence is an integrated set of technological skills, 
complementary assets, and organizational routines and capacities that provide the basis 
for a firm’s competitive advantage in one or more businesses85. To be a competence, an 
activity must meet three criteria: organization, intention and goal attainment.86 
Competencies that can be called core competencies should, according to Hamel and 
Prahalad, be identified according to their extendability. They provide a basis for new 
business development and should give a company some long run competitive advantage 
by making significant contributions to the perceived customer benefits of end products. 
Core competencies should be difficult for competitors to imitate.87 
Durand88 classifies competencies into five categories. The classification is close to the 
classification of Sanchez, Heene and Thomas89. Both are shown in the table below. 
These five categories of competence include culture, organizational processes, structure, 
cognitive capabilities, and stand-alone assets.  
                                                 
85  Teece, D. 1988. Technological change and the nature of the firm. In: Dosi, G., Freeman, C., 
Nelson, R., Silverberg, G., & Soete, L. (Eds.) Technological change and economic theory. Pinter. 
86  Sanchez, R., Heene, A. & Thomas, H. 1997. Introduction: towards the theory and practice of 
competence-based competition. In:Dynamics of competence-based competition. Pergamon, UK.  
87  Prahalad, C. K. & Hamel, G. 1996. The core competence of the corporation. In: Burgelman, R. A., 
Maidique, M. A. & Wheelwright, S.C. 1996. Strategic management of technology and innovation. 
Times Mirror Higher Education Group, USA. 
88  Durand, T. 1997. Strategizing for innovation: Competence analysis in assessing strategic change. 
In: Competence-based strategic management. Heene, A. & Sanchez, R. (Eds.) John Wiley & Sons. 
UK. 
89  Sanzhez, R., Heene, A. & Thomas, H. (Eds.) 1996. Dynamics of competence-based competition: 
Theory and practice in the new strategic management. Elsevier, Oxford, UK. 
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Table 2: Components of competence90 
Durand’s interpretation of Sanchez, Heene and Thomas’ 
categories 
Durand’s 
categories 
Culture  
Organizational 
processes 
C
oo
rd
in
at
ed
 
de
pl
oy
m
en
t 
Management 
processes 
Organization and 
processes for 
coordinated 
deployment of 
assets 
Efficient processes 
Structure 
Explicit / Tacit Knowledge Individual/ collective 
Capabilities Skills 
Cognitive 
capabilities 
Brand names 
Intangible 
 Software 
Products   
Equipment  
R
es
ou
rc
es
 
Assets 
Tangible 
Buildings  
Stand-alone assets 
Capabilities  
Capabilities are a special category of intangible assets that impact the use of other 
assets, tangible and intangible91. Amit and Schoemaker define capabilities as a firm’s 
capacity to deploy resources to reach a certain goal, usually in combinations and through 
organizational processes92. The goal can be, for example, to create, produce, and offer 
products to a market. According to Sanchez et al., capabilities are repeatable patterns of 
action in the use of assets93. Skill is defined as a special form of capability, usually 
specialized in, and related to, the use of a specific asset94. 
In this dissertation technological competence and the capability to execute chosen 
strategies are treated as two separate resources. The latter is called operational 
capability, and it consists of various capabilities complementing technological 
competence. The operational capability in this dissertation is defined as a firm’s 
capability to deploy its technological competence to gain competitive advantage through 
marketable products in a specific product market. The operational capability can consist 
                                                 
90  Durand, T. 1997. Strategizing for innovation: Competence analysis in assessing strategic change. 
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Management Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 33-46. 
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of, for example, production, distribution, purchasing, marketing and sales and is often 
product-market-specific. If a firm attempting to leverage its technologies in new 
product-markets lacks the of applicable operational capability, it may be possible for the 
firm to either build or acquire this capability or outsource certain activities, which will 
often mean that parts of the operational capability are outsourced in some way.  
2.3 Technology-based product market entries  
According to the resource-based view, competence building is a process by which the 
firm achieves qualitative changes in its existing stocks of assets or capabilities. 
Maintaining a competence requires continuous adaptation to maintain an effective 
coordinated deployment of assets under changing conditions. Competence leveraging, 
on the other hand, means the application of existing competencies to current or new 
markets in ways that do not require qualitative changes in firm’s assets and capabilities. 
It may happen using the existing stocks of assets or by making quantitative changes in 
stocks of like-kind assets. Competence leveraging means the exercise of one or more of 
a firm’s existing options for action created by its prior competence building.95 In 
practice, competence leveraging often also requires building of some new competencies. 
In technology creating industries, inventions within generic technologies are leveraged. 
According to Giget96, these are often inventions that can be patented. In technology 
integrating industries, the capability to integrate certain kinds of technologies is 
leveraged.97 98 
This research uses the term “leveraging technology”. This term may be slightly 
confusing as it may be read as suggesting that the technology would be under-utilized or 
that the firm would be over-investing in research and development. This is, however, 
not how leveraging technology is understood and used in this dissertation; here, when 
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used, the term leveraging technology merely means the same as “technology-based 
growth”. Thus, in this dissertation, “leveraging technology” does not imply that firms 
would be under-utilizing their technological competencies, or over-investing in research 
and development.  
Ford and Ryan have studied exploitation of technological assets99 100. They have 
classified “marketing of technology” into three categories101: the use of technology in the 
manufacture or design of a physical product, the marketing of a service such as design 
or testing based on technology, and the sale of technology incorporated in licenses, 
patents or, for example, a department. They believe that technological competence is 
relatively under-exploited from the company and societal point of view and that 
companies should have an explicit strategy for marketing their technologies. This 
strategy should make use of all three types of technology marketing.102 Later, they103 
have elaborated the idea of improving the rate of return to companies on their 
technology investments by using the technology life cycle to illustrate marketing 
technology as completely as possible during all stages of its life cycle. They promote the 
use of highly specialized staff to plan a company’s technology marketing. 
Roberts and Berry have written on market entries104, classifying market entries according 
to how new and familiar the market is to the firm, and how new and familiar technology 
is. They define newness of technology as the degree to which that technology has not 
formerly been embodied within the products of the company. Newness of a market is 
defined as the degree to which the products of the company have not previously been 
targeted at that particular market. Familiarity with a technology is defined as the degree 
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to which knowledge of the technology exists within the company, but is not necessarily 
embodied in the products. Familiarity with a market is defined as the degree to which 
the characteristics and business patterns of the market are understood within the 
company, but not necessarily as a result of participation in the market. The following 
table shows the questions Roberts and Berry suggest for assessing the technological and 
market familiarities. 
Table 3: Roberts' and Berry's assessment of technological and market familiarity 
Tests of technological familiarity  Tests of market familiarity 
More familiar 
Is the technological capability used 
within the corporation without being 
embodied in products, for example 
required for component manufacture 
(incorporated in processes rather than 
products)? 
Do the main features of the market 
relate to or overlap existing product 
markets, for example base and new 
products are both consumer products? 
Do the main features of the new 
technology related to or overlap with 
existing corporate technological skills 
or knowledge, for example coating of 
optical lenses and aluminizing 
semiconductor substrates? 
Does the company presently 
participate in the market as a buyer 
(relevant to backward integration 
strategies)? 
Do technological skills or knowledge 
exist within the corporation without 
being embodied in products or 
processes, for example at a central 
R&D facility? 
Has the market been monitored 
systematically from within the 
corporation with a view to future entry? 
Has the technology been 
systematically monitored from within 
the corporation in anticipation of future 
utilization, for example by a technology 
assessment group? 
Does knowledge of the market exist 
within the corporation without direct 
participation in the market, for example 
as a result of previous experience of 
credible staff? 
Is relevant and reliable advice available 
from external consultants? 
 
Is relevant and reliable advice available 
from external consultants? 
Less familiar 
Roberts and Berry then discuss alternative strategies of entry to markets with different 
degrees of technology and market familiarity. The alternative entry strategies they 
discuss are internal developments, acquisitions, licensing, internal ventures, joint 
ventures or alliances, venture capital and nurturing, and educational acquisitions. With 
regard to internal developments, Roberts and Berry state as its major advantage the use 
of existing resources. Its major disadvantages, according to them, are the long time lag 
in breaking even, as well as the potential errors due to unfamiliarity with new markets. 
The time lag to break even has been found to be longer for internal corporate 
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developments than comparable businesses newly started by individuals105. Roberts and 
Berry’s explanation of this is that the overhead allocation charges of large companies, 
their attempts at large-scale entry, or objectives that preclude early profitability may 
explain the delayed profitability of the ventures. Further to the potential problems in 
internal development, it has also been suggested that forcing established attitudes and 
procedures upon a new business might severely handicap it106. According to Roberts and 
Berry, acquisitions offer a rapid market entry, but may lead to the new business area 
being unfamiliar to the parent.  
In addition to entering a new product market with a vertically integrated business model, 
technology-based product market entries can also happen through, for example, 
licensing the technology to other firms, or entering the new market with a business 
model that makes extensive use of outsourcing. The sale of technology for example in 
the form of patents can sometimes be an attractive way to leverage it, if licensing or 
entry is not attractive. In addition, in some cases, joint ventures, spin-offs and 
divestments of entire business units incorporating a certain technology can be attractive 
ways of leveraging technology in certain areas.  
                                                 
105  Weiss, L. A. 1981. Start-up businesses: a comparison of performances. Sloan Management 
Review, Fall, pp. 37-53. 
106  Miller, S. S. 1963. The management problems of diversification. New York, John Wiley & Sons. 
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3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON TECHNOLOGY-BASED PRODUCT MARKET 
ENTRIES  
An important type of technology-based growth is technology-based diversification. The 
earlier research conducted on technology-based diversification is a base for this study. 
Other streams of research have studied technology-based product market entries from 
different points of view. The research discussing new product development and 
effectiveness of research and development investments are presented in this chapter. 
3.1 Diversification research 
In this chapter, diversification research is presented at three levels that are especially 
relevant for the topic of the study. The first of these is general diversification research, 
which builds up the basis and concepts of diversification research. The second is the 
research on related diversification, which is closely linked to the resource-based view. 
The third is technology diversification research, a part of which is especially relevant for 
the current topic. 
3.1.1 General diversification research 
The pioneering works by Ansoff107, Penrose108, Gort109, Chandler110 and Rumelt111 on 
corporate diversification mainly focused on product diversification and 
internationalization. Diversity was defined as the extent to which firms were 
simultaneously active in many distinctive areas, diversification thereby meaning the 
process of increasing diversity.112  
                                                 
107  Ansoff, H. I. 1957. Strategies for diversification, Harvard Business Review, Volume 35, No. 5, pp. 
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Product diversification means increasing the number of product-markets in which the 
firm is active113 114 115. Market diversification means increasing the number of 
geographical markets in which the firm is active116 117 118. A positive relationship has been 
found between international market diversification, commonly measured in terms of 
internationalization of market operations, and growth and profitability 119 120 121 122 123 124 125. 
Internationalization offers additional demand often with no substantial requirements for 
product alteration. Scale effects help increase profitability.  
3.1.2 Related diversification research 
Related diversification has been defined as diversification based on existing resources. 
Judging industry relatedness by, for example, the commonly used industry 
classifications can cause industries to be grouped as related that, in fact, have very few 
shared resources.126 There is evidence that related diversification in many situations 
                                                 
113  Ansoff, H. I. 1957. Strategies for diversification, Harvard Business Review, Volume 35, No. 5, pp. 
113-124. 
114  Gort, M. 1962. Diversification and integration in the American industry. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA. 
115  Berry, C. H. 1975. Corporate growth and diversification. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey. 
116  Ansoff, H. I. 1957. Strategies for diversification, Harvard Business Review, Volume 35, No. 5, pp. 
113-124. 
117  Gort, M. 1962. Diversification and integration in the American industry. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA. 
118  Berry, C. H. 1975. Corporate growth and diversification. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey. 
119  Geringer, M. J., Beaish, B. W. & daCosta, R. C. 1989. Diversification strategy and 
internationalization: implications for MNE performance. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 10, 
pp. 110-119.  
120  Granstrand, O. & Sjölander, S. 1992. Internationalization and diversification of multi-technology 
corporations. In: Granstrand, O., Håkansson, L. & Sjölander, S. (Eds). Technology management 
and international business. Wiley, London, UK. 
121  Severn, A. K. &  Laurence, M. M. 1974. Direct investment, research intensity, and profitability. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 29, pp. 181-190.  
122  Leftwich, R. B. 1974. U.S. multinational companies: profitability, financial leverage and effective 
income tax rates. U.S. Survey of Current Business, Vol. 54, May, pp. 27-36. 
123  Wolf, B. M. 1977. Industrial diversification and industrialization: some empirical evidence. 
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 177-191. 
124  Rugman, A. M. 1979. International diversification and the multinational enterprise. Lexington 
Books, Lexington, Massachusettes, USA. 
125  Caves, R. E. 1974. International trade, international investments and imperfect markets. Special 
Papers in International Economics, No. 10, Department of Economics, Princeton University. 
126  Grant, R. M. & Jammine, A. P. 1988. Performance Differences Between The Wrigley / Rumelt 
Strategies. Strategic Management Journal, Chichester, Jul/Aug, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 333-347.  
   27 
succeeds better than unrelated diversification127 128 129 130 131 132 133. To be able to 
conclusively verify this, however, the choice of criteria for relatedness is crucial. This 
choice has not always been made optimally. On the business unit level, market 
relatedness seems to have a positive relationship with sales growth, while production 
relatedness has been found related to high profitability.134 This is logical, as market 
relatedness helps especially in the initial sales efficiency. Production relatedness brings 
about scale effects, which helps reduce relative costs. The research on related 
diversification strategies shares much with the resource-based view. Specifically, the 
resource-based view has contributed significantly to theory building on related 
diversification by providing theoretical explanations for the findings on the limitations 
of diversified growth, motives for diversification, direction of diversification, and 
performance of diversification.135 However, here the basic problem of resource-based 
view of defining which resources are valuable limits the conclusiveness. 
The explanation as to why related diversification tends to succeed better than unrelated 
is that the wider the diversification, the more the resources not specific to the company 
that can be expected to be employed. These resources earn lower returns than more 
company-specific resources. A resource is suggested to loose more value when 
transferred to markets that are less similar to the markets where the resource 
originated.136 Related diversification should enhance performance especially when it 
allows a business to obtain preferential access to strategic assets. It may be possible for a 
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diversified firm to use the experience it has accumulated in operating one of its 
businesses to reduce the friction it would otherwise face in building new strategic assets 
in other businesses.137 Findings on the relationship between related diversification and 
performance have remained inconclusive138. The inconclusiveness of the empirical 
findings has been explained from a theoretical perspective139 140 141 as well as on the basis 
of measures used to define and measure relatedness in diversification142 143.  
Firms diversify in part to utilize excess resources. Excess resources are not at the time 
fully deployed in ongoing business. Physical resources, most knowledge-based 
resources, and external financial resources seem to be associated with more related 
diversification. Internal financial resources, on the other hand, are seen to be associated 
with more unrelated diversification. An association has been suggested to exist between 
intangible assets and related diversification.144 According to Peteraf145, high specificity of 
expertise constrains firms from diversifying on the basis of this expertise far from their 
original business. If they find new applications for their expertise, they are likely to get 
high rents. In the same vein, she suggests that firms with less specific expertise may 
have more diversification opportunities, but can be expected to get lower rents since the 
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resource is more abundant.146  Four ways in which the firm’s assets or strategic assets 
can be further utilized through related diversification are listed:147 
−  “Amortization advantage”: related diversifiers can amortize the cost of an existing 
asset by using it to serve multiple markets 
− A strategic asset itself cannot be shared or transferred between two strategic 
business units because it is market specific, but the competence gained in the 
process of building and sustaining an existing strategic asset in one strategic 
business unit can be used to improve the quality of an existing strategic asset at 
another strategic business unit 
− A core competence developed through the experience of building strategic assets in 
existing business can be utilized to create a new strategic asset in a new business 
faster or at a lower cost 
− In the process of creating a new strategic asset required to support diversification 
into a new business, the corporation learns new competencies that can be used to 
enhance its existing strategic business units 
In practice, a reason why it may be difficult to leverage technological innovations or 
other competencies through other organizations is that the transaction costs related to 
sales of technological competencies are high. This is due to, for example, uncertainty 
about the performance of the technology, and the limited number of suppliers and 
users.148 
Measuring the relatedness of two markets 
Relatedness of two markets has been measured in, amongst others, the following ways: 
− Standard industry classification codes149 
− Research and development intensity or advertising intensity, or others, as proxies for 
underlying resources150 
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− Types and proportions of human expertise151 
− Technology inflow-outflow matrix: industry relatedness is the degree to which two 
industries rely on the same inflows of technology152 
−  “The relative distance between the knowledge needed to operate in the new domain 
and the degree of knowledge available in the current domain”153 
Corporate coherence means the extent that a firm’s constituent businesses are related to 
each other. An interesting finding by Teece et alii154 related to corporate coherence is 
that as American manufacturing firms grow more diverse, they maintain a constant level 
of coherence between neighboring activities. Firms with many activities are not 
necessarily unrelated or incoherent. The boundaries of the corporation can be 
understood in terms of learning, path dependencies, technological opportunities, the 
selection environment, and the firm’s position in complementary assets.155 
Measuring relatedness with the help of standard industry classification may exclude 
cases where two businesses are strategically related. For example, many conglomerates 
that are classified as having diversified into unrelated areas may exhibit a degree of 
strategic similarity across their business units that relates them in a cognitive sense.156 157 
A similar “dominant logic” may make the management of strategically similar 
businesses within a firm easier than the management of strategically less similar 
businesses. Dominant logic means the logic according to which managers conceptualize 
their business and make critical resource allocation decisions. Essentially dominant 
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logic is a management mindset; when managers of different units have a similar mindset 
that emphasizes similar strategic assets, the two units are “strategically related”. 158    
Strategic relatedness has been in previous research operationalized based on categories 
of strategic assets and then comparing different businesses’ perceptions of the 
importance of these categories of assets. The categories used were customer assets such 
as brand recognition and customer loyalty, and channel assets such as channel access 
and pipeline stock. Further categories include input assets such as quality of suppliers 
and financial capacity, process assets such as proprietary technology, and market 
knowledge such as accumulated information on demand or market responses.159 160 161 
Traditional measures of business relatedness are not helpful when searching for cases 
where the strategic assets that offer important sources of long-run competitive advantage 
are common across two businesses.162 Traditionally, relatedness of businesses is 
analyzed in terms of similarities in products, markets, and technologies. Alternative – 
and, for the purposes of diversification research, possibly more relevant – 
conceptualizations of relatedness are presented in the following list, which includes the 
most important criteria used by a sample of nearly 200 managers.163 
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Table 4: Different conceptualizations of relatedness 
Businesses share customers 
Businesses require same raw materials 
Businesses share manufacturing processes 
Product-market relatedness 
Businesses share distribution network 
Businesses have strong brand names 
Businesses emphasize new product development 
Businesses emphasize product design 
Differentiation relatedness 
Businesses emphasize research and development 
Furthermore, relatedness of two businesses can be assessed by evaluating the relatedness 
of the strategic assets in each. Some possible types of relatedness for strategic assets are 
listed in the following: 164   
1 Customer assets: The nature of interactions with customers is an important 
determinant of the types of assets necessary to effectively serve a market, and can be 
measured, for example, in terms of media expenditures and frequency of purchase.  
2 Channel assets: Imperfectly tradable assets that provide a basis for competitive 
advantage by improving the flow of physical product, service, and marketing 
information through the channels between manufacturers and users. These include 
relationships with networks of third-party distributors as well as marketing 
infrastructures through which manufacturers can communicate directly with users. 
Channel assets can be measured through for example channel dependence and 
amount of push marketing.  
3 Process experience assets: Superior process capabilities can open the way for a 
company to go beyond a basic, standard product to offer high-quality, differentiated 
specifications or to respond to the particular needs of individual customers. These 
process capabilities range from research and development and design skills to 
competencies in flexible manufacturing, and can be measured at industry skill level.  
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3.1.3 Technology diversification research 
Kodama165, Pavitt et al.166, and Granstrand & Sjölander167 set the basis for the 
conceptualization and operationalization of technology-based diversification. 
Granstrand168 formulates, in his words, a first draft of a theory of a technology-based 
firm. He attempts to explain strategies and growth paths of technology-intensive firms 
better than previous explanations have managed to do. He especially attempts to clarify 
the role of technology and the role of management169. The main idea of Granstrand’s 
theory is that the high investments required to develop new technological competencies 
create an incentive to leverage these competencies as widely as possible, or to find ways 
to reduce investments. Reducing the investments is possible through research and 
development rationalization and technology-related partnering, among others. These 
writings create a good foundation for understanding technology-based diversification. In 
this chapter, first the concept of technological opportunity set and its impact on 
diversification is reviewed. Then, three studies explaining the success of product 
diversification on the basis of an existing technology base are discussed. 
Technological opportunity set and diversification 
Progress of science and technology has been claimed to expand the set of technological 
opportunities170 171. Relatively recent examples of such progress are the rapid 
development of information technology, biotechnology, automation technology, and 
new materials. Furthermore, the possibilities for combining these technologies give rise 
to an expanding set of new opportunities. On the firm level, exploiting these new 
                                                 
165  Kodama, F. 1986. Technological diversification of Japanese industry. Science, July, pp. 291-296. 
166  Pavitt, K., Robson, M. & Townsend, J. 1989. Technological accumulation, diversification and 
organization in UK companies 1945-1983. Management Science, Jan. 
167  Granstrand, O. & Sjölander, S. 1990. Managing innovation in multi-technology corporations. 
Research Policy, Feb. 
168  Granstrand, O. 1998. Towards a theory of the technology-based firm. Research Policy, Sep, pp. 
465-489. 
169  For typical representations of technology and management in theories of the firm, see Granstrand, 
O. 1998. Towards a theory of the technology-based firm. Research Policy, Sep, pp. 465-489. 
170  Coombs, R., Saviotti, P. & Walsh, W. 1987. Economics and technological change. MacMillian 
Education, London, UK. 
171  Jaffe, A. B. 1989. Characterizing the “Technological position” of firms, with application to 
quantifying technological opportunity and research spillovers”. Research Policy, Vol. 18, pp. 87-
97. 
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opportunities often requires widening a firm's technology base.172 One of the 
fundamental reasons for technology diversification is the expanding technological 
opportunity set. It has been proposed that technological and market opportunities may 
vary systematically according to technological area173 174 175.  
According to Granstrand, increased technological opportunities can lead to sales growth 
through at least three different ways as listed below176. This can be compared to the 
previously discussed growth strategies pointed out by the research on related 
diversification, which focus on utilizing the existing opportunities. 
− Static economies of scale, that is, using the same technology in different products 
with minor adaptation costs. Static economies of scale are significant when a 
technology has a wide applicability to many different areas in a corporation, for 
example, in the case of generic technologies. 
− Dynamic economies of scale achieved through improving knowledge through 
multiple applications 
− Cross-fertilization of technologies yielding new inventions, new functionalities, as 
well as increased product performance and better processes 
Product diversification to utilize existing technology base 
In an attempt to justify the high costs of research and development, firms have sought 
different means of leveraging research and development investments more extensively. 
Product diversification has been suggested to pose the highest requirements for 
managerial resources177. Reasons for this may be the requirements of product 
diversification for new market knowledge as well as new applications of technology.   
                                                 
172  Oskarsson, C. 1993. Technology diversification: The phenomenon, its causes and effects. 
Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden. 
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176  Granstrand, O. 1998. Towards a theory of the technology-based firm. Research Policy, Sep, pp. 
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177  Granstrand, O. 1998. Towards a theory of the technology-based firm. Research Policy, Sep, pp. 
465-489. 
   35 
The causal relationship between diversification and growth has been researched. The 
results indicate that technology-based diversifying firms grow more than other 
diversifying firms do178. Different types of diversifying firms were classified the 
following way:179 
− Firms diversifying their business based on their technology base: technology 
diversification is followed by product diversification and internationalization 
− “Stick to the knitting”: technology diversification followed by internationalization or 
product diversification, or internationalization followed by product specialization 
− Market specializers: increased technology diversification followed by product 
diversification, and then followed by market specialization 
− Defenders: specialize both product-wise and market-wise, and sometimes even 
technology-wise  
Technology diversification may lead to product diversification. Oskarsson found 
product diversification to be probably the most important driver of above average 
growth. Initial technology diversification may open up possibilities for product 
diversification in areas not initially targeted. Realizing these opportunities may require 
additional technology diversification, which can lead to additional opportunities. 
Increased technology diversification can thus cause increased research and development 
expenditures, which can be a reason for increased product diversification.180 181 Overall, 
according to over 20 case studies of European, American and Japanese firms, the fastest 
growth seemed to be created by first diversifying the technology base, and subsequently 
entering new product markets and internationalizing.182  
                                                 
178  Sjölander, S. & Oskarsson, C. 1995. Diversification: exploiting the flow of technology. A Swedish 
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Silverman183 has studied product diversification from the viewpoint that firms diversify 
to exploit their existing resource base. The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 
several hundreds of companies in the USA. The aim was to clarify reasons for 
diversifying. One factor used to explain diversification was the absolute and relative 
technological resource applicability. This factor influenced which markets the firms 
entered and the order in which they entered them. Technological resources were 
operationalized at a more detailed level than in prior studies, and it could be shown that 
the predictive power of the resource-based view of the firm can be greatly improved 
when resources are measured at a finer level. Another factor used to explain 
diversification was the contractual hazards. They were found to influence the choices 
between a hierarchical or market mode of entry. Principles from transaction cost 
economics were integrated into resource-based predictions concerning diversification to 
test the common assumption that rent-generating resources are too asset-specific to 
allow contracting. As a result, Silverman identified circumstances where resources can 
be, and are, exploited through contracting, rather than through diversification. Similar 
research regarding resource exploitation through diversification would be needed. 
3.2 Research on new product development  
Research on new product development is relevant to understanding technology-based 
product-market entries because these entries often require the development of a new 
product. A reason for the need for a new product is that a firm’s existing products are 
often not suited for serving the needs of the new markets, which it wants to enter. 
Following Krishnan and Ulrich184, new product development is here defined as a 
transformation of a market opportunity into a product available for sale. New product 
development has been widely discussed in fields as varied as marketing, organizations, 
operations management, and engineering design.  
                                                 
183  Silverman, B. S. 1999. Technological resources and the direction of corporate diversification: 
toward an integration of the resource-based view and transaction cost economies. Management 
Science, pp. 1109-1124. 
184  Krishnan, V. & Ulrich, K. T. 2001. Product development decisions: A review of literature. 
Management Science, January, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 1-21. 
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According to a meta-analysis of previous empirical research on new product 
performance185, a wide range of antecedent factors can influence the outcomes of new 
product development activity. The meta-analysis reveals a wide variety of study designs 
and methodological approaches. A wide variation in results was also found. Although 
some consistency as to which factors are considered by researchers was revealed, the 
range of factors considered in each study was found to be narrow.  
An approach that seems fruitful for integrating the antecedent factors that seem to 
influence new product development outcomes is conceptualizing new product 
development as a decision-making process, as opposed to concentrating on 
environmental and contextual decisions186. This “decision perspective” on new product 
development describes product development in a way that is both comprehensive and 
parsimonious because it cuts across the functional perspectives without getting involved 
in the mechanics of how decisions are made187. An assumption underlying this 
perspective is that an organization manages uncertainty through information 
processing188 189.  
Product development decisions can be organized into two broad categories190: decisions 
made within the context of a single project in actually developing the product and 
decisions in establishing an organizational context and in planning development 
projects. In their literature review, Krishnan and Ulrich191 have used this categorization 
as the basic framework to further classify previous empirical research in order to 
provide an overview of what is known about new product development. They classify 
the previous research under decisions that need to be made in different phases of new 
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product development. Decisions within a project as categorized by Krishnan and Ulrich 
in their literature review are listed in Appendix 1. This is an exhaustive summary of the 
previous research and points out that new product decisions have not previously been 
studied from the managerial perspective of this dissertation. 
Of the phases of decision-making in new product development, the previous research on 
concept development is most relevant for the present research. Concept development is 
addressed by research on attribute-based assessing of customer needs192, which suggests, 
for example, conjoint analysis as a structured approach to optimally determine the target 
values of product attributes. Here, it is to be kept in mind that the embodiment of 
attributes into a technological approach must also be addressed in concept design193.  
Decisions in setting up a project as categorized by Krishnan and Ulrich in their literature 
review are also listed in Appendix 1. High-level product strategy and planning are 
important decisions influencing setting up a new product development project. A firm’s 
target market, product mix, project prioritization, resource allocation, and technology 
selection have a significant influence on the probability of economic success194. In 
deciding which product opportunities to pursue, a possible mistake is to focus on only 
the markets where the company is already present: data from the disk drive industry has 
been used to show that previously successful firms often fail to recognize technological 
or market shifts, because product planning is biased toward existing markets195.  
The results of an empirical study of 120 completed development projects for assembled 
goods by Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss196 show that organizational process factors are 
associated with achievement of operational outcome targets for product quality, unit 
cost, and time-to-market. The organizational process factors measured in the study were 
process concurrency, process formality, and process adaptability. Process concurrency 
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refers to the degree of simultaneity in the design engineering and manufacturing 
engineering efforts. Process formality refers to existence of an overall organizational 
process and structure of the project. Process adaptability refers to flexibility during the 
project to meet emerging circumstances, and represents discretion available to the 
project management. Operational outcomes that were measured were product quality, 
unit cost, and time-to-market. Achievement of operational outcomes was found to aid 
achievement of market outcomes. Measured market outcomes were customer 
satisfaction and relative sales. The findings were robust under conditions of 
technological, market and environmental uncertainty. 197  
It was also hypothesized that technology novelty would moderate the relationship 
between all three process factors and operational outcomes. These hypotheses did not 
however receive support. It was not considered that technology novelty could also 
impact market outcomes directly through new product features, customers’ perceptions 
of functional and feature quality, and marketing and sales personnel’s lack of knowledge 
of the new technology and its features. Measures of operational outcomes such as 
product quality, unit cost, and time-to-market do not measure the success of the product 
in the market. Technology novelty can impact market outcomes as well. The 
relationship of technology novelty and market outcomes was not tested. Market newness 
was not found to moderate the relationship between operational outcomes and market 
outcomes.198  
The relationship of research and development investments to firm performance has been 
the subject of much research. It seems to have been confirmed that research and 
development investments, with some time lag, increase performance199 200: specifically 
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growth201 202 as well as likelihood of maintaining market share203. However, also 
disconfirming results exist204 205. 
Many researchers have investigated which factors moderate the relationship of research 
and development investments and growth. Factors that have been confirmed to have 
such a moderating impact are whether and how the firm is diversified206 207 208 209 210, and 
what its technology strategy is like. In these studies, technology strategy has been 
defined merely as the targeting of research and development investments and 
management of research and development, not taking into consideration strategies for 
commercializing technological competence211 212 213. More specifically, technology 
strategy has been defined as matching research and development to market needs, 
decreasing time to market for new products, and the management of research and 
development with constrained resources. Indeed, it has been pointed out that research 
and development strategy should be linked to overall corporate strategy, but no concepts 
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have been presented as to how this can be achieved. 214 A construct named the “overall 
R&D managerial capability” has been shown to be related to sales growth. This 
capability was defined as research and development meeting its project-level objectives 
and schedule, technical performance and budgeted cost. It has been pointed out that in 
order to uncover relationships between technology measures and profitability, the 
intervening variables at the level of strategy development and implementation should be 
taken into account.215 The impact of organizational form as well as control and incentive 
systems on research and development investments and innovation has also been 
researched. 216 217 218 
Based on their extensive literature review, Krishnan and Ulrich219 suggest several topics 
for further research within new product development. In their view, product planning 
decisions and development metrics seem particularly ad hoc in industrial practice. Only 
a few research results seem to provide answers to the question of how to integrate the 
efficiency issues associated with the use of product platforms with the market benefits 
of high product variety. They see an opportunity to bring together market, product and 
process considerations on the decision of what products to develop, when and with what 
level of sharing resources. Product definition, development, launch and management are 
highly contingent on market uncertainty and other environmental characteristics220.  
Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss221 identify fruitful future areas for research on new 
product development. According to them, future research is needed to incorporate other 
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important antecedents to development performance, such as product portfolio 
composition, project leader characteristics, project task characteristics such as project 
complexity, competitive market intelligence, market orientation, market attractiveness, 
resource uncertainty, and competitive intensity. In addition, Tatikonda and Montoya-
Weiss suggest that the uncertainty variables of their research should be examined in 
greater detail. They suggest that the focus of future research should be re-directed 
towards project planning. They emphasize the importance of project planning because 
this is when organizational process factors and operational outcome targets are set, 
technology alternatives are investigated, and important product market choices are 
made. The variety and magnitude of uncertainties a development project faces in its 
execution are a function of choices made in project planning. The organizational process 
factors and the desired target levels of development outcomes are key managerial 
decision variables. Therefore, according to Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss, future 
research is needed to investigate who in the organization makes these decisions, and the 
nature of their influence on the decision-making process. 
3.3 Summary of previous research on technology-based product market entries  
Technology-based product market entries have been previously researched from several 
perspectives. Diversification research has attempted to identify successful growth paths 
through leveraging technology in new product and geographical markets. An important 
notion that has been established in the resource-based research on related diversification 
is that the relatedness of two markets is more accurately defined by the relatedness of 
the resources employed in the industries than by the commonly used industry 
classification-based measures. This is an important finding, the application of which has 
the potential of enhancing the conclusiveness of the findings of future diversification 
research, as well as of the present research, as market relatedness is one of the most 
important concepts of diversification research. New product development research has 
discovered many antecedents to outcomes of product development, thereby supporting 
the research of technology-based product market entries, as technology-based product 
market entries are in many cases achieved through development of new products.  
These streams of research have clarified many aspects of technology-based product 
market entries, yet they leave important questions unanswered. Until now, 
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diversification research has concentrated mainly on trying to explain companies’ growth 
paths as can be seen in their presence in industry classification code groups, which may 
ignore very closely related diversification or technology leveraging222. In addition, even 
diversification research with a resource-based perspective has mainly concentrated on 
topics that can be researched with the help of large, existing databases223. For this 
reason, internal company management, competence, and organizational factors as 
antecedents to diversification choices and success have not yet received as much 
attention as they would deserve.  
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4 RESEARCH APPROACHES 
Two research approaches, the resource-based view and decision-making research, will 
be discussed in this chapter as a basis for understanding factors affecting leveraging of 
technology in new product markets. Some of the main theoretical arguments of the 
resource-based view highlight the importance of managerial resources for achieving 
growth. Other factors proposed by the resource-based view as important determinants of 
growth are knowledge concerning growth opportunities and risk and uncertainty related 
to individual growth projects. The success of individual projects is important, not only 
for the sake of growth from an individual project, but also for decreasing the perceived 
risk and uncertainty and thus encouraging managers to undertake more of such projects. 
Furthermore, often the growth projects form a basis for further growth projects. The 
importance of these factors is closely linked to the importance of managerial resources. 
The way that managerial resources concretely impact is through decision-making; 
strategic decision-making processes are incorporations of managerial services. Decision-
making researchers have modeled strategic decision-making processes and their impact 
on outcomes of projects. In Sections 1 and 2 the theoretical arguments based on the 
resource-based view and decision-making research leading to the hypotheses are 
presented. In Section 3, the hypotheses are summarized and a model of factors affecting 
technology-based product market entries in new markets is presented.    
4.1 Resource-based view 
The traditional industrial organization approach to strategy research has as its basic 
assumption that the industry requirements determine which resources are needed to 
compete. In contrast, the resource-based view takes the resources of a firm as the 
starting point and attempts to identify the most attractive industries for their 
deployment. Resources are considered more difficult and time-consuming to develop 
and imitate than market-specific knowledge. Especially with regard to unstable 
environments, proponents of the resource-based view argue that firm-specific resources 
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and capabilities provide a more durable basis for strategy formulation than product-
market positioning224. Furthermore, a central difference in comparison to the industrial 
organization approach is that within the resource-based view it is seen that an 
entrepreneur has the possibility of altering the environmental conditions into his or her 
favor225. The main explanation for performance differences between firms is that 
competitive advantage arises from the fact that resources are heterogeneously distributed 
among firms and resources differ in their potential to generate rents for the firm226.  
Imperfect transplantability of resources has been proposed to constrain their leveraging. 
This means that it may not always be possible to utilize a resource in a new market. The 
imperfect transplantability may be due to a characteristic of a resource that ties it to the 
original use. Another reason may be extensive investments required for applying a 
resource to another use. These investments may take the form of building extensive new 
operational capabilities, for example. Transplantability is also weakened by the 
managerial inability to perceive opportunities for wider utilization of the resource. 227  
Edith Penrose228, to whom the birth of the resource-based view is attributed, described 
many of the central ideas. Her main propositions were that a firm is a collection of 
material and human productive resources and administrative tasks, and firm growth is a 
process of using these resources to exploit the “productive opportunity”, and to increase 
the resource base. The existing resource base and the availability of managerial and 
entrepreneurial capacity limit growth. Specialization is necessary for the process of 
growth, and causes a need for even further growth and diversification to fully utilize the 
unused production capacity.  
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Wernerfelt229 and Rumelt230 re-surfaced the view of firms as collections of resources 
rather than sets of product-market positions, and launched the term “resource-based”. 
Wernerfelt described the firm’s operations in terms of resource-position barriers and 
resource-product matrices. Rumelt studied unique resources and management’s 
criticality. Within the evolutionary economics research stream, Nelson and Winter 
clarified the context for the resource-based view by describing the evolutionary 
processes through which resources are born231. Barney232 coined some of the assumptions 
of the resource-based view that became fundamental for much of the research to follow. 
These include the arguments that resources can produce a competitive advantage if they 
are rare and valuable, and that this competitive advantage can be sustained if the 
resources are inimitable, non-substitutable, and imperfectly transferable. A newer 
research stream has focused on the interdependencies between competencies instead of 
single resources or capabilities233 234 235. 
Despite its wide acceptance among strategy researchers, the resource-based view has 
recently been criticized for a lack of rigorous theory-building236 and tautological 
definitions237. The most severe problem seems to be defining a resource without 
referring to performance, which causes the accusations of tautology. Some researchers 
have attempted to clarify the core concepts by applying definitions and drawing parallels 
from other, more established theories. An example of such an attempt is Williamson’s 
comparison of “governance and competence perspectives”238. He uses the bounded 
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rationality concept from behavioral theory of the firm to characterize the human actors 
of the resource-based view, and, as the unit of analysis, he compares the concept of 
routines from evolutionary theory with the resources of the resource-based view. 
According to Williamson, the resource-based view “rejects the idea of the firm as a 
production function and emphasizes management and organization features instead”.  
4.1.1 Firm level constraints to growth 
Penrose has in her classic book “The theory of the growth of the firm” taken a holistic 
look at the firm level constraints to growth. She states the following as the main 
constraints: a firm’s productive opportunity, managerial resources, risk and uncertainty, 
and complex impacts of firm size and previous firm growth. According to Penrose, 
managerial services are the most important determinant of firm growth. Management 
chooses, plans, implements and controls the opportunities that lead to the growth of the 
firm. With managerial resources is here meant the number of managers, whereas 
managerial services means the services the managers are able to provide for the firm, 
which is a function of both the number and knowledgeability of the managers. Penrose 
points out that managerial services available for growth are the total managerial services 
available to a firm minus the managerial services required for operating the firm in 
existing circumstances. In large firms, the total planning task is so extensive that 
specialized personnel can be continuously occupied with planning.239 Managerial 
services available for growth set a limit to how much growth can be planned because all 
growth plans absorb some of the managerial services available. The amount of growth 
limits the amount of new personnel that can be profitably absorbed during the next 
period. 240  
Growth of managerial services determines the fastest possible pace of growth of a firm. 
The reason for this is that essentially all other resources can be increased at a faster 
pace. Managerial services can be increased only at a restricted pace because the 
“managerial resource” providing the services is not just a sum of individual managers, 
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but a team. The members of this team must be able to trust each other and coordinate 
activities efficiently with each other.  New managers cannot successfully be hired at just 
any targeted fast growth rate, but limits of learning and integration are even more 
important than for other resource acquisitions.241 
Within the resource-based view, several empirical studies have touched upon issues and 
phenomena closely related to technology-based product market entries. These have most 
often been studies within research on related diversification. The operationalization of 
the resource-based view of diversification has been limited to broad categorizations of 
resources and the industries in which they might be applicable, while the management 
or processes of diversification lack research242. Therefore, the resource-based view of 
diversification could be enhanced with a better understanding of the role of managerial 
resources in the process of growth.  
Finding growth opportunities that are large relative to firm size would seem likely to get 
more difficult as the firm grows. Large firms are likely to have a wider range of 
complementary capabilities to support the implementation of the projects, and may 
therefore succeed better in implementing them. Firms with a high growth orientation in 
terms of high past growth and high growth aspiration are likely to set the growth 
expectations regarding the leveraging projects on a high level. Research and 
development intensive firms seem likely to get involved in large-scale projects where 
fundamentally different products are created. Less R&D intensive firms seem more 
likely to get involved in smaller-scale improvement projects.  Firms with extensive 
managerial resources available for growth are likely to be actively looking for growth 
opportunities and creating conditions where starting even experimental, uncertain 
projects on a small scale is possible. The first hypothesis concerns the impact of firm 
level constraints on technology leveraging projects.   
H1: Firm level factors related to technology leveraging influence the goal 
setting in technology leveraging projects and success of the projects. 
                                                 
241  Penrose, E. 1972 (orig. publ. 1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. Basil Blackwell and 
Mott, Oxford, 5th edition.  
242  Silverman, B. S. 1999. Technological resources and the direction of corporate diversification: 
toward an integration of the resource-based view and transaction cost economies. Management 
Science, pp. 1109-1124. 
   49 
 H1a: Large firm size reduces growth expectations from a leveraging project in 
relation to firm size. 
H1b: Large firm size reduces deviation from expectations in a leveraging 
project. 
H1c: High growth orientation increases growth expectations from a leveraging 
project   
H1d: Research and development intensity of the firms increases growth 
expectations from a project in relation to firm size. 
H1e: Managerial resources available for growth support involvement in many 
small-scale leveraging projects.  
Several more recent streams of research within the resource-based view shed light on 
some aspects of managerial resources. Strategic planning243 244, administrative skills245 
and management skills246 have been researched as resources potentially giving a single 
firm sustainable competitive advantage. These studies, however, have addressed 
managerial resources from a functional or a skill viewpoint. The issue of whether the 
investments of scarce managerial resources in generating growth instead of only 
operatively managing existing business are justified has not been researched at the level 
of detail of the number of managers available for growth.  
A related research stream also emphasizing the importance of managerial resources 
concentrates on dynamic capabilities247 248. Eisenhardt defines dynamic capabilities as 
specific and identifiable processes such as product development, strategic decision-
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making and alliancing. According to her, they are not themselves sources of long-term 
competitive advantage, as they are not necessarily rare, inimitable or non-substitutable. 
However, long-term competitive advantage can be gained by firms that use dynamic 
capabilities “sooner, more astutely, or more fortuitously” 249 than the competition to 
create resource re-combinations with long-term competitive advantage. Such advantage 
is seldom achieved in dynamic markets. Therefore, especially in dynamic markets, 
dynamic capabilities can be important, as firms may be able to compete by creating a 
series of temporary competitive advantages.250  
In relation to dynamic capabilities Powell251 discusses “strategic planning” from a 
resource-perspective. He also comes to the conclusion that strategic planning does not 
satisfy the criteria for sustainable advantage. This is because strategic planning is easily 
imitated and may be substitutable. Strategic planning and financial performance were 
mostly not related in his study. They were, however, positively related when an industry 
was found to have strategic factor market imperfections. It should be noted that Powell’s 
research was limited to formal planning. According to Powell’s more recent study252, 
administrative skills provide an important source of competitive advantage. He names, 
in particular, skills such as aligning an organization’s structure, strategy making, and the 
environment as such skills. According to his study, administrative skills account for a 
significant proportion of profitability variance, explaining more than industry or 
strategic group membership. 
Also research on corporate entrepreneurship highlights the importance of availability of 
managerial services for growth253 254 255 256. Within this research stream, it has been 
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proposed that despite potential contributions of entrepreneurial activities to shareholder 
value creation, executives may not support them due to risk aversion257 258. Zahra and 
Covin have empirically researched financial consequences of corporate 
entrepreneurship259. The results suggest that corporate entrepreneurship may provide an 
effective means for improving long-term company financial performance.  
The importance of the managerial component to firm performance has also been studied 
in research examining the effectiveness of research and development investments. 
Researchers have investigated which factors moderate the relationship of research and 
development investments and growth. Such factors relating to the managerial 
component are technology strategy as matching research and development to market 
needs 260 261 262 263, management of R&D, and organizational form as well as control and 
incentive systems with regard to R&D264 265 266. These factors, however, concentrate 
mainly on how research and development investments should be allocated to produce 
optimal returns on these investments, not on the role of the managerial component in 
finding and exploiting business opportunities based on technological competencies 
produced through the investments. Hitt and Lee suggest that studying the impact of 
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technological learning and management of knowledge on growth is important for 
clarifying the relationship of research and development investments, technological 
competence and firm growth267. According to them, this relationship has been 
theoretically explored, but no cohesive empirical evidence seems yet to exist268. 
Finally, it has been suggested that firms may be able to circumvent managerial limits to 
growth by using contractual organizational forms such as franchising. New and growing 
firms have a disproportionate preference for contractual organizational forms269. One 
reason for this is that contractual organizational forms allow resource-constrained firms 
to gain control over co-specialized assets270, and seem to allow firms to grow faster by 
overcoming managerial limits to growth271.  
Knowledge concerning growth 
The services that managers are able to provide to the firm depend on the number of 
managers as well as their knowledge concerning growth. Knowledge development is a 
path-dependent process272. New knowledge can more easily be built on, and related to, 
existing knowledge of the organization than on completely new areas. The search for 
new knowledge is often local in that it is close to current knowledge273 274; firms develop 
knowledge through a problem solving process that explores alternatives in the 
neighborhood of existing knowledge. Thus the existing knowledge base of a firm 
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defines a space in which the firm will search for problem solutions275. The cumulative 
nature of knowledge and the local search leads to a firm’s knowledge developing 
according to a knowledge trajectory276.  
Firms may need to acquire knowledge outside their existing knowledge trajectory to 
change their capability base277. This may be difficult because of a potential need to 
unlearn some of the existing knowledge278, and because of not recognizing information 
and knowledge as valuable when judging it against the existing knowledge279. Failing to 
recognize the value of information when judging it against the existing knowledge can 
arise for two reasons: the existing knowledge functions as a filter admitting only 
information and knowledge that fits into the existing mental models280 281 and the firm 
actively suppresses information or knowledge that contradicts the knowledge base282 283. 
Even a high level of knowledge concerning growth opportunities cannot assure that all 
productive opportunities are detected. Knowledge is, however, likely to increase the 
number of opportunities detected 284.  
The nature of technology has been proposed to set boundaries to the number of 
opportunities it can be expected to entail 285 286 287. Technological opportunities can be 
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defined as executives’ perceptions of the ability to support and generate growth 
opportunities through product and process innovations. These have been claimed to vary 
considerably industry by industry288. Industries with high levels of perceived 
technological opportunities are characterized as having rapid and frequent product and 
process technology introductions, and high levels of research and development spending 
and patenting. To succeed in these kinds of industries, managers need large amounts of 
information on competition, markets, and customers289.  
Factors such as uncertainty, complexity and inter-organizational conflicts affect 
managerial decisions concerning resources290. In addition, behavior with respect to the 
utilization of firm resources becomes routinized over time. Knowledge-enhancing 
activities such as corporate venturing can offer a mechanism for breaking out of the 
routines and gaining access to new resources and information.291 The literature on the 
application of options theory in strategy conceptualizes finding, choosing and 
concretizing a firm’s growth opportunities. Central to this view is the point that 
opportunities for strategic action can be realized when decision-makers recognize them. 
The option bundle can contain several options awaiting recognition. Recognition of an 
option on a particular investment opportunity makes it more likely that a strategy to 
capture that opportunity will emerge.292 However, opportunities do not always need to be 
recognized early and captured through a conscious strategy; they can also become 
captured gradually as by-products of implementing other strategies.  
Complementing the contributions of the psychological and behavioral views of firms, an 
options perspective can make economical modeling of organizational intuition more 
possible, help make organizational intuition more explicit, and create an economic logic 
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for the behavioral process of incremental resource investment. 293 294 295 296 Especially in 
uncertain conditions, application of options theory to strategy seems to have advantages 
297 298 299.  
Incorporating evaluation of opportunities into management processes throughout the 
organization may sensitize the organization to opportunities that have not been utilized. 
According to the application of options theory in strategy, opportunity recognition can 
be facilitated with organizational processes300 301 302 303. Opportunities are often evaluated 
through a qualitative and unstructured assessment on top of the firm’s normal 
assessment, which uses investment criteria based on the cash flow-based calculations. 
The former is unlikely to incorporate as much of the information concerning the value 
of the opportunities existing in the organization as would be possible with a more 
structured and comprehensive approach. Establishing explicit ways of evaluating the 
opportunity value of technology as a part of the management system of the company 
could help in identifying opportunities. Explicit valuation of opportunities that 
technologies entail would seem likely to increase discussion within the firm about these 
opportunities. Such discussion could increase understanding of the opportunities. This 
“explicit valuation” can be compared with “implicit valuation”. In “implicit valuation” 
technologies are expected to entail some opportunities. Individual employees have 
perhaps even explicitly evaluated the expected opportunities, but such statements have 
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not been commonly made throughout the organization. Through uncovering at least 
some of the option value, “explicit valuation” of opportunities that technologies entail 
may help discover the attractiveness of long-term investments into more generic 
capability platforms based on the firm’s technologies. A possible way of more explicitly 
evaluating the opportunities is to conceptualize them as options. Managers already 
intuitively use many of the concepts of the options theory304. Making these concepts 
explicit could enhance the quality of decision-making related to uncertain projects.  
4.1.2 Risk and uncertainty related to individual technology-leveraging projects 
Risk and uncertainty related to individual growth projects may restrict the expansion 
plans of the firm305. More information and better planning can reduce the uncertainty. 
Information gathering and planning require managerial resources. Some uncertainty will 
always remain. Usually, the limit for an acceptable risk level is set by firm-specific 
traditions. The more risky a project, the greater the need for managerial services to deal 
with uncertainty. Perceived risk and uncertainty of growth projects lead to a need for 
managerial resources for planning, analysis, and implementation. In addition, perceived 
risk and uncertainty can render managers more hesitant in becoming involved in growth 
projects. The more unfamiliar the new market, and the greater the need for more 
investments, the higher the perceived risk and uncertainty that can be assumed.  
As growth proceeds into increasingly unknown areas, the new activities become less 
familiar and more effort is required of the management306. Applicability of existing 
operational capabilities in the newly entered markets would seem to reduce the need for 
managerial capacity for two reasons. First, the applicability of existing operational 
capabilities in the entered market is a measure of how familiar the market is; if the 
market is very dissimilar to the firm’s previous markets, the operational capabilities are 
less likely to be applicable. Entering a more similar market is likely to require less 
managerial capacity for planning the entry, as more assumptions about the market can 
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be made without an extensive information search. New knowledge is easier to 
understand in a familiar area than in an unfamiliar area307. Second, applicability of 
existing capabilities in the new market reduces the managerial capacity needed for 
acquiring or building the necessary operational capabilities.  
From resource based view’s foundation-laying writings, the research stream has 
developed to explain how firm-specific skills, competencies, and other tangible or 
intangible resources can be viewed as the basis for a firm’s competitive advantage308 309 
310. The match between resources and strategies is seen as related to firm performance311. 
Resource complementarities have a role in this relationship. Resource complementarity 
means that performing one activity increases the returns on performing another312. The 
value of a resource may depend on the availability of other resources313. Resource 
complementarities can be, for example, technical, political, economic, and cognitive314. 
Importance of complementary resources has also been emphasized in resource-based 
research on the antecedents to diversification315. 
In addition to enabling growth, existing resources316 317 318 or the firm’s previous 
activities319 can also restrictively determine the direction of growth. An additional 
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possible restriction to growth is that established routines, existing dominant logic320 321 
322, knowledge biases and structural inertia may prevent the adoption of new 
perspectives, routines and new priorities required by a new business venture323. They 
may prevent a firm from recognizing an opportunity at all324. Changes in intangible 
assets may be more difficult to implement than changes in tangible assets325 326. One 
reason to this is that the culture and strategy of an organization need to be adapted to its 
current environment, but in a way that does not harm the company’s ability to adjust to 
radical changes in that environment.327  
Technology leveraging projects involve lots of learning. Learning is a dynamic process, 
which cannot be planned very well. Therefore, the successful project teams are likely to 
be small and empowered. Such teams are only viable if the project is in the beginning 
scoped as relatively small. Other reasons for better success of smaller projects may be 
their easier management due to their lower complexity, and the pressure to succeed due 
to limited funds. This is in line with the propositions of corporate venturing literature 
that tight financing328 and staged structure329 make the likelihood of success higher. 
Additionally, literature on application of options theory to strategy suggests a similar 
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logic330 331 332 333 334 335 336, albeit with even further developed implications. Projects with 
high growth expectations may reach their goals less often than those with low growth 
expectations for one of two basic reasons:  First, the expectations may be set at too 
optimistic a level. Second, even if the expectations are set at a "correct” level, the 
project can still be large or small. Large projects can be more difficult to implement 
because of more complexity, even if they would receive more management attention.    
H2: Smaller project size reduces deviation from expectations. 
According to the resource-based view, applicability of existing operational capabilities 
in a new market reduces the risk and uncertainty of the entry 337 338 339 340. Examining the 
risk and uncertainty directly is difficult for two reasons. First, it is difficult to find direct, 
objective measures of the risk and uncertainty of individual growth projects. Second, 
assessments concerning risk and uncertainty provided in surveys by personnel involved 
in growth projects are subject to a significant post rationalization bias. Therefore, the 
dependent variable chosen for studying factors affecting the level of risk and uncertainty 
in technology leveraging projects is deviation of the projects’ results from the results 
expected. The third hypothesis concerns the impact of the applicability of existing 
operational capabilities in the market entered on the deviation from expectations. Also 
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investments in technology and marketing and sales are measured as an aspect of 
applicability of existing operational capabilities in the entered market. 
H3a: Applicability of the existing operational capabilities in the entered market 
reduces deviation from expectations of an individual technology-leveraging 
project. 
H3b: In technology-leveraging projects, applicability of technology is the most 
critical, thereafter applicability of marketing and sales, and last applicability of 
operations. 
In technology-leveraging projects, technology is the core capability. Therefore the 
strength of this competence in the new market seems like the most important of the 
three types of operational capabilities.  Strength of marketing and sales capabilities is 
important in a market entry. Therefore this is on second place. Operations comes last as 
it does not seem to have a similar critical position as the two other capabilities. 
Operations can often be outsourced. 
The impact of the applicability of existing operational capabilities in the new market has 
been empirically tested with varying results. It has been proposed that entrants are likely 
to perform well in the newly entered industry when their respective parent firms possess 
the skills and resources critical for competitiveness compared to the incumbents of the 
industry entered 341 342 343. On the other hand, an entering firm may be able to gain 
competitive advantage over incumbents by leveraging key skills that are not widespread 
in the industry344. Focus should be on the potential to exploit economies of scale and 
scope between related businesses345 346. Empirical research which has been 
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operationalized unsuitably for revealing resource relatedness has failed to find support 
for the proposition that familiarity increases the likelihood of success in product market 
entries347. In the research in question348, resource relatedness was operationalized 
according to a functional emphasis. Relatedness of the original and entered industries 
was measured according to standard industry classification codes. These measures are 
poorly suited to revealing resource relatedness.  
Using a resource-based approach to modeling interrelationships among businesses has 
received empirical support when applied to the analysis of financial performance of 
large manufacturing firms on the corporate level349. Good results have also been 
received from looking at human expertise similarity to reveal and explain patterns in 
diversification350. Furthermore, in a study combining the skill and physical bases of 
relatedness a positive effect on most indicators of performance was empirically 
confirmed351. The resource perspective has been confirmed as a relevant approach to 
modeling interrelationships among businesses.  
It might be argued that the complementary capabilities required for leveraging 
technology can be acquired, learned or built quickly, and with little risk. In that case, 
whether or not the existing marketing and operational capabilities fit in the new market 
would not greatly impact the deviation from expectations of leveraging projects. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate Hypothesis 3. 
To summarize this chapter: the figure below presents the main contributions of the 
resource-based view to the understanding of related diversification and leveraging of 
technology. From the viewpoint of the resource-based view, two questions would seem 
to be important for a better understanding of leveraging of technology. The first one of 
these is: What is the impact of the availability of managerial services for growth on firm 
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growth? The second is: What is the impact of the applicability of existing operational 
capabilities in the new market on the success of leveraging projects?   
 
Sequential entry strategy: It is often better to
develop the resource in one market and then
enter other markets from a strong resource
position
Application-specificity of resources leads to
high rents and imperfect transplantability
Related diversification supports more
extensive exploitation of application-specific
resources than unrelated diversification
Resource-based view:
leveraging of technology
Important to assess the impact of
applicability of existing operational
capabilities in the new market on success
of technology leveraging projects
Important to model managerial competence
in choosing from the “productive
opportunities”
Missing pieces concerning
leveraging of technology
Resources are the starting point, the most
attractive industries for their deployment
should be identified
− Development of resources more
difficult than learning the industry
specificities needed for their
deployment
− Especially in unstable
environments the firm-specific
resources and capabilities provide
a more durable basis for strategy
formulation than product-market
positioning
Resource complementarity means that
doing one activity increases the returns to
doing another
“Productive opportunities” are unlimited,
and thus all of them cannot be exploited.
Therefore, managerial competence is an
important determinant of firm performance
Resource-based view:
main ideas
 
Figure 1: Summary: Resource-based view on related diversification  
4.2 Decision-making research 
One of the most important ways that managerial resources concretely impact is through 
decision-making; strategic decision-making processes are the incorporations of 
managerial services, as decision-making incorporates the results of important 
managerial services such as analysis, preparation, thinking, intuition and motivation. In 
this chapter, streams of research within the decision-making research discussing factors 
affecting the success of growth projects are discussed.  
Strategy can be seen as a pattern in a stream of decisions352. The way decisions are made, 
or the structure of the decision process itself, may mould decision outcomes and 
strategies that organizations follow353. Although strategic decision-making research has 
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benefited from behavioral decision theory and transaction cost economies, it has 
recently gained also its own momentum354. 
Three paradigms dominate strategic decision-making literature: the rationality and 
bounded rationality paradigm, the politics and power paradigm, and the garbage can 
paradigm. Eisenhardt and Zbaracki355 have synthesized the empirical findings from these 
and found that describing organizations as political systems in which strategic decision 
makers have partially conflicting objectives and limited cognitive capability has been 
proven a fruitful approach. According to their review, both boundedly rational and 
political approaches best describe strategic decision-making. Further, the garbage can 
model seems less relevant because it has received less empirical support than the other 
approaches. However, it can function as a concept helping managers take into account 
the importance of chance. An extensive, empirically supported literature on ways of 
improving decision-making through enhancing decision-quality and improving 
commitment to the decisions made also exists. 
Four common perspectives of studying decision-making are the "individual decision 
perspective", "strategic or management choice", "environmental determinism", and the 
"firm characteristics and resource availability perspective"356. According to the decision 
perspective, the nature of the decision itself may be important. The way managers 
categorize and label a decision in the early stages of the decision-making process 
strongly influences the organization's subsequent responses357 358 359. Decisions 
interpreted as threats, as opposed to opportunities, are treated with a more 
comprehensive decision-making process360. The strategic or management choice 
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perspective emphasizes the role of decision-makers. Strategic choices have an 
endogenous behavioral component and partly reflect the idiosyncrasies of decision-
makers361 362. According to the environmental determinism perspective, strategic 
decisions and processes express adaptation to opportunities, threats, constraints, and 
other characteristics of the environment, and the role of top managers is minimized to a 
facilitation of this adaptation. Comprehensive processes lead to better performance in 
rapidly changing environments363. The firm characteristics and resource availability 
perspectives emphasize internal factors such as internal systems, company performance, 
size, or corporate control. They can be linked to the "inertial" perspective proposed by 
Romanelli and Tushman364. According to this “inertial” perspective existing 
organizational arrangements, structures, systems, processes, and resources constrain 
future strategic decision-making.   
4.2.1 Strategic decision-making processes 
Strategic decision-making process has been described as a sequence of steps, phases or 
routes by several authors365 366, or as dimensions of the process367 368 369 370 371. The most 
common dimensions of strategic decision-making processes found in the literature are 
described in the following table. 
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Table 5: Dimensions of strategic decision-making processes 
Comprehensiveness and rationality dimension  
Elements of rationality can also be found in 
studies on complexity of methodology, degree of 
inquiry and scrutiny 
Dean & Sharfman, 1993a, b;  Lyles & Mitroff, 
1980; Miller, 1987  
Langley, 1990; Lyles, 1987; Cray et alii, 1988  
Centralization Cray et alii 1988; Lyles 1987; Miller 1987  
Formalization and standardization of the process Stein 1980 
Conflict and problem solving dissension 
consisting of politicality and negotiation as well as 
bargaining 
Lyles, 1987; Hickson et alii, 1987; Dean & 
Sharfman, 1993b; Pfeffer & Salanick, 1974; Cray 
et alii, 1988; Hickson et alii, 1986; Pettigrew, 
1973  
Forces that set in motion a strategic decision-making process have been researched in a 
study of 352 strategic decisions372. It was discovered that, in most cases, decision-
making was initiated by claims from stakeholders that pointed out important concerns. 
In these claims, directions were given that guided the search for ways to respond. 
Decision-making success was higher when the claims were performance-based and 
when the search for alternatives was directed by agreed-upon performance expectations. 
Decision-making success was lower when the claims and directions limited the search 
for alternatives or framed the strategic choice as a certain action to be taken. 
Janis and Mann373 have listed steps in rational decision processes from studying all 
stakeholders' objectives, through generating and analyzing alternatives, to evaluating the 
consequences of the chosen alternative and developing implementation plans, control 
systems and contingency plans. As this rational decision-making approach has its main 
emphasis on comprehensiveness, Fredrickson and Mitchell374 divided 
comprehensiveness into two components: analytic and integrative. Analytic 
comprehensiveness refers to those decision processes designed to produce a complete 
set of goals and strategic alternatives. Integrative comprehensiveness refers to the 
logical consistency among the decision components that comprise and support strategy. 
Three main obstacles to adopting comprehensive strategic decision processes have been 
identified. The first one is lacking the required resources to perform the relevant 
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strategic information search375 376. The second is that individuals responsible for 
decisions may have limited cognitive capabilities377. The third is that the decision-
makers may not want to conflict with an organization's political structure and deal with 
the consequences of the conflict378. 
Making a decision can be seen to involve two fundamental problems: a technical 
problem of trying to calculate the best solution, and a political problem of resolving 
divergent interests379. With regard to the technical problem, under conditions of 
uncertainty, managers sacrifice meaning, accept an incomplete search, and use post-
rationalization380. Some decision rules that an individual may employ in responding to 
an organization's political structure have been identified381. An example of these is the 
avoidance of punishment by finding out and supporting the strategic position favored by 
those holding the most power. Another example is power enhancement, that is, 
supporting the strategic options that will maximize one’s own coalition's power gain or 
minimize its power loss. Other examples are "rigging", that is, selectively disseminating 
information to build consensus for the favored strategic option, and building group 
harmony by choosing the strategic option that minimizes internal disruptions in the 
strategic group. 
4.2.2 Impact of decision-making context and process on results 
In an exploratory study, where case descriptions of 68 major projects were analyzed, 
interesting findings related to the impact of context and process on the success of major 
projects were made382. A number of contextual variables were found to influence the 
project planning and implementation process, and then indirectly influence project 
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outcomes through the planning and implementation process. In addition, both process 
and contextual variables have been found to affect outcomes directly. The following 
table lists what the study in question383 meant by contextual variables, process variables 
and project outcome variables. 
Table 6: Contextual variables, process variables, and project outcome variables in project 
related decision-making processes 
Contextual variables  
− Involvement of the organization 
− Adequacy and skill of planning staff 
− Technological competence 
− Time available for the project  
Project planning and implementation process  
− Amount of communication 
− Extent of forcing decisions and delay 
− Use of compromise as a resolution strategy 
Project outcomes  − Success 
− Learning  
Research on corporate planning system effectiveness supports a contingency view: 
characteristics of effective planning systems appear to vary by size of company and 
industry384. In his study of strategy-making processes in 10 large American firms, Quinn 
concluded that formal planning provided a network of information and forced managers 
to think about the future. In addition, it encouraged rigorous communications about 
strategic issues, and made managers feel more comfortable about decisions. However, it 
was only one building block in the overall process of strategy formation385. Planning 
systems contribute more to decisions considered important and risky than to those 
global in nature or related to divestments386. 
Participation in decision-making should increase commitment to implementing plans387. 
Consideration of member input and members’ influence on a decision affect their 
perceptions of fairness of a decision-making process and their commitment to the 
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decision, attachment to the group and trust in its leader388. The normative rational model 
of strategic decision-making has focused on high-quality decisions as a means of 
enhancing organization performance389 390. The value of decisions depends to an extent 
on the willingness of managers to cooperate in implementing those decisions391 392 393. It 
would seem important that the persons operatively responsible for implementing the 
projects participate in the decision-making process, as their commitment to 
implementation is important. Such operatively responsible persons that should be 
included in the decision-making process are most likely to be part of the middle and 
junior management of the firm. Including even the lower organizational levels may be 
difficult due to the larger numbers of people involved. Individuals' commitment to a 
strategic decision ensures that the choices necessary for coordinated, cooperative effort 
will be made394, whereas a lack of commitment places a major constraint on the range of 
options the team-leader can consider395. The extent to which team members agree and 
cooperate with a decision can significantly affect the leader's ability to implement it396. 
The members of a team can delay or sabotage the implementation of initiatives397. Even 
slight delays can prove critical in highly competitive and dynamic environments398.  
In addition to increasing their commitment to the decisions, another reason why the 
persons that will be operatively responsible for implementing the decisions should be 
involved in the decision-making process is that they are likely to have valuable 
information concerning the decisions. They should have an incentive to assure that all 
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relevant information that helps in correctly setting the targets for which they will be 
responsible is taken into consideration.  
Decision-making research proposes that in the planning of projects the involvement of 
the organization, adequacy and skill of planning staff and the amount of communication 
are important factors impacting success of growth projects399. Thus, it would seem that 
the quality of plans for growth projects could be increased by wide participation of the 
personnel knowledgeable of, and responsible for, implementing them 400 401 402 403, and that 
this quality would impact the success of the projects positively. The fourth hypothesis 
concerns the impact of wide participation in the decision-making process on risk and 
uncertainty of individual technology-leveraging projects, and reflects the managerial 
services at the level of an individual growth project. The deviation of the project's 
achieved results from the results expected is used as a proxy for realized risk and 
uncertainty.  
H4: Extensive managerial participation in the decision-making process reduces 
deviation from expectations of an individual technology-leveraging project. 
H4a: Participation of CEO and top management reduces deviation from 
expectations. 
H4b: Participation of middle management reduces deviation from expectations. 
H4c: Participation of junior management reduces deviation from expectations. 
Managerial resources are one of the most severe constraints to growth. Therefore their 
availability in a specific growth project should promote success of the project. 
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Commitment of CEO and top management is important for securing resources for the 
project. Participation of middle management is important for structuring and managing 
the project. Participation of junior management is important for commitment to 
implementation success. 
Using information to support decision-making should enhance the quality of 
decisions404. In addition to assuring the availability of information, wide participation 
also brings into the decision-making process conflicting views of the right decision to 
take. It induces an information search as different parties attempt to find support to their 
preferred alternative, which also increases decision quality.405 406 The decision-quality 
enhancing impacts of information intensity and conflict are discussed below. 
An organization's ability to adapt to changing environmental contingencies partly 
depends on the organization's perceptual and information-processing capacities407. 
Controversy surrounds the appropriateness of adopting a comprehensive decision 
making mode when the external environment is complex and dynamic. Several studies 
support the positive relationship of decision comprehensiveness and organizational 
performance408 409. This holds both among entrepreneurs of small firms and professional 
managers of larger firms410.  
According to previous research, the impact of using a formalized process for decision-
making in unclear. On the one hand, it may help assure that all important factors and 
information are taken into consideration. On the other hand, when too rigid, it may 
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alienate the participants from their responsibility for the decision outcome and its 
implementation. Procedural rationality can be defined as an attempt to collect the 
information necessary to form expectations about alternatives and the use of this 
information in the final decision. It has been empirically operationalized as a degree of 
information focus, search and analysis, and the extent to which quantitative measures 
are used.411 A positive relationship between procedural rationality and performance has 
been found for firms facing dynamic environments. At least three studies lend empirical 
support to this relationship: Priem et alii conducted a survey of 101 middle-sized and 
large firms412. Miller and Friesen studied changes in environmental dynamism and 
process rationality, and their impact on firm performance for a sample of large Canadian 
and American firms413. Eisenhardt analyzed decision-making in eight firms in the 
microcomputer industry414. No relationship between procedural rationality and 
performance has been found for firms in stable environments415. Even contrary results 
have been found416: Fredrickson operationalized rationality as comprehensiveness of the 
planning process. He found a negative relationship between comprehensiveness and 
performance in unstable environments, and a positive relationship in stable 
environments. An interesting remark on rationality is that procedural rationality and 
political behavior are independent dimensions of the strategic decision-making 
process417.  
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Conflict in decision-making has a potentially complex impact on decision quality and 
commitment to implementing a decision. On the one hand, conflict improves decision 
quality, but on the other, it may weaken the ability of the group to work together418. 
Perceptions of loyalty within teams strengthen the positive relationship between conflict 
and decision quality, whereas perceptions of within-team competence strengthen the 
positive relationship between conflict and decision commitment419. 
When conflict is functional, it is generally task oriented and focused on judgmental 
differences about how to best achieve common objectives420. This type of conflict is 
called cognitive conflict421. Cognitive conflict is inevitable in top management teams 
because different positions see different environments422. This perceptual diversity leads 
to conflict over how best to accomplish an organization's objectives423 424. A reason why 
cognitive conflict in some situations contributes to decision quality is that the synthesis 
that emerges from the diverse perspectives is generally superior to the individual 
perspectives themselves 425 426 427 428. 
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Although the role of cognitive conflict in enhancing the quality of decisions and 
assumptions has received strong support, it may also have negative effects on decision-
making. Two possible negative effects have been identified. First, cognitive conflict can 
reduce decision-makers’ general satisfaction. According to a study carried out as a 
laboratory-experiment, satisfaction within groups of decision-makers, acceptance of 
decisions, and willingness to continue working with the group was highest for groups 
using the consensus approach, as compared to groups using different types of cognitive 
conflict approaches429. Second, cognitive conflict, when misunderstood, can cause 
affective conflict, which is detrimental to decision commitment. 
According to several other studies, cognitive conflict should not affect consensus and 
affective acceptance adversely. Cognitive conflict should enhance understanding 
through encouraging the evaluation of an alternative's underlying assumptions. 
Cognitive conflict should also enhance commitment: as decision-makers debate their 
perspectives, they have a chance to get their views heard in the decision process430. As a 
result, they should become more committed to the decision431 432. For similar reasons, 
cognitive conflict should also enhance affective acceptance. In a study of top 
management teams, Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza433 found that positive affection 
within teams was produced when sincere consideration was given to the input of team 
members. 
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When conflict is dysfunctional, it is usually emotional and focused on personal 
incompatibilities or disputes434. This type of conflict is called affective conflict435. 
Affective conflict emerges when cognitive disagreement is perceived as personal 
criticism. Brehmer argues that such misinterpretation can cause purely cognitive 
disagreement to turn into emotional conflict436. For instance, it is likely that the criticism 
and debate necessary for cognitive conflict could be interpreted as political playing, 
where one team member tries to gain influence at the expense of another437 438. As 
decision-makers engage in cognitive conflict, they may accidentally trigger affective 
conflict439. 
Politics, not as conflict, but as coalition formation, has also been researched. Results 
indicate that politics arises from power centralization. It was found that autocratic chief 
executive officers participate in politics and create political behavior among 
subordinates. It also was found that politics is not organized into temporary and shifting 
alliances founded on issues; instead, it is organized into stable coalitions founded on 
demographic characteristics, such as office location and age. Politics within top 
management teams was found to be associated with poor firm performance.440 
Summarizing the above, according to decision-making research, the quality of plans for 
growth projects can be increased by increasing the level of rationality in the decision-
making process, and by increasing the comprehensiveness of information utilized441 442 
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443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454. The fifth hypothesis concerns the impact of the 
analytical quality in the decision-making process, and reflects the managerial services at 
the level of an individual growth project. The deviation of the project's achieved results 
from the results expected is used as a proxy for realized risk and uncertainty.  
H5: High analytical quality of the decision-making process reduces deviation 
from expectations related to an individual technology-leveraging project. 
In this research, high analytical quality of the decision-making process refers to a 
process characterized by certain qualitative characteristics. It does not as such mean that 
the quality of a certain decision-making process would be better than the quality of 
another one. Effectiveness of decision-making processes depends on the context.    
4.3 Model of factors affecting technology-based product market entries  
Based on the discussed theories and streams of research, it is hypothesized that the 
boundaries to the extent of technology-based product market entries are set by the nature 
of technology in question and a firm's operational capabilities for executing the entries. 
Further, boundaries are set by the management’s understanding of opportunities for 
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leveraging, as well as managerial resources available for translating the recognized 
business opportunities into business plans for growth projects. This understanding may 
be facilitated through the explicit and proactive management of technology-related 
opportunities. 
 
Spheres of opportunities based on a 
technological competence
Boundaries to the 
spheres of 
opportunities 
set by:
Characteristics of 
technology
Proactiveness of 
opportunity search
Possibilities to dis-
integrate the 
technology
Ability to translate 
the understood 
opportunities into 
project plans
Applicability of the 
existing operational 
capabilities in 
potential new 
markets
Perceived risk and 
uncertainty of the 
growth projects
Opportunity set of a technology
Opportunities 
understood 
by a company
Opportunities 
that can be 
exploited 
internally
Opportunities 
that can be exploited 
externally
 
Figure 2: Different spheres of opportunity and factors setting their boundaries 
The hypotheses presented in Chapter 4, Sections 1 and 2 are summarized in the two 
tables below. The five hypotheses contribute to diversification research by studying 
factors that impact the success of growth projects that lead to diversification. An attempt 
is made at clarifying the process of diversifying and the management aspects of 
diversification. This is a new aspect of diversification research, as diversification 
research has previously concentrated on the firm level, and measures available from 
databases.  
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Table 7: Summary of hypotheses based on resource-based view 
Research 
stream Main ideas of the research stream Hypotheses 
Firm level factors exist, which limit 
firm growth. The most important 
one of these factors is managerial 
services available for growth. 
Other factors are investments in 
growth in the form of research and 
development, firm size, past firm 
growth, and growth aspiration.   
H1 
 
 
 
H1a
 
 
H1b
 
H1c
 
H1d
 
 
H1e
 
Firm level factors related to technology 
leveraging influence the goal setting in 
technology leveraging projects and 
success of the projects. 
Large firm size reduces growth 
expectations from a leveraging project in 
relation to firm size. 
Large firm size reduces deviation from 
expectations in a leveraging project. 
High growth orientation increases growth 
expectations from a leveraging project. 
Research and development intensity of the 
firms increases growth expectations from 
a leveraging project in relation to firm size.
Managerial resources available for growth 
support involvement in many small-scale 
leveraging projects. 
Complexity of projects consumes 
managerial resources  
H2 Smaller project size reduces deviation 
from expectations. 
Resource-
based view 
Risk and uncertainty of growth 
projects is an important constraint 
to firm growth, as they increase 
the need for the limited 
managerial services in planning 
the projects, and make managers 
hesitant to undertake growth 
projects. Applicability of existing 
operational capabilities in the new 
markets reduces risk and 
uncertainty of the entry, as less 
new kinds of capabilities need to 
be acquired  
H3a
 
 
 
 
H3b
 
Applicability of the existing operational 
capabilities in the entered market reduces 
deviation from expectations of an 
individual technology-leveraging project. 
 
In technology-leveraging projects, 
applicability of technology is the most 
critical, thereafter applicability of marketing 
and sales, and last applicability of 
operations. 
The proposed contribution of Hypothesis 1 to the resource-based view is the 
clarification of the role of managerial services and other potential firm level constraints 
in resource-based growth. Hypothesis 2 further explores the role of managerial services 
in resource-based growth through investigating whether growth projects, which are less 
complex succeed better due to a lower requirement for managerial resources. The 
proposed contribution of Hypothesis 3 to resource-based view is studying the positive 
impact of the applicability of existing capabilities in new markets on the success of 
technology-based product-market entries. Support to such a positive impact would 
strengthen the preference for resource-based growth as a growth strategy455 456. A new 
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aspect is the decomposition of the different sources of uncertainty resulting from weakly 
related entry markets. These different sources of uncertainty are uncertainty from having 
to learn new capabilities and uncertainty of investments.  
Table 8: Summary of hypotheses based on decision-making research 
Research 
stream Main ideas of the research stream Hypotheses 
Careful planning of the projects 
and assuring the commitment of 
key people to the plans can 
reduce risk and uncertainty in 
growth projects. This assures that 
they release the needed resources 
during the implementation and are 
committed to implement. 
 
H4 
 
 
 
H4a
 
H4b
 
H4c
Extensive managerial participation in the 
decision-making process reduces 
deviation from expectations of an 
individual technology-leveraging project. 
Participation of CEO and top management 
reduces deviation from expectations. 
Participation of middle management 
reduces deviation from expectations. 
Participation of junior management 
reduces deviation from expectations. 
Decision-
making 
research Quality of plans can be increased 
by increasing the level of 
rationality and comprehensiveness 
of information utilized, by making 
use of financial analyses, and by 
formalizing organizational rules 
related to decision-making 
processes. 
H5 
 
High analytical quality of the decision-
making process reduces deviation from 
expectations of an individual technology-
leveraging project. 
 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 contribute to the resource-based view by clarifying the possibilities 
of reducing risk and uncertainty related to individual growth projects through 
managerial action. Hypotheses 4 and 5 also contribute to research on new product 
development by increasing an understanding of the process and by bringing in a general 
management and project a planning perspective. These have been suggested as the next 
important areas to be studied with regard to new product development457.  
The factors hypothesized to affect leveraging of technology in new product-markets are 
summarized in the model below. According to resource-based view, the main factors 
affecting resource-based growth are the managerial services available for growth as well 
as risk and uncertainty of growth projects. The first part of the model explains 
leveraging of technology on a firm level, showing how the managerial services available 
for growth an other firm level constraints affect firm growth. The second part of the 
model explains the success of individual technology-leveraging projects, focusing on 
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factors hypothesized to reduce deviation from expectations in individual projects. 
Deviation from expectations was researched only in the context of individual projects. 
Deviation from expectations is at least partly specific to individual technology-
leveraging projects. It can be assumed that it is possible to identify also firm-specific 
factors reducing the deviation. However, it is difficult at this point to determine a 
specific capability distinguishing different firms on the grounds of their ability to 
manage deviation from expectations: this would require a representative sample of 
several projects from each firm.  
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Figure 3: Model of the relationships between the theoretical constructs 
Technology-based growth is studied on the project level because risk and uncertainty of 
growth projects are important constraints to firm growth458. The risk and uncertainty 
involved with individual growth projects, or their aggregated risk and uncertainty, is 
difficult to measure. Therefore, Penrose’s459 theoretical proposition of the negative 
impact of risk and uncertainty of individual growth projects to firm growth will not be 
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tested empirically. Risk and uncertainty related to growth projects will be studied on the 
level of individual growth projects indirectly through the deviation of reached results 
from expectations set for the project.  
Another factor impacting deviation from expectations in addition to the inherent risk 
and uncertainty of projects is how well the project is planned and implemented. This 
raises the question of what part of risk and uncertainty can be regarded controllable 
through good planning and implementation, and what part is an inherent characteristic 
of specific growth projects. The distinction between controllable and inherent risk and 
uncertainty is not clear because most risk and uncertainty may be controllable with 
enormous time investments in implementation and planning. On the other hand, it may 
be, in practice, that the investments for controlling risk and uncertainty in some cases 
would be so large that it would clearly not be economic for a firm to do so.  
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5 METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, the methodology of the study is presented. First, the population is 
defined and sample selection is described. Next, the statistical methods used to verify 
the reliability and validity of the operationalizations are presented; the methods used to 
test the hypotheses are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Finally, the 
operationalizations of the variables are presented.  
5.1 Population, sample and response patterns 
The target population of this dissertation comprises established Finnish and Swedish 
technology-based firms engaged in technology-based diversification. Firms less than 
five years old were excluded to ensure that the firms had stabilized their core operations. 
The primary industry sectors included in the sample were industrial goods, electronics, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, specialty materials, cable, software, and metal sectors. 
Firms in the target population were contacted in order to find out whether they had 
entered new product-markets on the basis of technological competencies that they 
possessed prior to entry. 
The initial screening process yielded a total of 93 companies each promising to return a 
survey questionnaire. 63 companies actually returned it, which is a very high response 
rate. The person who responded to the questions in most cases had been the leader of the 
project, the chief of the leader, or the present manager of a business that had been 
created through the project. The main reasons for not agreeing to participate in the study 
were, in order of importance, not knowing the case well enough or not having the time 
to participate. 
The survey respondents were asked questions concerning past events. This leads to a 
possible post rationalization bias, which is always present when researching past events 
on the basis of data that has not been documented. Relying on documented data only 
would result in a loss of richness in research settings. Post rationalization bias has been 
diminished through formulating the questions to concern objective matters, not personal 
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opinions. The respondents were not asked to provide any reasoning but merely 
seemingly rather unrelated facts.  
Other possible problems of a survey are a typically low response rate and a possible 
non-response bias resulting from this. Further problems are the difficulty of 
operationalizing the theories and the possible risk that the respondent might 
misunderstand some questions as a result of this difficulty. Typical cures to these 
problems are the use of previously tested operationalizations that have been found to 
function well, as well as a pre-testing of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was carefully tested prior to the survey with representative technology 
leveraging projects chosen from the sample. Operationalizations were adopted from 
previous studies as far as possible. Where no previously used operationalizations were 
available, new ones were constructed on the basis of interviews with nine companies. 
All statement items were measured on a seven-point Likert-scale. The items can be 
found in Appendix 2. Confirmatory factor analysis was used for assessing the reliability 
and validity of the constructs. In addition, five deepening case analyses were also 
conducted after the survey. These technology diversification projects were chosen from 
among the 63 projects. A cluster analysis was conducted of the 63 projects to identify 
clusters that would be internally as similar as possible, but, respective to each other, as 
dissimilar as possible. Altogether three clusters were formed. 
5.2 Statistical methods 
This chapter briefly describes the statistical methods used in the analyses from a 
theoretical and technical viewpoint. Confirmatory factor analysis is used for assessing 
the reliability and validity of the operationalizations. Multiple linear regression analysis 
is used for testing the hypotheses, and structural equation analysis for highlighting the 
factors underlying the results confirmed by the regressions.  
5.2.1 Testing reliability and validity of the constructs - confirmatory factor analysis 
Because no external information is available on most of the variables of interest in this 
study, relying on self-reported data by the relevant managers was inevitable. This is also 
an advantage, as information included in databases is insufficient for studying many 
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aspects of strategy. The advantage of primary data is that it can be tailored to the exact 
needs of the research and the researcher is not at the mercy of the data. However, when 
using cross-sectional questionnaire data, it is important to ascertain that common 
method variance is not the factor that actually causes the relationships between the 
variables460 461. To diminish this problem, earlier validated constructs were used as far as 
possible462. Harman’s single factor test463 was conducted to detect possible common 
method bias: all variables were entered in a factor analysis. Common method variance is 
present if one factor accounts for a large part of the covariance in the variables. This was 
not the case: five factors with eigenvalues over 1 were extracted, while the strongest 
explained only 38% of the covariance. Thus, the common method bias does not seem to 
be a problem. 
Confirmatory factor analysis is used for assessing the reliability and validity464 of the 
operationalizations. Five types of validity have been defined. These are content validity, 
criterion and nomological validity, as well as convergent and discriminant validity. 
Content validity has been defined as whether “the domain of a concept is made clear and 
the analyst judges whether the measures fully represent the domain”465. A theoretical 
definition for the concept is necessary to accomplish content validity. Criterion validity, 
also known as predictive validity or concurrent validity, has been defined as “the degree 
of correspondence between a measure and a criterion variable, usually measured by their 
correlation” 466. Nomological validity or construct validity467 has been defined as “the 
degree to which predictions from a formed theoretical network containing the concept 
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under scrutiny are confirmed”468. Both criterion and nomological validity are especially 
relevant in business research, which seeks normative prescription. 
Confirmatory factor analysis tests the reliability of a measurement instrument, or 
operationalization, in that it confirms that a set of observed variables define a latent, 
theoretical construct469. A minimum coefficient value of 0,40 for indicating that an item 
can be considered a part of the construct for social sciences has been suggested470. As a 
complementary measure, Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are used for assessing the 
internal consistency of the measures. A common rule of thumb is that an acceptable 
level of Cronbach’s alpha is at least 0,70.  
Confirmatory factor analysis can also test the validity of a measurement instrument 
through assessing its convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity is 
achieved if measures of constructs that theoretically should be related to each other are 
observed to be related to each other in fact. Discriminant validity is achieved if 
measures of constructs that theoretically should not be related to each other are observed 
not to be related to each other in fact.471 This kind of a test can be performed with 
confirmatory factor analysis by factor analyzing several variables in one batch. The fact 
that the individual measurement items load on the factors that, according to theory, they 
should be loading on, and not on other factors, indicates the fulfillment of both 
discriminant and convergent validity. The common rule of thumb of acceptable levels of 
factor loadings of at least 0,60 on the primary dimension, and not more than 0,40 on any 
other dimension, is used in this study.  
The method of factor extraction used in this study is the maximum likelihood method. 
This is because the more commonly used principal components model was actually 
designed for the use in natural sciences and is unsuitable for the scales used in most 
strategy research. The rotation method used is Varimax, which is the most common 
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rotation method. Varimax is an orthogonal rotation algorithm, which means that it does 
not allow the factors to correlate with each other. It thereby finds a solution where each 
measurement item loads as much as possible on one factor, and as little as possible on 
the others.472 
5.2.2 Testing the hypotheses - multiple linear regression analysis 
Multiple linear regression analysis aims at explaining the variation of one dependent 
variable by estimating the influence of several independent variables on the dependent 
variable. The predictive power of the regression relationship is analyzed with several 
measures. R² or adjusted R² measures the proportion of variance of the dependent 
variable that is explained by the independent variables. Adjusted R² takes into account 
the number of independent variables included in the regression and the sample size. The 
significance of the overall model is measured with the F ratio. F ratio with p<0,05 
indicates that the overall model is significant. The t-test indicates the significance of 
coefficients of each independent variable. A t-value with p<0,05 means that a 
coefficient is significant in explaining the variance of the dependent variable. 
Standardized beta coefficients can be compared with each other directly.  
When investigating moderating relationships with the help of regression analysis, the 
regressions are carried out in two phases. First, the direct effects of the two independent 
variables, the moderation effect of which is hypothesized, on the dependent variable are 
tested. Then the interaction term, which is the product of the two independent variables, 
is added into the analysis and another regression is performed. If the interaction term is 
significant without the separate independent variables being significant, and if the 
interaction term improves the regression, a moderating effect is shown to exist.   
Collinearity of the independent variables can distort the results of the regression 
analysis. The tests used for controlling whether there is risk of collinearity distorting the 
results are VIF-values, which should be below 5 to be free from the possibility of 
collinearity, and tolerance values, which should be above 0,10. 473 
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5.2.3 Further clarifying the causalities - structural equation modeling  
The goal of structural equation models is to understand the structure among several 
variables.474 They allow the examination of a series of dependence relationships 
simultaneously, whereas with multiple regression analysis these would have to be 
conducted separately, one after each other. In using structural equation modeling, it is 
especially important to base the tested model strictly on theory. Therefore, the use of 
structural equation modeling in a confirmatory way is recommended, especially if the 
purpose is to find support for the hypotheses proposed.  
The goodness-of-fit of the model should be assessed using several criteria. The absolute 
fit indices, such as the chi-square, do not use an alternative model as a base for 
comparison. They are derived from the fit of the obtained and implied covariance 
matrices and the maximum likelihood minimization function. They are not very good 
measures of fit because they are affected by sample size, model size, and, in the case of 
chi-square, distribution of variables. Some lack of fit is always present because of 
omitted variables – no model takes into account all that affects the phenomenon.475  
Of the second category of fit indices, the relative fit indices, the NFI or, in other words, 
the Bentler-Bonnett Nonnormed Fit Index will be used here. While before the minimum 
value for these measures was suggested to be 0,9, now it is suggested that it should be at 
least 0,95. These indices compare chi-square of the tested model to an index one of a so-
called null model, which is also called the baseline model or independence model. 
These relative fit indices are computed using ratios of the chi-squares and degrees of 
freedom. The values always range approximately, or for some of the indices exactly, 
between 0 and 1. 476 
The third category of fit indices is the noncentrality-based category, of which the 
RMSEA or Root Mean Square Error of Approximation and the CFI or Bentler’s 
Comparative Fit Index will be used here. The idea of the noncentrality-based indices is 
that perfect fit is unlikely, even in the population, because some variables are inevitably 
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left out of the model, so variance cannot be perfectly explained. Therefore, the model 
chi-square should be tested against a noncentral chi-square rather than zero. The 
RMSEA value is almost acceptable, when it is between 0,08 and 0,1, and it is good 
when it is less than 0,05.477 The CFI is good when it is very close to one478. 
The fourth category of fit indices is the parsimonious fit category, which includes 
indices such as PNFI based on NFI and PCFI based on CFI. These indices are adjusted 
to penalize models that are less parsimonious and thus favor simpler models.  
5.3 Operationalization of the constructs  
In this chapter, the variables used to test the hypotheses as well as the 
operationalizations of these variables are presented. Operationalizations have been 
adopted from previous studies as far as possible. Where no previously used 
operationalizations were available, new ones have been constructed on the basis of 
interviews with nine companies with regard to their technology leveraging. All 
statement items were measured on a seven-point Likert-scale, where the choices were 
labeled as –3 = strongly disagree to 3 = strongly agree. The results of factor analyses to 
test the reliability and validity of the operationalizations are included in Appendix 2, 
while the exact questions are included in Appendix 3.  
The firm level factors explaining project success are managerial resources available for 
growth, the firms’ growth aspiration, past growth, size, and research and development 
intensity. The decision-making process characteristics hypothesized to impact success of 
the individual technology leveraging projects are: participation of different levels of 
management in the decision-making process, participation of different functions in the 
process, information intensity of the process, existence of formalized rules and process 
for decision-making, use of a business plan and financial analysis to support the process, 
and the degree of conflict experienced in the process. The variables related to the 
applicability of existing operational capabilities in the new market are fit of marketing, 
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operational and technological competencies and capabilities, and investments in 
marketing and technology, as well as technological learning.    
The dependent variables are sales expectations and achieved sales in the project 
compared to firm sales unrelated to the project. The firms’ industry sector and country 
were included as control variables. Additional control variables are knowledge on 
growth opportunities and level of technological competence.  
5.3.1 Firm level constraints to growth 
Managerial resources available for growth, as the most important firm level constraint to 
growth, is measured with a variable representing the quantity of knowledgeable 
managerial resources available for growth. The impact of management resources on 
growth is difficult to measure. Attempts have been made by addressing managerial 
resources from a functional or skill viewpoint, measuring formal strategic planning479 480, 
administrative skills481, and management skills482. Research examining the effectiveness 
of research and development investments has studied the impact of technology strategy 
483 484 485 486, “overall R&D managerial capability” 487, and organizational form, as well as 
control and incentive systems488 489 490 on the relationship between research and 
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development investments and financial performance. These studies show that 
managerial resources play a role, but leave unclear the justification of investing scarce 
managerial resources in the generation of growth, instead of only in managing the 
existing business operatively.  
The extent of managerial activity targeted at firm growth could be measured by 
measuring how much time the managers of a firm use for such activity. Another way 
would be to look at such indicators as the number of growth projects discussed, the 
number of projects that enter the first feasibility review stage, and so on. The latter way, 
however, is tautological, as it measures some of the early outputs of the managerial 
resources, not only the input. The first measurement, that is, the time managers of a firm 
use for activities directly targeted at firm growth, measures the input of managerial 
resources. In practice, there are some complications in measuring this. Such data is not 
gathered or registered in the firms or by any institution, and must therefore be requested 
from a representative of the company who is capable of estimating it. Such estimations 
have errors because the estimators seldom know the exact nature of the work of every 
person in the company. Here, it can help ask the respondent to estimate the effort 
separately for each organizational level. Also, asking the respondent to make the 
estimation for managers involved part-time in the activities targeted at firm growth 
separately from managers who are involved as their main task can help make the 
estimation more accurate. Furthermore, choosing respondents who are involved with 
growth projects helps assure they know this part of the organization well. 
In technology-intensive firms, an important part of productive opportunities is based on 
technological competencies. The measurement of how much time the management uses 
for activities targeted at firm growth can further be narrowed to managerial resources 
committed to detecting and exploiting the productive opportunities based on 
technological competencies. This includes taking part in developing business 
opportunities based on technological competencies, as well as monitoring different 
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technologies and the strategic implications of their development. Further narrowing 
down the definition in such a way should make it easier for the respondents to be 
accurate in their assessments. The amount of managerial resources available for growth 
was operationalized as the number of top, middle and junior managers committed full 
time for the above-mentioned tasks. This variable is used as an absolute number. Using 
the variable relative to, for example, all management resources in the firm, or to all 
personnel in the firm, would be wrong. These merely indicate the size of the firm’s 
current operations, which does not necessarily have much to do with targeted growth. 
Size of the firms is controlled for separately. Full time resources are important, as part-
time resources are likely to get too tied up with daily business. Full time resources have 
pressure to start projects, as this is their only measurable output. Full time resources can 
establish conditions in which even uncertain and explorative projects can be started on a 
small scale. 
The other firm level constraints to growth, which are productive opportunity, firm size 
and previous firm growth, were measured as follows. Research and development 
investments as percent of sales 1997-1999 and 1985-1987 is used as a proxy for the 
productive opportunity. Firm size is measured in sales. The firms’ sales growth is 
measured as the compound annual growth rate during the period 1994-1999. The unit of 
analysis was chosen according to what was relevant from the perspective of technology 
competence and technology management variables. Thus, in case of conglomerates that 
operate as financial holdings, the growth was measured only from the company that 
implemented the case. The growth figures were obtained from public sources.  
To strengthen the analysis of the impact of previous firm growth, the growth aspiration 
of the firms was also included. The items asked from the respondents were “We wanted 
to grow the company as fast as we could”, “We were prepared to sacrifice the 
profitability of the company for some years if that way we could get the company to 
grow fast.”, “We wanted to keep the company's operations on the same level as they 
were.”, “Trying to make the company grow fast was pointless.”, “We wanted to keep the 
company small.”. In addition, the respondents were asked to report what the annual 
targeted growth rate of their company was at the time of starting the growth project. 
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5.3.2 Applicability of existing operational capabilities in the new market 
In order to leverage its technological competence – be it in the original market or a new 
one – a firm needs basic operational capabilities, such as purchasing, production, sales, 
marketing, distribution, and others. These operational capabilities vary by market in 
their scope, nature and relative importance. The operational capabilities deployed in the 
original market can sometimes also serve as the basis for entry into new markets if the 
original and new markets are closely related.  
Firms that are the first to commercialize a product may fail to extract economic value 
from the innovation despite the fact that the product is successful. This situation can 
occur if an innovator fails to build or access competitive capacity in activities 
complementary to the innovation491. Possible factors causing failure to extract economic 
value from an innovation are wrong strategy, decisions of integration and collaboration, 
ease of imitation, market failure, wrong positioning, and losing the profits to the owners 
of the complementary assets 492 493. Some basic principles of profiting from technological 
innovation as listed by Teece are as follows: 494 
− Regimes of appropriability: environmental factors that govern an innovator’s ability 
to capture the profits generated by an innovation, excluding firm and market 
structure. Important ones are the effectiveness of legal mechanisms of protection 
such as patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, as well as the nature of the technology, 
meaning whether it is a product or a process technology, and tacit or codified. 
− The dominant design paradigm: When imitation is possible and occurs coupled with 
design modification before the emergence of a dominant design, followers have a 
higher chance of having their modified product become the industry standard  
                                                 
491  Teece, D. J. 1988. Interfaces, Providence, May/Jun, pp. 46-62. 
492  Teece, D. J. 1996. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, 
collaboration, licensing, and public policy. In: Burgelman, R. A., Modesto A. M. & Wheelwright 
S. C. Strategic management of technology and innovation. Times Mirror Higher Education Group, 
USA. 
493  Teece, D. J. 1997. In: Shinoya, Y. & Perlmann, M. (eds.) Innovation in technology, industries and 
institutions. The University of Michigan Press, USA. 
494  Teece, D. J. 1996. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, 
collaboration, licensing, and public policy. In: Burgelman, R. A., Modesto A. M. & Wheelwright 
S. C. Strategic management of technology and innovation. Times Mirror Higher Education Group, 
USA 
   92 
− Complementary assets needed to commercialize an innovation: competitive 
manufacturing, distribution, service, complementary technologies, and other. 
Complementary assets can be generic, specialized, or co-specialized. Specialized 
complementary assets are such where there is a unilateral dependence of the asset on 
the innovation or a unilateral dependence of the innovation on the asset. Co-
specialized complementary assets are such where there is a bilateral dependence.  
When leveraging technological competencies, operational capabilities usually consist of 
some combination of inbound and outbound logistics and operations such as production, 
marketing, sales, and services. Operational capability is operationalized in this study by 
asking the respondents first to what extent the leveraging project in question was able to 
use the existing operational functions and competencies or knowledge within its first 
year of operation. This is measured with variables named “marketing and sales fit”, 
“technology fit”, and “operations fit”. Second, the respondents were asked, whether 
significant investments were made within the first year of operation. This is measured 
with variables named “marketing and sales investments” and “technology investments”. 
Marketing and sales fit was assessed by asking to what extent the project was able to use 
the existing sales and marketing department, distribution and after-sales networks, 
knowledge of customer groups, and knowledge of sales methods. Technology fit was 
assessed by asking to what extent the project was able to use the existing research and 
development department and the technological competencies. Operations fit was 
assessed by asking to what extent the project was able to use the existing production 
plants, purchasing or sourcing department, knowledge of production technology, and 
knowledge of purchasing or sourcing. Marketing and sales investments were assessed by 
asking how large investments were made in sales and marketing department and in 
distribution and after-sales networks. Technology investments were assessed by asking 
how large investments were made in research and development department and in 
technological competencies acquired from outside the company.  
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Operational capabilities have been measured with measurements similar to this study by 
Teece495 496 497 498, as well as Steensma499, Davis et alii500, Woo et alii501, Sorrentino and 
Williams 502, who researched production complementarities. Marketing and distribution 
complementarities have been researched with measurements similar to this study by 
Davis et alii 503, Woo et alii504 and Sorrentino and Williams505. 
A further variable relating to technological learning during the project was used to 
improve the measurement of the applicability of the technological capabilities. This 
variable was assessed with the statements “New technological fields were learned from 
the project”, “Learning related to technological fields caused changes in the 
implementation plan of the project”, “New patents or licenses were bought in order to 
implement the growth plan”, and “In the project new technological inventions were 
made internally and patented”. 
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5.3.3 Characteristics of the decision-making process 
Papadakis et alii506 have studied the decision-making processes in 78 corporate 
investment decisions a few years after they were made. The operationalizations used by 
them rely on an extensive literature search in which previously used operationalizations 
were gathered together and the best of them merged into exhaustive measurement 
instruments, which Papadakis et alii tested on the sample of investment decisions. With 
minor modifications to make the wording of the questions more clearly applicable to 
technology leveraging projects, the operationalization of the decision-making process 
characteristics in this study is based on the measurement items of Papadakis et alii.  
Wide participation in the decision-making process 
In order to measure the extent of participation in the decision-making process, the 
respondents were asked the following question: In each of the five phases of the 
decision-making process, how much did CEO and top management, middle 
management, as well as junior management, group leader and those at expert level 
participate in the decision-making process concerning whether to commit to the growth 
project? The decision-making process was divided into five phases, and the participants 
were asked separately for each phase. The five phases were  
- Generating growth ideas based on technological competence 
- Screening out technologically realistic ideas and ones realistic with regard to 
market potential 
- Evaluating and comparing the ideas 
- Making the final decision to enter the new market 
- Choosing people responsible for implementation 
The junior management, group leader and expert level participants from here on will be 
referred to as “junior management”.  
                                                 
506  Papadakis, V. M., Lioukas, S. & Chambers, D. 1998. Strategic decision-making process: the role 
of management and context. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, pp. 115-147.  
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Analytical quality of the decision-making process 
The analytical quality of the decision-making process can be measured by 
comprehensiveness and rationality of information usage, that is, how much information 
related to the decision was gathered, how much it was analyzed, and how systematically 
this was done.507 Analytical quality of the decision-making process was measured with 
the help of six variables that capture the most important aspects of analytical quality of a 
decision-making process. The first two of these six variables are “wide functional 
participation”, measuring how widely different functional departments participated in 
the decision-making process, and “information intensity” of the process, measuring how 
much information was used and discussed in each phase of the process. The three items 
measuring information intensity, “There were many meetings in this phase”, 
“Information was actively collected from different sources in this phase”, and “External 
sources of information were used systematically in this phase” were measured for each 
of the five phases of the decision-making process.  
The next three of the six variables used to measure the analytical quality of the decision-
making are the existence of a pre-defined process for such a decision-making situation, 
the requirements for a business plan, and the financial analysis done in the process. The 
existence of a pre-defined process was measured with three items, which were “A 
written guideline existed for this kind of a process”, “A set of criteria defining 
strategically fitting growth projects existed”, and “There was a certain process for the 
continuous screening for growth ideas”. The requirements for a business plan were 
measured with the statements “In order to approve a decision like this, a business plan is 
always required” and “In our company a business plan must always include certain 
parts”. Financial analysis was measured with “Income statement or balance sheet 
estimates of the project had an important role”, “Detailed cost estimates concerning the 
project had an important role”, and “A plan on sources of financing had an important 
role”.  
The sixth of the six variables used to measure the analytical quality of the decision-
making is the amount of conflict encountered in the decision-making process. As 
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discussed earlier508, conflict can increase the quality of decision-making in two ways: 
First, conflict can increase the quality of decision-making by assuring that more 
information is considered and it is thoroughly discussed. Second, in the end, it can be 
beneficial by causing participants in the decision-making process to be more committed 
to implementing the decisions agreed upon, as they have had a chance to participate and 
understand the solution better. The items measuring the degree of conflict in decision-
making processes are “During the process coalitions with different objectives were 
formed within the company”, “The central persons in the process went through many 
long negotiations”, “There was a lot of disagreement regarding the objectives of the 
decision”, “There was a lot of disagreement concerning what would be the correct 
procedure to follow in the process”, “There was a lot of disagreement regarding the 
correctness of the conclusions”.  
5.3.4 Level of technological competence 
In the analysis of firm-level growth the level of the firm’s technological competence is 
included as a control variable. Technological competencies have many different 
dimensions that are difficult to measure. Measurements that would seem objective, such 
as research and development spending, or the number of patents, may contain severe 
distortions. One way of measuring technological competence is by asking employees’ 
perceptions of their firm’s technological activities and abilities. Based on Sharif and 
Ramanathan’s509, Autio and Laamanen’s510, and several other scholars’ research, Lin511 
has constructed a questionnaire to measure the technology capability of individual firms 
as perceived by employees of the firm. Comparing experts’ rankings with the 
questionnaire survey results has provided some empirical validation for the plausibility 
of assessing the level of technological competence by means of such a questionnaire. 
However, it is also often argued that one’s own perception of capability is imprecise.  
                                                                                                                                               
507  Papadakis, V. M., Lioukas, S. & Chambers, D. 1998. Strategic decision-making process: the role 
of management and context. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, pp. 115-147.  
508  See Chapter 4.2.2 
509  Sharif, N. & Ramanathan, K. 1987. A framework for technology-based national planning. 
Technological forecasting and social change, Vol. 32. 
510  Autio, E. & Laamanen, T. Measurement and evaluation of technology transfer: review of 
technology transfer mechanisms and indicators. International Journal of Technology Management, 
Vol. 10, Nos 7/8, pp. 643-664. 
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Depth and distinctiveness are two different dimensions of technological competence. 
This distinction is important when measuring the perceived level of technological 
competence. In the table below some of the essential characteristics of depth and 
distinctiveness of technological capability are summarized. 
Table 9: Depth and distinctiveness of technological capability  
Aspect of 
technological 
capability 
Description 
Depth of 
capability 
− How well the company masters a certain technology 
− Not necessarily distinctive 
− Tested questionnaires for measuring exist 
Distinctiveness 
of capability 
− How much better than everyone else the company masters a certain 
technology 
− Tested questionnaires for measuring exist 
It has been found that patent data yields approximately the same assessments as peer 
review judgments of the level of technological competence of firms512. The bias caused 
by different propensities of firms to patent can be omitted by using citation intensity as 
the measure. Citation intensity indicates the extent to which a firm’s patents have been 
cited. The fundamental idea behind using citation intensity as a measure of 
technological competence is that a large number of forward citations indicate that the 
patent is an important invention that has lead to numerous technological improvements. 
Therefore, companies whose patents are frequently cited will tend to be more successful 
innovators than companies whose patents are less frequently cited.513 Empirical research 
examining the use of citation intensity as a measure of the level of technological 
competence has found that citation intensity is positively related to social gains from the 
patents514 515 and staff perception of patent value516. Evidence has also been found that 
citation intensity is positively related to litigation of the patents and, thus, possibly to 
patent value, as litigation can be an indication of whether a patent right is seen to be 
                                                                                                                                               
511  Lin, M. J. 1997. The research on the measurement of corporate technology capability. International 
Journal of Technology Management, Vol. 13, issue 2, pp. 133-139. 
512  Narin, F., Noma, E. & Perry, R. 1987. Patents as indicators of corporate technological strength. 
Research Policy, Vol. 16, pp. 143-155.  
513  Deng, Z., Lev, B. & Narin, F. 1999. Science and technology as predictors of stock performance. 
Financial Analysts Journal, May / June. 
514  Trajtenberg, M. 1989. The welfare analysis of product innovations with an application to computed 
tomography scanners. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, pp. 445-479. 
515  Trajtenberg, M.1990. A penny for your quotes: patent citations and the value of innovations. Rand 
Journal of Economics, Vol.21, pp.172-187. 
516  Albert, M., Avery, D., Narin, F. & McAllister, P. 1991. Direct validation of citation counts as 
indicators of industrially important patents. Research Policy, Vol. 20, pp. 251-259. 
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worth defending517. The citation counts used in this study have been obtained from the 
American patent database. As the aim was to obtain a measure of a long-term 
inheritance of technological competence, the citations were counted for the relatively 
long period of 1976 to 1995, that is, until the start of the period during which the firm 
growth was measured. Consistent with the approach adopted by Deng et alii518, a 
measure of citation intensity, that is, citations per patent, was used here instead of the 
total number of citations as the measure of the level of technological competence. 
5.3.5 Dependent and control variables 
The dependent variables in the model are the realized growth from the new markets that 
were entered on the basis of an existing technology, the growth expectations from the 
new markets at the time of entry, and reached growth as percent of growth expectations. 
To measure expectations with respect to the turnover of the project, the respondents 
were asked to evaluate the percentage of the whole company's turnover that the project 
was expected to generate by the end of its fifth year of operation. The first year of 
operation was defined to be the first year that the project had sales. To measure the 
results of the project, the respondents were asked to evaluate how large a percentage of 
the whole company's turnover the project actually generated by the end of the fifth year 
of operation. 
Reliable measurement of growth expectations from several years back in time is not 
easy. Distortions in answers may be due to remembering expectations inexactly or to 
purposefully misreporting them. However, this problem is not expected to be severe, as, 
because of their scope, the projects in question were important projects for the firm. Due 
to the importance of the projects it can be assumed that the growth expectations have 
been thoroughly researched, widely discussed and documented, and that the likelihood 
of expectations being remembered incorrectly or purposely misreported is consequently 
low.   
                                                 
517  Lanjouw, J. & Schankerman, M. 1997. Stylized facts on patent litigation: value, scope and 
ownership. Working Paper No. 6297, National Bureau of Economic Research, USA. 
518  Deng, Z., Lev, B. & Narin, F. 1999. Science and technology as predictors of stock performance. 
Financial Analysts Journal, May / June. 
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In order to be able to control the quality of the answers concerning the growth 
expectations, some qualitative control questions were asked using the –3 to +3 Likert-
scale. These control questions concerned how important the project was for the firm as a 
source of growth. The table below shows the correlations of the answers to these control 
questions with the question concerning growth expectations as percent of original sales. 
This question appears in the table that has “1” as the first column, and was formulated in 
the following way: What percentage of the whole company's turnover was the project 
expected to bring by the end of its fifth year of operation?  
Table 10: Pearson's correlation coefficients between quantitative and qualitative 
assessments of growth expectations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
2 A significant amount of new turnover was expected from the project 0,29*  
3 
The project was expected to be the most important 
source of growth for the company in the following 
years  
0,44*** 0,56***
 
4 The project was expected to create the base for the transition of the whole company to a new market  0,30* 0,24* 0,30* 
 
5 New technological fields were expected to be learned from the project  0,31* 0,12 0,34** 0,14 
 
6 New contacts were expected to be gained from the project  0,24* 0,23* 0,23* 0,20 0,12 
 
7 It was expected that a certain rising cycle could be exploited through the growth project  0,32* 0,31** 0,33** 0,36** 0,20 0,17 
1 - What percentage of the whole company's turnover was the project expected to bring in the end of its fifth year of 
operation?  
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1; one-tailed tests. N=63. Missing values replaced with 
means. 
The table shows that all control questions were positively and significantly correlated 
with the question regarding the growth expectations as percent of original sales. The 
respondents reporting higher numeric growth goals also tend to report higher growth 
expectations when responding to the qualitative questions. Most of the control questions 
were also positively and statistically significantly correlated with each other.  
Growth expectations and growth reached were used to calculate a dependent variable 
reflecting the actual variable of interest, percent of expectations reached. This dependent 
variable shows how correct the expectations were and it reflects the quality of decision-
making related to the project. It also reflects factors affecting commitment to the 
implementation of the project.   
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Several control variables are necessary in order to control for factors that may have an 
impact on the values of the dependent variables. Capon et alii519 provide a list of the 
most prevalent causal control variables in studies of performance. This list includes 
industry concentration, firm growth rate, firm size, capital intensity, research and 
development intensity, advertising intensity, and market share. With regard to 
explaining the performance of technology-based product market entries it was not 
considered critical to control for capital intensity, advertising intensity, and market 
share. The operationalizations of the variables are listed in the table below.  
Table 11: Operationalization of the control variables 
Variables Source 
Firm size External data 
Project size Asked in the questionnaire 
Research and development 
intensity 
Research and development investments as percent of sales 
1997-1999 and 1985-1987, asked in the questionnaire 
Main industry of the firm External data 
Home country of the firm External data 
The final control variable was the amount of analysis the firm had conducted concerning 
its technology-based growth opportunities. This was included as a control variable to 
account for any such analysis potentially done outside the group of junior, middle, or top 
management. For measurement purposes, knowledge concerning growth opportunities 
was detailed and narrowed down to a measure relevant for the sample firms. This 
measure identified the ways in which the firms had analyzed their technological 
competence to detect growth opportunities based on it. The respondents were asked 
whether there had been an attempt in their company to estimate the technology-based 
growth opportunities. The following statements were used to measure the variable 
analyzing technological competence to detect growth opportunities  
− In our company, we have a commonly known list or description of the most important 
areas of technological competence  
− In our company, we have a list or description of all documentable technological assets, 
such as patents, licenses, etc.  
− Documentable technological assets have been grouped into different areas of strength 
in technological competence  
                                                 
519  Capon, N., Farley, J. U. & Hoenig, S. 1990. Determinants of financial performance: a meta-
analysis. Management Science, Vol. 36, pp. 1143-1159. 
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− In our company, we have a list or description of "soft" technological assets, such as 
different persons' areas of specialization  
− "Soft" technological assets have been grouped into different areas of strength in 
technological competence  
− In our company, we have evaluated the competitive advantage in each area of 
technological competence 
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6 SURVEY RESULTS 
The empirical analysis is broken into two levels: firm level, which explains how the 
firm level growth constraints impact firm growth in the firms of the sample, and project 
level examining the success of individual technology leveraging projects. The inclusion 
of both firm and project levels is important because both opportunity detection and 
successful project implementation are essential components of technology-based growth 
and detail the impact of managerial resources on different levels. The firm level context 
can impact the project. The firm and project levels can be linked at this stage by 
studying the impact of the firm level growth constraints on the projects. Additionally the 
importance of that part of the firms’ growth that the projects have brought about in the 
years subsequent to their start is examined.  
6.1 Descriptive data analysis 
The following table shows the variables describing the types of firms and projects that 
were part of the study. The Likert-scale values of –3 to 3 were transformed to a scale of 
1 to 6, 1 corresponding to –3 and 6 corresponding to 3. Zero was transformed to a 
missing answer. 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics of variables related to types of firms and types of projects 
 
Firm size, 
sales 
MFIM 1999 
Annualized 
firm growth 
1995-99, 
% 
Research 
and 
develop-
ment 
invest-
ments, % 
of sales 
Growth 
aspiration, 
percent per 
year, % 
Growth 
expectat-
ions from 
project, % 
of original 
sales 
Reached 
growth 
through 
project, % 
of original 
sales 
Percent of 
growth 
expectat-
ions 
reached in 
the project
N 63 63 63 53 56 52 52 
Mean 5482 27 16 34 38 34 105 
Median 1055 12 6 15 23 20 96 
Std. Deviation 14466 37 36 48 47 33 85 
Skewness 5 2,8 5,5 3,7 3,4 0,9 1,6 
Kurtosis 22 9,6 34,3 17,8 17,2 -0,6 3,3 
Minimum 24 -12 0,8 0 1 1 0 
Maximum 78377 207 256 300 300 100 400 
In the table below, the firm size and research and development intensity are shown in 
more detail. The most numerous classes of firms in terms of size are firms with sales 
below half a billion FIM and those with sales between one and ten billion FIM. The 
   103 
most numerous class of firms with regard to research and development intensity is the 
one that has research and development investments of, as percentage of sales, between 
one and five percent; this class contains 25 firms. However, most firms had higher 
research and development intensity: sixteen firms had invested six to ten percent of their 
sales in research and development, ten firms 11 to 20 percent, and eleven firms more 
than twenty percent. 
Table 13: Firm size and research and development intensity 
Firm size, sales MFIM 1999 Research and development investments, % of sales 
Class, MFIM Number of firms Class, % of sales Number of firms 
24 to 99 4 0 1 
100 to 499 19 1 to 5 25 
500 to 999 8 6 to 10 16 
1000 to 9999 24 11 to 20 10 
10000 to 49999 7 21 to 30 4 
Over 50000 1 31 to 40 2 
  
 
Over 50 5 
With regard to yearly sales growth, the largest class of firms is the one with yearly 
growth from one to five percent. However, most firms had grown faster: 18 firms had 
grown at rates between 6 and 20 percent, while 26 firms had grown each year at rates 
faster than 20 percent. The firms reported having had even higher growth aspirations 
during the same period. It must be noted that this was a period of strong economic 
growth in Finland and Sweden.  
Table 14: Firm growth and growth aspiration 
 Annualized firm growth 1995-99 Growth aspiration, percent per year 
Class, percent 
growth per year Number of firms % of answers Number of firms % of answers 
 -12 to 0 3 5 1 2 
1 to 5 16 25 7 13 
6 to 10 7 11 10 19 
11 to 15 8 13 9 17 
16 to 20 3 5 3 6 
21 to 30 9 14 10 19 
31 to 40 6 10 1 2 
41 to 50 5 8 2 4 
Over 50 6 10 10 19 
Total 63 100 53 100 
The most common industry of the participating firms is “industrial goods”. This is 
representative of the Finnish and Swedish industrial structures. The second most 
common industry is the electronics industry. Because of the higher willingness of 
Finnish firms to participate in a Finnish study, the sample includes more Finnish firms 
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than Swedish ones. There were, however, no significant differences in the regression 
results when analyzed separately for the Finnish and the Swedish sample. The home 
country of the firm was included as a control variable.  
Table 15: Industries and countries 
 Number of firms % of firms 
Electronics 15 24 
Industrial goods 22 35 
Chemicals 4 6 
Pharmaceuticals 6 10 
Specialty materials 2 3 
Building materials 5 8 
Cable 4 6 
Software 4 6 
Metal 1 2 
Finland 49 78 
Sweden 14 22 
Total 63 100 
In general, most of the projects that were part of the study can be considered important 
projects for the participating firms, as most of the projects brought more than ten 
percent of the revenues of the firms at the end of the fifth year of the project. Most of 
the projects were also relatively successful in reaching more than 80 percent of their 
sales target. This, however, cannot be regarded as a statement about the success of 
technology leveraging projects in general, as it is possible that firms were willing to 
participate in the study only with respect to successful cases, even if participation with 
respect to unsuccessful cases was actively solicited. With this in mind, it is actually 
interesting that as many as 21 of the 63 cases were so unsuccessful as to reach less than 
80 percent of their goals. The projects took place in the later part of 1990’s, except for 
three of them, which took place in the 1980’s and one, where that idea originated from 
1979.    
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Table 16: Growth reached through project as percent of original sales and as percent of 
expectations 
Reached growth through project, 
percent of original sales  
Percent of growth expectations 
reached in the project 
Class, new sales 
as percent of 
original sales 
Number of firms   
Class, percent of 
growth 
expectations 
reached 
Number of firms 
1 to 10 17 0 to 50 12 
11 to 20 10 51 to 80 9 
21 to 50 11 81 to 100 14 
51 to 100 14 101 to 150 9 
 151 to 200 3 
Over 200 5 
Asking the respondents to indicate in how many years after the first year in which the 
project had sales was the project expected to become profitable was used to control for 
the profitability of the projects. At the end of the questionnaire, respondents were asked 
in how many years the project actually did become profitable. The results are shown in 
the table below. In general, projects reached profitability in three to four years. 
According to the reported numbers, most projects seemed to reach profitability on 
schedule, as can be seen in the following table. In all cases where no answer for 
reaching profitability was provided the date when profitability should have been reached 
had not passed yet. Thus reaching profitability by the due date was still possible.   
Table 17: Profitability of the projects 
 Expected year of reaching profitability
Year of reaching 
profitability 
How much before expected 
date profitability was 
reached 
N 61 39 39 
Mean 4 4 0 
Median 3 3 0 
Std. Deviation 2 3 3 
Skewness 2 2 0 
Kurtosis 6 6 8 
Minimum 1 1 -10 
Maximum 15 15 9 
Resources available for identifying and planning technology-based growth projects 
varied considerably between firms in amount and consistence as shown in the table 
below. Most firms reported the managing director using at least five percent of his or 
her time in these activities. One firm even reported identifying and planning growth 
projects as the main task of the managing director. More people were in general 
committed to the task on a part time basis than full time, suggesting that a structure with 
a small full time core group, and a larger part time extended group, would be common. 
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In general, in both part and full time groups, more resources from lower management 
levels were committed to the task than from higher levels, as can be seen in the 
following table.  
Table 18: Amount and consistence of managerial resources available for growth  
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N 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Mean 1 3 6 10 14 0 2 3 6 5 
Median 1 2 4 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 
Std. Deviation 0,9 2,8 6,5 17,0 49,1 0,3 3,6 4,9 12,2 16,1 
Skewness 3,0 1,6 1,5 2,3 6,1 3,0 5,6 3,3 4,7 4,4 
Kurtosis 12,7 4,5 1,7 5,4 40,9 7,0 34,5 12,2 26,2 22,7 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 5 15 25 80 350 1 25 25 80 100 
In most firms at least one person from top, middle and junior management is committed 
full time to identifying and planning technology-related growth projects. In general, the 
number of people committed increases towards lower levels of management. In 21 
firms, more than three junior managers were committed full time to growth projects.   
Table 19: Amount and consistence of full time managerial resources available for growth 
 Number of firms per class 
 Full time 
Class, number of people Top management Middle management Junior management 
0 22 25 23 
1 19 5 4 
2 12 11 5 
3 2 4 3 
Over 3 2 12 21 
The table below presents figures describing the two variables: technology evaluation 
and patent citation intensity. The latter was used to show the level of technological 
competence. The answers concerning technology evaluation ranged from the lowest 1 to 
the highest 6, both mean and median lying at 4. The source for the patent citation data 
was the US patent database. 
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Table 20: Technology evaluation and patent citation intensity 
Technology evaluation Patent citation intensity 
N 62 63 
Mean 4 1 
Median 4 1 
Std. Deviation 1,2 0,9 
Skewness -0,7 2,4 
Kurtosis 0,2 6,4 
Minimum 1 0 
Maximum 6 4 
The descriptive statistics concerning the variables related to the success of individual 
technology leveraging projects are shown in the table below. The answers in almost all 
questions ranged between the highest and lowest possible evaluations. Only for the 
variable “existing process” was the highest answer five, while, for “operations fit” and 
“technology fit”, the lowest scores were 2. Means and medians were for most variables 
in the range of four to five, indicating a rather positive assessment of decision-making 
characteristics and fit of operational capabilities. The means and medians were on the 
negative side only for the two decision-making variables: existing process and degree of 
conflict. The mean and median were similarly low also for marketing and sales 
investments. 
Table 21: Decision-making process characteristics and applicability of existing 
operational capabilities in the new market 
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N 53 54 63 60 60 62 62 60 62 62 
Mean 5 4 4 3 3 5 4 3 5 4 
Median 5 5 4 3 3 5 4 3 5 4 
Std. 
Deviation 1,3 1,3 1,0 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,4 0,9 1,2 
Skewness -1,0 -0,9 -0,4 0,0 0,3 -0,5 -0,4 0,1 -1,1 -0,4 
Kurtosis 0,6 0,3 0,4 -1,0 -0,8 -0,7 0,0 -0,9 1,6 0,2 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 
Maximum 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Most variables were usable for maximum likelihood and regression analyses in their raw 
form, as they had a relatively normal distribution. All significant skewness in the 
variables was positive; therefore, for the sake of the variables that were not normally 
distributed, a logarithmic transformation was performed in order to assure normality. 
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6.2 Firm level context for the technology-based product market entries 
This chapter investigates the firm level context for the technology-based product market 
entries, focusing on the impact of managerial services available for growth on firm 
growth in technology-intensive firms, and the other firm level constraints to growth 
discussed in Chapter 4, Section 1. The factors impacting growth of technology intensive 
firms that were included in addition to managerial resources are the firm’s growth 
aspiration, size, level of technological competence, conducted technology evaluation, 
the level of R&D investments, the industry the firm is active in, and its home country.  
The correlations between the variables of the firm level context are presented in the 
table below. The correlation of the dependent variable, firm growth, with all 
independent and control variables are shown in the first column, followed by the 
independent variable in column two, and control variables in rows three to fifteen. The 
independent variable correlates statistically significantly and positively with firm 
growth. The most interesting control variables are the research and development 
investments, growth aspiration, and the electronics industry. Research and development 
investments are positively correlated with firm growth and growth aspiration. The 
negative correlation of research and development investments with firm size results 
from the fact that research and development investments were measured as percent of 
sales. Growth aspiration and electronics industry are positively correlated with each 
other and with firm growth.  
The positive correlation between the level of technological competence – measured as 
patent citation intensity over a period of 20 years – with firm size points to a stronger 
base of technological competencies in the larger firms. It tells us that, on average, the 
patents of larger firms have been more frequently cited than the patents of smaller firms. 
This could be due to larger firms being able to invest in absolute terms more in research 
and development work. It seems plausible that, on average, larger investments yield the 
more significant innovations. 
The positive correlation of electronics industry with growth aspiration and research and 
development investments reflects the growth of the electronics industry in Finland and 
Sweden during the nineties. The emergence of new opportunities in new applications 
especially in the field of communication explains the firms’ high growth aspirations and 
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high investments in research and development. The negative correlation between 
Sweden as the country and firm size is caused by the generally higher willingness of the 
large Finnish firms to participate when compared to large Swedish firms. 
Table 22: Pearson's correlation coefficients between the independent, dependent and 
control variables of the technology leveraging model on firm level 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
2 Managerial resources available   
   for growth 0,374**       
3 Technology evaluation 0,058 0,049      
4 Level of technological  
   competence 0,121 0,002 0,183+     
5 Growth aspiration 0,297* 0,011 -0,201+ -0,106    
6 Firm size -0,016 0,125 0,186+ 0,536*** -0,181+   
7 Research and development  
   intensity 0,437*** 0,037 0,064 0,002 0,293* -0,231*  
8 Electronics 0,243* -0,147 -0,119 0,261* 0,460*** -0,098 0,483*** 
9 Chemicals -0,159 0,119 0,124 -0,021 -0,249* 0,178+ -0,197+ 
10 Pharmaceuticals 0,058 -0,077 -0,029 -0,089 -0,232* -0,157 0,297* 
11 Specialty materials 0,090 0,004 -0,062 0,144 -0,036 0,181+ 0,030 
12 Cable -0,129 0,030 0,096 -0,206+ -0,067 -0,023 -0,035 
13 Software 0,059 -0,031 0,140 -0,143 0,067 -0,246* 0,141 
14 Metal 0,000 -0,015 0,072 0,000 -0,041 0,133 -0,021 
15 Country: Sweden 0,200+ 0,005 -0,195+ -0,076 0,262* -0,435*** 0,163 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1; one-tailed tests. N=59. Missing values replaced with 
means. 
Regression analyses were carried out in order to test the impact of the aspects of firm 
level context on firm growth. A model where all variables were entered is shown in all 
the following tables presenting results of regression analyses as the “Base” model. In the 
next step, the variables that were insignificant were eliminated (Backward Elimination). 
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In order to detect possible multicollinearity, the tolerance and VIF values were 
examined. All tolerance values were above 0,10, and all VIF values below 5. Therefore, 
multicollinearity should not cause erroneous results.  
Table 23: Regression analysis results: Firm level context 
Dependent variable: Firm growth 
 Base B.E. 
Managerial resources available for growth 0,365** 0,359** 
Control variables: 
Technology evaluation 0,091  
Level of technological competence 0,076  
Research and development intensity 0,324+ 0,424*** 
Growth aspiration 0,180  
Firm size 0,042  
Electronics 0,001  
Chemicals -0,095  
Pharmaceuticals 0,033  
Specialty materials 0,076  
Cable -0,092  
Software -0,033  
Metal 0,012  
Sweden 0,134  
Model: 
R² 0,406 0,320 
Adjusted R² 0,217 0,295 
F 2,150* 13,16*** 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1  
Coefficients are standardized beta weights. Missing values replaced with means. N=59 
Dependent variable is firm growth 
Amount of managerial resources available for growth seems to be positively related to 
growth.  The only other variable having a significant impact in the regression model is 
research and development intensity, which is positively related to growth.  
The evidence as to the positive impact of managerial resources available for growth on 
growth has to be considered as only tentative at this point. Although the relationship 
receives support from the empirical data, two factors weaken the power of this evidence. 
First, the direction of causality between managerial services available for growth and 
firm growth cannot be known for certain. The causality that was assumed is that the 
amount of managerial resources available for growth would increase firm growth. It 
may, however, also be that firm growth increases the amount of managerial resources 
invested in growth. The assumed direction of causality is to some extent supported by 
four factors. First, the amount of managerial resources for growth was measured 
concerning a period before the period from which firm growth was measured. Here the 
problem may be that the respondents do not remember correctly what the situation was 
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five years ago, and respond rather according to today’s situation. Second, firm size was 
controlled, which should control for the effect that as firms grow larger, their functions 
become more specialized, and only because of this evolution there may be more 
managerial resources available for growth. Firm size in the sample did not correlate with 
managerial resources available for growth or with firm growth. This points to the 
differences in the amounts of resources firms have decided to invest in growth. Third, a 
theoretical argument exists for the causal relationship from managerial resources 
available for growth520 to firm growth. Fourth, research on organizational structures has 
proposed that the number of individuals in specialized supportive tasks or functions are 
associated also with variables other than organizational size in complex ways521. 
Therefore, it would seem too simplified to assume that the size of managerial resources 
invested for identifying and planning growth projects would directly depend on growth.  
The second factor that may be weakening the power of the evidence in favor of the 
proposed relationship is that many other factors affect growth on the firm level as well. 
It may be that the empirical support found for the relationship is only due to covariation 
of the variable “managerial resources available for growth” with some other factors, and 
that these other factors are actually the ones impacting firm growth. This problem exists 
always when firm growth is the dependent variable, as controlling all factors possibly 
affecting growth is virtually impossible. 
6.3 Model of technology-based product market entries  
The project level model of technology-based product market entries explains the impact 
of the hypothesized factors on the deviation of the reached growth from the expectations 
in implementing technology-leveraging projects. The hypothesized factors are firm level 
factors, characteristics of the decision-making process concerning the project, 
applicability of existing operational capabilities in the new market, and size of the 
project.  
                                                 
520  Penrose, E. 1972 (orig. publ. 1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. Basil Blackwell and 
Mott, Oxford, 5th edition.  
521  Child, J. 1973. Parkinson’s progress – accounting for the number of specialists in organizations. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Sept, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 328-. 
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Figure 4: Model of technology-based product market entries  
6.3.1 Correlations between the dependent variables 
The success of the projects is measured with three dependent variables. The first 
dependent variable is the deviation of reached results from expected results of the 
project, as a percentage of the expectations reached. This dependent variable shows how 
successful the implementation of the project was. In addition to this dependent variable, 
also expected and reached growth from the project are used as dependent variables to 
highlight the mechanisms through which the independent variables affect deviation from 
expectations. The dependent variables have significant correlations with each other. 
These are important to understand in order to be able to interpret the results correctly.  
The correlations of the three dependent variables measuring the success of individual 
projects together with firm growth as an indication of the ultimate success of a firm’s 
growth strategy are shown in the Table below. 
Table 24: Pearson's correlation coefficients between dependent variables 
  1 2 3 
     
2 Percent reached -0,221*  
3 Growth reached 0,750*** 0,408*** 
 
 
4 Firm growth 0,254* -0,176+ 0,152 
1 – Growth expectations 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1; one-tailed tests. N=63. Missing values replaced with 
means. 
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The statistically significant positive correlations are the following 
• Growth expectations regarding the project and growth reached in the project. 
This strong correlation indicates that the projects reached the expectations 
relatively closely. It remains unclear, whether the expectations were “correct”: 
they may have been set too low, for example, and have guided the project to 
reach only so much growth. 
• Firm growth and growth expectations. This is an interesting correlation 
suggesting that fast-growth firms engage in larger growth projects. This may be 
caused by a tendency to overstate the growth expectations in the plans due to 
being used to talking about large growth numbers in the fast-growth 
environment.  
• Percent of growth expectations reached and growth reached. This is not 
surprising, as the first is calculated with the help of the second.  
The statistically significant negative correlations are the following 
• Percent of growth expectations reached and growth expectations. This suggests 
that small projects reach their goal more often. 
• Percent of growth expectations reached and firm growth. This suggests that 
faster-growth firms fail more often in reaching the goals of their growth projects. 
This can be caused by engaging in larger projects. 
6.3.2 Correlations between the model variables  
The correlations between the variables of the model are presented in the table below. 
The correlations of the dependent variables, that is, percent reached, expected growth 
and reached growth, with each other are shown in the first three columns. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, these three dependent variables are all significantly correlated 
with each other. Projects with higher growth expectations tend to reach a lesser 
percentage of these expectations.  
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With regard to the firm level variables, research and development intensity of the firm is 
positively correlated with growth expectations and reached growth from the project. It is 
negatively correlated with functional participation and conflict in the project, as well as 
with the fit of the existing marketing and sales capabilities in the entered market. It is 
positively correlated with CEO and top management participation, financial analysis, 
technology investments made in the project, and technological learning in the project. 
Furthermore, research and development intensity is positively correlated with growth 
aspiration.  
Growth aspiration is positively correlated with growth expectations and growth reached 
through the project. It is negatively correlated with junior management participation, 
information intensity, functional participation, existing process, and business plan. Firm 
growth is positively correlated with growth expectations and operations fit. Managerial 
resources available for growth is positively correlated with junior management, 
information intensity, functional participation, firm size, and firm growth. It is 
negatively correlated with growth expectations, growth reached from project, and 
technological learning.  
Interestingly, firm size is significantly correlated with most project level variables, 
suggesting that the size of a firm may impact the way decisions in leveraging projects 
are made. Firm size is positively correlated with participation of junior management in 
the decision-making process, with information intensity of the process, functional 
participation, the extent to which a pre-defined process exists for such a decision, how 
important a role a business plan had in the decision-making process, the degree of 
conflict, and operations fit. Firm size is negatively correlated with technology fit and 
technology investments. This suggests that in larger firms the decision-making 
processes of technology leveraging projects would be more participative and structured, 
and also characterized by more conflict. Firm size is negatively correlated with expected 
and reached growth from the project: small firms had implemented projects that brought 
more sales relative to the original sales. This is not surprising, as it would seem more 
difficult for a large firm than for a small firm to find a growth project that would, for 
example, double its size. Furthermore, firm size is negatively correlated with growth 
aspiration and research and development intensity. Smaller technology intensive firms 
seem to have bolder growth aspirations than the larger ones. 
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Project level variables positively correlated with percentage reached include 
participation of junior management in the decision-making process and technology fit. 
Marketing and sales investments are negatively correlated with the percentage reached. 
Expected growth is positively correlated with CEO and top management participation, 
financial analysis and technology investments. Expected growth is negatively correlated 
with conflict, technology fit and marketing and sales fit. Reached growth from the 
project is positively correlated with CEO and top management participation, financial 
analysis and technological learning. Reached growth is negatively correlated with 
functional participation, conflict and marketing and sales fit. 
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Table 25: Pearson's correlation coefficients betw
een the dependent, project level and 
firm
 level variables of the m
odel of technology-based product m
arket entries – part 1  
 
Growth expectations 
Percentage reached 
Growth from project 
CEO & top 
management 
Middle management 
Junior management 
Information intensity 
Functional 
participation 
Financial analysis 
Existing process 
Business plan 
Conflict 
Operations fit 
Marketing and sales fit 
Marketing and sales 
investments 
Technology fit 
Technology 
investments 
Technological learning 
Firm size 
Growth aspiration 
R&D intensity 
Firm growth 
Percentage 
reached 
 -0,221* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
row
th from
 
project 
0,750*** 
0,408*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
EO
 & top 
m
anagem
ent 
0,351** 
0,043 
0,355** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
iddle 
m
anagem
ent 
0,197 
-0,102 
0,140 
0,276* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Junior 
m
anagem
ent 
-0,075 
0,242* 
0,137 
-0,003 
0,304** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inform
ation 
intensity 
0,131 
0,013 
0,170 
0,082 
0,452*** 
0,594*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Functional 
participation 
-0,126 
-0,186 
 -
0,295** 
0,206 
0,140 
0,204 
0,144 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
analysis 
0,299** 
0,100 
0,385*** 
0,082 
0,229* 
0,244* 
0,487*** 
-0,131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Existing 
process 
0,081 
-0,114 
-0,006 
0,081 
0,191 
0,192 
0,378** 
0,296** 
0,121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business plan 
0,122 
-0,034 
0,149 
0,211* 
0,228* 
0,204 
0,448*** 
-0,012 
0,329** 
0,438*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
onflict 
 -0,229* 
-0,059 
 -0,254* 
0,028 
0,083 
-0,179 
0,002 
0,041 
0,005 
0,059 
0,049 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1; one-tailed tests. N
=63. M
issing values replaced 
w
ith m
ean. 
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Table 26: Pearson's correlation coefficients betw
een the dependent, project level and 
firm
 level variables of the m
odel of technology-based product m
arket entries – part 2  
  
Growth expectations 
Percentage reached 
Growth from project 
CEO & top 
management 
Middle management 
Junior management 
Information intensity 
Functional 
participation 
Financial analysis 
Existing process 
Business plan 
Conflict 
Operations fit 
Marketing and sales fit 
Marketing and sales 
investments 
Technology fit 
Technology 
investments 
Technological learning 
Firm size 
Growth aspiration 
R&D intensity 
Firm growth 
O
perations fit 
-0,056 
-0,084 
-0,129 
0,028 
0,257* 
0,065 
0,247* 
0,196 
0,024 
0,268* 
0,336** 
0,029 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
arketing and 
sales fit 
 -0,241* 
-0,101 
 -0,220* 
-0,031 
0,126 
-0,080 
0,083 
-0,040 
-0,053 
0,113 
0,046 
0,256* 
0,131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
arketing and 
sales 
investm
ents 
0,046 
 -0,244* 
-0,091 
-0,048 
0,103 
-0,164 
-0,075 
-0,113 
0,051 
0,010 
-0,010 
0,129 
0,214* 
0,360** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology fit 
 -0,211* 
0,241* 
-0,017 
-0,050 
0,108 
0,002 
-0,003 
-0,106 
-0,047 
-0,055 
-0,070 
-0,194 
0,152 
0,091 
0,105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology 
investm
ents 
0,270* 
 -0,237* 
0,122 
0,214* 
0,251* 
-0,046 
0,062 
0,006 
-0,016 
-0,062 
-0,066 
-0,028 
0,092 
0,074 
0,154 
0,091 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technological 
learning 
0,177 
0,056 
0,237* 
0,079 
-0,008 
0,036 
0,198 
-0,111 
0,007 
0,058 
0,098 
0,000 
0,163 
-0,065 
0,071 
-0,144 
0,432*** 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm
 size 
 -0,248* 
-0,075 
 -
0,326** 
-0,077 
0,196 
0,263* 
0,307** 
0,274* 
0,178 
0,259* 
0,320** 
0,338** 
0,221* 
0,080 
-0,141 
 -0,276* 
 -0,281* 
-0,028 
 
 
 
 
G
row
th 
aspiration 
0,251* 
0,040 
0,254* 
-0,002 
-0,105 
 -
0,391*** 
 -
0,313** 
 -0,247* 
0,005 
 -
0,387*** 
 -0,245* 
-0,124 
-0,130 
0,032 
0,128 
0,065 
0,085 
-0,053 
 -
0,356** 
 
 
 
R
&D
 intensity 
0,472*** 
0,023 
0,522*** 
0,266* 
-0,048 
-0,104 
0,038 
 -0,230* 
0,265* 
-0,150 
0,003 
 -0,284* 
-0,148 
 -0,272* 
0,012 
0,207 
0,354** 
0,276* 
 -
0,494*** 
0,312** 
 
 
Firm
 grow
th 
0,254* 
-0,176 
0,152 
0,184 
0,169 
0,011 
0,068 
0,073 
-0,011 
0,101 
0,165 
-0,022 
0,300** 
0,087 
0,035 
0,014 
-0,002 
-0,159 
0,094 
0,190 
0,199 
 
M
anagerial 
resources 
-0,196+ 
-0,05 
-0,178+ 
0,077 
0,106 
0,294** 
0,254* 
0,293** 
0,146 
0,109 
0,116 
0,042 
0,124 
0,058 
-0,12 
0,001 
-0,140 
-0,276* 
0,239* 
-0,090 
-0,120 
0,305** 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1; one-tailed tests. N
=63. M
issing values replaced 
w
ith m
ean. 
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6.3.3 Regression analysis results of the model of technology-based product market 
entries 
The regressions were carried out in three steps in order to first study the impacts of 
different groups of factors on the leveraging projects before putting them together in one 
model. First, only the impact of firm level factors on the goals, implementation and the 
results of the projects were studied. These were firm size, two variables measuring the 
firms’ growth orientation (annual firm growth during the past five years and growth 
aspiration), managerial resources available for growth, and the research and 
development intensity of the firms. These correspond to the first hypothesis. The results 
are presented in the following Table. All tolerance values were clearly above 0,1 and all 
VIF values clearly below 5. Multicollinearity should not cause problems in the 
regression. 
Table 27: Regression analysis – Hypothesis 1: Firm level factors 
Dependent  variables: Growth expectations Percent reached Reached growth 
 Base B.E. Base B.E. Base B.E. 
Hypothesis 1:       
Firm size -0,011  -0,023  -0,066  
Growth aspiration 0,066  0,061  0,064  
Firm growth 0,234+ 0,243* -0,199  0,101  
R&D intensity 0,374** 0,397** 0,035  0,433** 0,522***  
Managerial resources -0,214+ -0,223+ 0,023  -0,135  
Model:       
R² 0,297 0,293 0,039  0,303 0,273 
Adjusted R² 0,235 0,257 -0,045  0,242 0,261 
F 4,82*** 8,14*** 0,46  4,96*** 22,86*** 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1; one-tailed tests.  
Coefficients are standardized beta coefficients. Missing values replaced with means. N=63 
The main results from the analysis of the firm level factors corresponding to the 
Hypothesis 1 are as follows: 
Growth expectations reflecting the goals of the project is  
• positively influenced by research and development intensity and firm growth. 
This implies that high-growth firms, which also invest heavily in creating 
opportunities for growth in the form of research and development, either tend to 
set the expectations for the growth projects higher, or engage in larger projects. 
This supports Hypothesis 1d concerning the positive impact of research and 
development investments on growth expectations. It provides partial evidence to 
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Hypothesis 1c concerning the positive impact of high growth orientation on 
growth expectations from a certain project. 
• negatively influenced by managerial resources available for growth. This implies 
that firms that invest in leveraging growth opportunities either tend to set the 
expectations for the growth projects lower or engage in smaller projects. From 
analyzing the impact of the factors related to technology leveraging on the firm 
level, we know that the amount of managerial resources available for growth is 
positively associated with overall firm growth. Therefore, it seems that firms, 
which invest in managerial resources available for growth, grow faster than other 
firms through implementing smaller but a larger number of growth projects. This 
supports Hypothesis 1e concerning the impact of managerial resources available 
for growth on growth expectations from a certain leveraging project. 
Percent of growth expectations reached in the project, which reflects the implementation 
success of the project, is not statistically significantly influenced by any firm level 
factors. This is interesting as it suggests that a firm of any size, growth orientation, and 
research and development intensity can conduct technology leveraging projects equally 
successfully provided it adopts successful practices of conducting such projects. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1b does not receive support: the wider range of complementary capabilities 
available to large firms does not seem to significantly support reaching the project goals, 
or this factor is overpowered by the negative characteristics of large firms. Furthermore, 
the other hypothesis regarding firm size – H1a – remained without support, as firm size 
had no impact on growth expectations.    
The measure of the results of the project, growth reached through the project as percent 
of original firm sales, is positively influenced by research and development intensity. 
This means the research and development intensity is the only one of the firm-level 
factors impacting the growth reached in the projects even after accounting for the impact 
of the implementation success. 
The results of the regression analyses testing Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5 concerning the 
impact of the project level factors are presented in the following table. All tolerance 
values were clearly above 0,1 and all VIF values clearly below 5. Multicollinearity 
should not cause problems in the regression. Hypothesis 2 concerns the impact of 
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project size on reaching the set targets. Hypothesis 3 concerns the impact of market 
familiarity on reaching the project targets. Hypotheses 4 and 5 concern how 
characteristics of the decision-making process impact the success of individual projects.  
Table 28: Regression analysis – Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5: Project level factors 
Dependent  variables: Growth expectations Percent reached Reached growth 
 Base B.E. Base B.E. Base B.E. 
Hypothesis 2:       
Expected growth   -0,196   0,739***  0,708***  
Hypothesis 3:       
Technology fit -0,281* -0,264* 0,292* 0,305* 0,200* -0,165* 
Marketing and sales fit -0,247*  0,006  0,072  
Operations fit -0,056  0,017  -0,050  
Technology investments 0,197 0,223* -0,309* -0,313* -0,180* -0,127+ 
Marketing and sales investments 0,119  -0,229+ -0,230* -0,138+ -0,165* 
Technological learning -0,031    0,278+  0,222+  0,226*  0,206*  
Hypothesis 4:       
CEO and top management  0,282* 0,273* 0,250+  0,172* 0,176* 
Junior management  -0,263+ -0,198+ 0,351* 0,222+  0,277** 0,268** 
Middle management  0,143  -0,058  -0,020  
Hypothesis 5:       
Information intensity  0,148  -0,228  -0,174 -0,185+ 
Functional participation -0,200  -0,229 -0,198+  -0,190* -0,219** 
Financial analysis 0,189 0,318** 0,207  0,169+ 0,165+ 
Existing process 0,151   -0,018  -0,033  
Business plan -0,071  -0,119  -0,003  
Conflict -0,294* -0,319** 0,048  0,005  
Model:       
R² 0,494 0,395 0,442 0,307 0,772 0,765 
Adjusted R² 0,332 0,330 0,220 0,233 0,693 0,720 
F 3,06** 6,09*** 2,10* 4,13** 9,73*** 16,92*** 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1; one-tailed tests.  
Coefficients are standardized beta coefficients. Missing values replaced with means. N=63 
 
The main results from the analysis of the project level factors corresponding to the 
Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5 are as follows: 
• Growth expectations is  
- positively influenced by technology investments, participation of the 
CEO and top management and financial analysis 
- negatively influenced by technology fit, participation of junior 
management, and conflict. 
• Percent of growth expectations reached in the project is 
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- positively influenced by technology fit and technological learning (H3), 
as well as participation of junior management (H4)  
- negatively influenced by technology investments and marketing and 
sales investments (H3), as well as functional participation. The latter 
supports the opposite of Hypothesis 5. 
• Growth reached through the project as percent of original firm sales is 
- positively influenced by technological learning, participation of the CEO 
and top management, participation of junior management, financial 
analysis, and growth expectations 
- negatively influenced by technology fit, technology investments, 
marketing and sales investments, information intensity, and functional 
participation.   
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As the third step, firm level as well as project level factors were combined into one 
model. The results are shown in the Table below. 
Table 29: Regression analysis – Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5: Final model 
Dependent  variables: Growth expectations Percent reached Reached growth 
 Base B.E. Base B.E. Base B.E. 
Hypothesis 1:       
Firm size -0,166 -0,316** -0,202  -0,232* -0,262***  
Growth aspiration 0,120  0,211 0,214+  0,109  
Firm growth 0,277* 0,352*** -0,027  0,039  
R&D intensity 0,046  -0,140  -0,008  
Managerial resources -0,220+ -0,288** -0,139  -0,057  
Hypothesis 2:       
Expected growth   -0,278  -0,263*  0,635***  0,592***  
Hypothesis 3:       
Technology fit -0,295* -0,258* 0,264+ 0,244* 0,136  
Marketing and sales fit -0,224+ -0,180+ -0,034  0,060  
Operations fit -0,089  0,047  -0,030  
Technology investments 0,125  -0,316* -0,312* -0,224* -0,190* 
Marketing and sales investments 0,069  -0,267+ -0,222* -0,174* -0,126+ 
Technological learning -0,010   0,271+  0,243+  0,241*  0,171*  
Hypothesis 4:       
CEO and top management  0,199+ 0,236*  0,280+ 0,236+ 0,153+ 0,177* 
Junior management  -0,141  0,432* 0,297* 0,332** 0,216** 
Middle management  0,133  -0,063  0,017  
Hypothesis 5:       
Information intensity  0,161  -0,174  -0,158  
Functional participation -0,080  -0,176 -0,246*  -0,135 -0,201** 
Financial analysis 0,219 0,360***  0,258  0,208* 0,163* 
Existing process 0,163  0,029  0,002  
Business plan -0,038  -0,068  0,042  
Conflict -0,180  0,104  0,068  
Model:       
R² 0,616 0,513 0,485 0,395 0,810 0,773 
Adjusted R² 0,433 0,451 0,221 0,292 0,712 0,735 
F 3,36*** 8,28*** 1,84*** 3,85*** 8,31*** 20,09*** 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1; one-tailed tests.  
Coefficients are standardized beta coefficients. Missing values replaced with means. N=63 
The main results from the combined analysis of the firm level and the project level 
factors corresponding to the Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are as follows 
• Growth expectations is  
- positively influenced by firm growth, participation of the CEO and top 
management, and financial analysis 
- negatively influenced by firm size, managerial resources available for 
growth, technology fit, and marketing and sales fit  
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• Percent of growth expectations reached in the project is 
- positively influenced by growth aspiration, technology fit, participation 
of CEO and top management, participation of junior management, and 
technological learning 
- negatively influenced by technology investments, marketing and sales 
investments, functional participation, and growth expectations 
• Growth reached through the project as percent of original firm sales is 
- positively influenced by participation of the CEO and top management, 
participation of junior management, financial analysis, technological 
learning, and growth expectations 
- negatively influenced by firm size, technology investments, marketing 
and sales investments, and functional participation   
The firm level hypotheses receive some support. H1a is supported: large firm size 
reduces growth expectations in relation to firm size. H1b regarding the impact of the 
firm size on the percent of results reached does not receive support. H1c partially 
receives support, as firm growth increases the expectations. Growth aspiration had no 
statistically significant impact on growth expectations. H1d concerning the impact of 
research and development intensity received no support. H1e is supported as managerial 
resources reduce growth expectations from a single project. Hypothesis 2 concerning the 
positive impact of small project size on reaching the goals received support.   
The applicability of the existing operational capabilities in the entered market was 
hypothesized to reduce deviation from expectations set to a technology-leveraging 
project. This was confirmed for the part of the technological competence, but not for 
marketing and sales, and operations. Investments in technology, marketing, and sales 
increased deviation from expectations related to an individual technology-leveraging 
project, further confirming Hypothesis 3. Applicability of the existing operational 
capabilities in the entered market decreased the level to which the growth expectations 
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were set in the projects. This may be due to the closeness and familiarity of the entered 
market. This finding applies in particular to the technological competence.  
Wide participation in the decision-making process of key personnel was hypothesized to 
reduce deviation from expectations related to an individual technology-leveraging 
project. This hypothesis was confirmed for CEO, top management, and junior 
management participation, but not for middle management participation. The 
participation of the CEO and top management increased growth expectations. In the 
model with the project level variables only the opposite seems to be the case with regard 
to junior management, which points to a more conservative approach of junior 
management in setting the targets for a project.  
High analytical quality of the decision-making process was hypothesized to reduce 
deviation from expectations. This hypothesis was not confirmed with regard to any of 
the six variables used to measure different aspects of analytical quality. In fact, the 
opposite was confirmed with regard to functional participation. With regard to analytical 
quality and growth expectations, two of the six variables had statistically significant 
relationships. In the model with the project level variables only, high level of conflict 
reduced growth expectations, presumably because of restricting over-optimism in the 
planning. High level of financial analysis increased growth expectations, which is likely 
to point towards a practice of doing more financial analysis in larger projects.  
6.3.4 Structural equation model of the project level variables 
From the above regression analysis, it is not quite clear how the decision-making 
process characteristics and the applicability of existing capabilities in the entered market 
are related to the success of the projects. It may be that some of the variables impact the 
deviation from expectations only by influencing the level at which growth expectations 
are set. It is interesting to examine more in-depth through which mechanisms the 
variables are related to project success. A structural equation model is constructed 
where growth expectations mediate the impact of decision-making process 
characteristics and the applicability of operational capabilities on the percentage of 
growth expectations reached. The model is presented in the figure below.  
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CEO & top management
Junior management
Functional participation
Marketing and
sales investments
Technology fit
Percent reachedGrowth expectations
-0,30*
Technology investments
0,34 0,47
0,22
-0,20+
0,02
-0,28**
-0,03
0,42***
0,17
0,26*
0,37*
-0,40**
-0,18+
-0,25+
 
Figure 5: Structural equation model of the project level of technology-based product 
market entries  
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1 
The numbers on the arrows represent the maximum likelihood coefficients of the relationships. 
The two numbers in the boxes “growth expectations” and “percent reached” indicate the R² of 
these variables. Error terms are omitted from the picture. 
The goodness of fit statistics of the structural equation regression indicate that the model 
has a good fit. The NFI (0.985) and CFI (0.999) indicators of fit show acceptable levels, 
i.e. levels very close to 1522. The RMSEA (0.0358) value is good as it is less than 0,05523. 
The Chi-square statistic for the regression is 16.37. The maximum likelihood 
coefficients of the model are presented in the Table below. First, the coefficients of the 
impacts of the six variables on growth expectations are shown, and then the impacts of 
the six variables on the percentage of growth expectations reached are shown. In the last 
row, the direct impact of growth expectations on percentage reached is shown. 
                                                 
522  Bentler, P. M. & Bonett, D. G. 1980. Significance test and goodness of fit in the analysis of 
covariance structures. Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 88, pp. 588-606.  
523  Browne, M. W. & Cudeck, R. 1993. Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In: Bollen, K. A. & 
Long, J. S. (Eds.) Testing structural equation models. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, 
California, USA.   
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Table 30: Maximum likelihood coefficients of the variables in the structural equation 
model 
Dependent variables Growth expectations Percent reached 
   
CEO & top management 0,420*** 0,366* 
Junior management -0,032 0,263* 
Functional participation -0,281** -0,397** 
Marketing and sales investments 0,019 -0,180+ 
Technology fit -0,197+ 0,167 
Technology investments 0,220 -0,247+ 
Growth expectations  -0,298* 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1 
Coefficients are maximum likelihood coefficients. Missing values estimated. N=63 
The coefficients of the impact of the CEO and top management participation on both 
growth expectations, and percentage reached, are significant and positive. The 
participation of the CEO and top management seems to cause setting the growth 
expectations high as well as reaching the set expectations. The impact of the 
participation of junior management on percentage reached is statistically significant and 
positive, but the impact on growth expectations is not significant. It seems that the 
participation of junior management affects the success of leveraging projects by 
increasing the likelihood of reaching the set goals. Functional participation impacts 
significantly and negatively both growth expectations and the percentage reached. The 
impact of marketing and sales as well as technology investments on the percentage 
reached is negative and almost significant, and the impact on growth expectations is 
insignificant. It may be that large marketing, sales, and technology investments 
contribute to the uncertainty of reaching the goals of the project.  
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6.3.5 Impact of growth projects on firm growth  
The following table shows regressions demonstrating the impact that the individual, 
studied growth projects have had on firm growth. The variable “growth reached” in the 
projects has been added to the firm level model as an independent variable. 
Table 31: Regression analysis results, firm growth as dependent variable: Firm level 
factors and growth reached in the studied leveraging project 
Dependent variable: Firm growth 
 Base B.E. 
Managerial resources available for growth 0,405** 0,393*** 
Impact of growth from studied projects:   
Growth reached in the studied leveraging project 0,247+ 0,194+ 
Control variables: 
Technology evaluation 0,026  
Level of technological competence 0,026  
Research and development intensity 0,254 0,358** 
Growth aspiration 0,158  
Firm size 0,111  
Electronics -0,006  
Chemicals -0,102  
Pharmaceuticals 0,067  
Specialty materials 0,045  
Cable -0,068  
Software -0,029  
Metal -0,026  
Sweden 0,158  
Model: 
R² 0,447 0,352 
Adjusted R² 0,253 0,317 
F 2,312* 9,956*** 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1  
Coefficients are standardized beta weights. Missing values replaced with means. N=59 
The results show that, in general, the relationship is not statistically significant. A likely 
reason to this is that some firms in the sample, which reported large growth projects as 
compared to firm size, had not been growing much on the firm level due to divestment 
of other business lines. This result also points out how difficult it is to draw conclusions 
about the firm level growth on the basis of a single project. Projects are scoped 
differently, and a firm can grow fast either by doing many small projects or few large 
ones.   
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6.3.6 Interpretation of the results of the statistical analysis 
What determines whether the set growth goals are reached? 
According to the results from the regression analysis, projects seem to have a tendency 
to reach their goals when growth expectations as percentage of total sales are set low, 
when functional participation in the decision-making process is low, when marketing 
and sales investments are low, and when investments in technology are low. Projects 
also seem to have a tendency to reach their goals when CEO and top management 
participation is high, when junior management participation is high, when technology fit 
is high, when there is technological learning in the project, and when the firm has a high 
growth aspiration. 
Large investments in marketing, sales, and technology reduce the certainty of reaching 
the goals. There are two possible reasons for this. First, investments often have some 
uncertainty as to whether they will succeed in terms of delivering the expected benefits. 
Second, large investments in marketing and sales as well as in technology indicate that 
the project is proceeding into unfamiliar areas with regard to these aspects. The 
unfamiliarity makes the success more difficult to achieve. Large growth expectations 
appear to make reaching the goals more difficult. A reason for better success of smaller 
projects may be easier management due to lower complexity.   
The optimal project team being rather small and tightly knit can cause projects with 
wide functional participation to be less likely to reach their goals. A small team assures 
a sense of responsibility and commitment. A too-wide formal involvement of many 
functions may lead to a loss of a sense of responsibility. Active CEO and top 
management participation is a sign of their commitment and support for the project. 
This commitment and support seems to be very important, especially in phases where a 
project faces severe setbacks and where the project team’s faith is on trial. Participation 
of junior management in decision-making assures that they are committed to the goals, 
and that the goals are set realistically.  
Learning new technological fields, and changes in the implementation plan caused by 
them, point to technological uncertainty in the project. At the same time, however, the 
variable "technological learning” points to success in the development of new 
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technological competencies. This is likely to have impacted positively reaching the 
growth expectations. The positive impact of firm growth aspiration on reaching the 
growth expectations is likely to be caused by the generally growth oriented culture of 
the firms with high growth aspirations. Firms like this are likely to have also 
implemented growth projects before, and therefore have experience of how to take them 
through successfully. 
It is interesting that information intensity does not impact reaching the goals. This 
indicates that information gathering and analysis add no value that could be detected in 
the present research setting. The level of information usage seems to depend more on 
the nature of project, which determines how much information is available. Financial 
analysis, existence of a formalized process, and requirement for a business plan have no 
impact. The reason to this would seem to lie in the explorative role of the projects. Such 
dynamic learning processes cannot profit from such structured project management 
methods. They must be carried through even tough times by the project team 
commitment and top management vision.    
What determines how high the growth expectations are set? 
One reason for unrealistically high growth expectations may be that it has been 
necessary to actively sell the project to top management in order to receive the needed 
financing. When growth expectations are set at a low level, the reason may be that the 
decision on going ahead with the project is taken on the basis of the initial growth only. 
Many projects yield many further phases of growth, but the initial phase, as such, can 
already justify the initial investments. The size of growth expectations may also be 
restricted by the project’s intrinsic size: some projects are likely to simply have less 
growth potential than others. 
Growth expectations are set on a high level, or projects are commonly large relative to 
firm size when the CEO and top management are involved, when a lot of financial 
analysis is carried out, and when the firm has grown fast. The role of the CEO and top 
management is setting numerical targets and delivering results such as increased growth. 
They are more likely to get involved in large projects relative to firm size than small 
ones.  
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Junior management may prefer to set the growth expectations on a low level as they 
have to implement the plans. Conflict can inflate the set expectations, as more doubts 
are outed and uncertainties discussed. High marketing and technology fit indicate a 
relatively familiar market. For larger growth opportunities, more unfamiliarity may have 
to be accepted. Managerial resources available for growth can create munificient 
conditions for starting small projects. 
An interesting finding is that the firm growth aspiration does not impact growth 
expectations from the project. This indicates that fast growth is not sought through only 
large projects, but may also be sought through several smaller ones. Such conclusion 
receives further support from the negative impact of managerial resources available for 
growth on growth expectations. These managerial resources are positively related to 
overall firm growth.   
Interpretation of the results in light of the literature review 
Firms differ in their ability to manage risks related to technology-based diversification 
processes. At the outset, it was hypothesized that certain decision-making process 
characteristics would reduce the deviation between growth expectations and eventually 
reached growth. These characteristics were divided into two broad categories: personnel 
who participated in the decision-making process and how analytical, rational, 
comprehensive and full of conflict the process was. Hypothesis 4, concerning the 
participation in the process, was supported; participation of top and junior management 
was positively related to reaching the results expected from the project. Hypothesis 5, 
concerning the analytical quality of the process, was not supported; to the contrary, 
functional participation seemed to increase the deviation. It was also hypothesized that 
the applicability of existing operational capabilities in the new market would reduce 
deviation from expectations. This hypothesis was supported for the applicability of the 
marketing and sales capabilities and technological competencies, but not for the 
applicability of operative capabilities. 
Based on previous research it would seem likely that the lower the person in an 
organization’s managerial hierarchy, the more concrete his or her involvement in the 
implementation of the decision and, thus, the greater the importance of commitment 
would be. The analyses confirmed the negative impact of junior management 
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participation on the deviation from expectations. In addition, participation of junior 
management was positively associated with reached growth. Managers operatively 
responsible for implementing projects have an incentive to assure all relevant 
information is taken into consideration. Managers at higher organizational levels, who 
are not directly responsible for implementing technology-based diversification projects, 
may be more prone to setting unrealistically high targets. The analyses revealed a 
positive impact of top management participation on expectations, and a negative impact 
of junior management participation. It may be the case that top management are more 
prone to exaggerating the goals for a certain growth project in order to be able to present 
good future scenarios. In addition to having an incentive to ensure the prognoses are not 
overly optimistic, junior management is also likely to have more detailed practical 
information critical for defining a technology-based diversification project correctly. 
The impact of the applicability of existing operational capabilities on the deviation from 
expectations in individual leveraging projects was discussed in light of previous 
literature. It was concluded that applicability of existing operational capabilities seems 
to have a threefold impact on individual leveraging projects: First, applicability of 
existing operational capabilities in the new market is an indication of similarity of the 
markets, which, as such, reduces the uncertainty of the entry. Second, applicability of 
existing operational capabilities in the new market reduces the managerial capacity 
needed for planning the entry, as more assumptions about the market can be made 
without extensive information search. Third, applicability of existing operational 
capabilities in the new market reduces the managerial capacity needed for acquiring or 
building the necessary operational capabilities. All these three impacts should reduce the 
deviation from expectations in individual leveraging projects. The results of the 
empirical analysis provide a partial confirmation to the earlier research by showing that 
managers can make the success of leveraging projects more likely by choosing the 
projects so that the technology and marketing and sales components are as familiar as 
possible. 
The role of information intensity in decision-making processes has been discussed in 
previous research from two perspectives. On the one hand, it seems plausible to assume 
that extensive information usage would improve the quality of the plans, while, on the 
other, it can make the process heavy and lost in details. In this study, the data does not 
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support the view that information intensity as such would actually be beneficial to the 
decision-making process in contributing to the accuracy of plans. A reason for this may 
be the overruling importance of a committed and empowered operative project team in 
assuring that all relevant information is considered, irrespective of formal information 
channels and processes. Other aspects of analytical quality may fail to support the 
projects for similar reasons: so much learning is necessary in the projects that planning 
and structuring are useless. 
A further interesting finding from the survey is that technology-leveraging projects that 
are small relative to firm size seem to reach more of the expected results than larger 
projects. In new product development research, an important question is the impact of 
project complexity on the success of new product development projects524. Project 
complexity may be smaller in smaller scale projects, and therefore, it could be that 
smaller scale projects would succeed better. In the case of technology-based product-
market entries, this would imply that committing resources to the project gradually 
might be the optimal investment policy. After reaching certain milestones, more 
resources would be committed for the next stages if the results of the first stages were 
favorable. 
                                                 
524  Tatikonda, M. V. & Montoya-Weiss, M. M. 2001. Integrating operational and marketing 
perspectives of product innovation: The influence of organizational process factors and capabilities 
on development performance. Management Science, January, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 151-172. 
   133 
 6.4 Summary of the survey results  
The table below summarizes the results of the regression analyses. Hypothesis 1, 3 and 
4 were partially supported. Hypothesis 2 was supported. Hypothesis 5 was not 
supported.  
Table 32: Summary of hypotheses based on resource-based view 
Hypotheses Variables Support 
H1 
 
 
 
H1a 
 
H1b 
 
H1c 
 
H1d 
 
 
H1e 
 
Firm level factors related to technology 
leveraging influence the goal setting in 
technology leveraging projects and success of 
the projects. 
Large firm size reduces growth expectations 
from a leveraging project in relation to firm size.
Large firm size reduces deviation from 
expectations in a leveraging project. 
High growth orientation increases growth 
expectations from a leveraging project. 
Research and development intensity of the 
firms increases growth expectations from a 
leveraging project in relation to firm size. 
Managerial resources available for growth 
support involvement in many small-scale 
leveraging projects. 
 
 
 
 
Firm size 
 
Firm size 
 
Firm growth 
Growth aspiration 
 
R&D intensity 
 
Managerial resources 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
H2 Smaller project size reduces deviation from 
expectations. 
Project size relative to firm 
size 
Yes 
H3a 
 
 
 
 
H3b 
Applicability of the existing operational 
capabilities in the entered market reduces 
deviation from expectations of an individual 
technology-leveraging project. 
 
In technology-leveraging projects, applicability 
of technology is the most critical, thereafter 
applicability of marketing and sales, and last 
applicability of operations 
Operations fit 
Marketing and sales fit 
Technology fit 
 
Marketing and sales 
investments 
Technology investments 
No 
No 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Table 33: Summary of hypotheses based on decision-making research 
Hypotheses Variables Support 
H4 
 
 
 
H4a 
 
H4b 
 
H4c 
Extensive managerial participation in the 
decision-making process reduces deviation 
from expectations of an individual technology-
leveraging project. 
Participation of CEO and top management 
reduces deviation from expectations. 
Participation of middle management reduces 
deviation from expectations. 
Participation of junior management reduces 
deviation from expectations. 
 
 
 
 
CEO and top management  
 
Middle management 
  
Junior management 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
H5 
 
High analytical quality of the decision-making 
process reduces deviation from expectations of 
an individual technology-leveraging project. 
 
Functional participation 
Information intensity 
Existing process 
Basic financial analysis 
Business plan 
Conflict 
Opposite 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
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7 CASE ANALYSIS 
In order to be able to explain the results and the conclusions more fully, five deepening 
case analyses were conducted. The growth projects for the case analyses were chosen 
from the 63 projects of the survey. A cluster analysis was conducted of the 63 projects 
to identify clusters that were internally as similar as possible, but, respective to each 
other, as dissimilar as possible. As variables of comparison, the independent variables 
that were significant in the regression analysis were chosen, as they reflected the project 
characteristics that seemed to be relevant for project success. The cluster analysis was 
conducted using the Ward method and squared Euclidean distances. In the cluster 
analysis, three clusters were identified. The Dendrogram is attached in Appendix 4. The 
first cluster had 19 cases, the second 35, and the third 9. In the figure below, the 
differences between the means of the clustering variables for each cluster are shown.  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Technology fit
Technology investments
Technological learning
Marketing and sales fit
Marketing and sales investments
CEO and top management participationJunior management participation
Middle management participation
Functional participation
Financial analysis
Conflict
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
 
Figure 6: Cluster profiles 
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In terms of technology fit, technological learning, and functional participation the 
clusters are relatively similar. In each of these three variables, Cluster 1 has the highest 
values, Cluster 2 the second highest and the Cluster 3 the lowest, but, as stated before, 
the differences are very small. Clusters 1 and 2 are similar along four dimensions. They 
are close together, but further from Cluster 3 in technology investments, marketing and 
sales fit, junior management participation, and middle management participation. 
Clusters 1 and 3 are close together, but further from Cluster 2 in three dimensions: 
marketing and sales investments, financial analysis, and conflict. Clusters 2 and 3 have 
the fewest similarities. 
Cluster 1 differs from the other two clusters by clearly having the highest mean values 
for the CEO and top management participation, as well as for junior management 
participation. Cluster 1 also has the highest values for middle management participation 
and technology investments, but, in these variables, Cluster 2 has mean values that are 
almost as high. Therefore, Cluster 1 is characterized by a high participation of the 
essential groups. 
Cluster 2 differs from the other two clusters by having clearly the highest values for 
marketing and sales investments, financial analysis, and conflict. Therefore, Cluster 2 
seems to be a cluster of marketing, rather than technology, driven cases, as compared to 
the cases of the other clusters. 
Cluster 3 differs from the other two clusters by having clearly the lowest values for 
technology investments, CEO and top management participation, junior management 
participation, and middle management participation. Furthermore, cluster three also has 
the lowest value for marketing and sales fit. Cluster 3 is thus characterized by low 
participation of the essential groups. 
The five cases were chosen so that there would be at least one case from each cluster. A 
further criterion was that and that the cases would represent all types of cases projects 
with regard to how much growth was reached through the project and the percentage of 
growth expectations reached in the project. The figure below shows all cases according 
to growth reached, and percentage of growth expectations reached. The form of the 
marker indicates cluster membership. 
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Figure 7: Cases according to expectations reached and growth as percentage of original 
sales 
Project A belongs to Cluster 1. It is a small project with regard to reached growth as a 
percentage of original sales. It is, however, a successful project with regard to 
percentage of growth expectations reached. Almost twice as much growth was reached 
as was expected. Project D also belongs to Cluster 1. It is a large project that increased 
the firm’s sales by 33 percent of the original sales, and a successful project with regard 
to reached expectations, as expectations were exceeded by 30 percent. Project B belongs 
to Cluster 2 and is a relatively large project that increased the firm’s sales by 20 percent. 
This project is an example of growth expectations that were clearly set clearly too low: 
the project brought four times as much turnover as was expected. Project C belongs to 
Cluster 3, and is a relatively large project that increased the firm’s sales by 20 percent. 
The growth expectations were exceeded by 33 percent. Project E also belongs to Cluster 
3. This is a large project that generated 35 percent growth, but still only 58 percent of 
the growth expectations were reached. This project highlights the importance of 
understanding both the factors influencing success with regard to reaching expectations, 
and success with regard to reached growth. Project E performed worst of the five 
projects with regard to reaching expectations, yet it brought the most growth, relative to 
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original sales. The figure below shows how closely each case follows the mean of its 
cluster in each variable, which indicates how well the case represents its group.  
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Figure 8: The five cases compared to their cluster profiles 
Data for the case analysis was collected by interviewing three persons from each of the 
case companies. One of the interviewed persons was the survey respondent, and the 
other ones were other managers who had been closely involved in the project. In one of 
the firms, (Project D) it was not possible to identify a third person anymore due to 
personnel changes. Here, the survey respondent was interviewed twice. In addition to 
interviews, the case analysis is built on the survey responses as well as other quantitative 
data. The five cases, their characteristics with regard to the variables used for explaining 
the success of the projects, and the reasons that, according to the firms, lead to successes 
and failures in the projects, are discussed below.  
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7.1 Descriptions of each of the five cases 
7.1.1 Project A 
The opportunity for Project A was discovered through a slow process over several years. 
The market, which was close to the main markets of the division, seemed attractive 
because of greater possibilities for differentiation and higher profitability. Later, a 
technological solution matured that could possibly give the firm a competitive 
advantage in the market. The technological solution developed gradually through the 
development of one of its components and trials with another. 
”The technological innovation for entering market X consisted of combining two already 
known technologies. One of them was a very standard technology that had been used in 
the whole industry for a long time. The other one had been already built by the firm to a 
factory in country Z. In order to be able to combine the two technologies the most 
difficult technological development was done in a specific technological field K, where 
the firm had previous experience through a development project that had not 
succeeded.” 
Through this learning process, more and more people in the firm became convinced that 
the technological solution was possible. A strong champion of this point of view who 
was a part of the top management of the parent firm strengthened the belief in the idea, 
both among the top management, as well as in the division. Further, the fact that the 
new product market was well known in the firm and that it was an established market 
with a foreseeable demand strengthened the belief in the idea. The idea faced opposition 
from an acquired factory abroad and the employees who originated from it. They 
claimed that another, less advanced, technology would bring the same advantages as the 
new one. Overall, in discovering the opportunity, technology, as well as marketing and 
sales fit, played a role; the opportunity was revealed through the knowledge of both the 
markets and technology. The responses reported in the questionnaire for Project A were 
4,5 for technology fit and 5 for marketing and sales fit, both relatively strong statements 
for the fit. This familiarity helped plan and implement the project successfully and 
without major surprises. A further factor important for the discovery of the opportunity 
and, perhaps, for the existence of the champion was the firm’s aggressive growth search 
at that time. It should also be noted that the firm was capital-rich and in a business 
sector where very large investments were routinely made. 
“Both the market and the technological fields were familiar, so actually the project could 
not have failed, and there were no major surprises in executing it." 
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"The technology was just combining two old things. Therefore, there weren’t many 
surprises in the project, because all components were familiar.” 
”Yet another strength of the project was that there were not so many new aspects. The 
business logic was well known: we knew exactly to which markets and segments we 
would be targeting the products." 
 ”The project was perceived very low risk, because the market already existed based on 
the older technologies, and had high margins. The new technology would bring 
competitive advantages in variety of different types of products that could be 
manufactured in the same plant, and in being able to satisfy the increasingly demanding 
standards of some segments." 
"We had the people to operate the factory, they had a lot of experience in manufacturing 
products of this type." "We had already been building factories so we knew how the 
process of the project proceeds. We had the right people and resources in place." 
”The firm had an aggressive growth strategy in the eighties. Especially the division had 
outrageous growth goals in the beginning of the nineties.” 
The CEO and top management had an important role in strongly supporting the project 
because of its strategic importance in enabling further growth projects based on this one. 
Because of this strong support, there was no need to sell the project to the management, 
and therefore the growth expectations could be set at a moderate level. The middle 
management had an important role in structuring the project and managing it according 
to the project plans. This was the only case of the five where the middle management 
had such a role. At the same time, this was the most clearly foreseeable of the projects, 
and this kind of an important middle management role seems natural. The responses 
reported in the questionnaire for Project A were 5,5 for CEO and top management 
participation, 5,6 for middle management participation and 3,4 for junior management 
participation. Of these, the two first are relatively strong statements about CEO, top 
management and middle management participation in the decision-making process, 
whereas the last one indicates low junior management participation. In other, more 
uncertain projects, junior management participation in decision-making was important 
for project success because the projects proceeded in an explorative manner and 
therefore the executors were in a leading position. In Project A, due to the high 
familiarity of all factors, proceeding in a structured, well-planned manner was possible. 
An additional distinctive factor in Project A was that large capital investments were 
made, which can and need to be planned carefully. In the other projects, the investments 
were mainly in R&D, and thereby the domain of the executing R&D management. 
Despite the greater involvement of middle-management, also in this case the atmosphere 
was entrepreneurial. 
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"Top management was very committed because of the strong champion. They were 
also very interested in monitoring the process. The champion was able to secure the 
necessary resources for the whole four year development period, even if one year was 
the worst in the firm's history."  
"The champion concentrated on this project and neglected all other work. He had the 
experience to recognize that this was a golden egg." 
"Management set the sales goals." 
"Middle management participated a lot in the project decision-making. The manager 
level people [middle management] had a greater role in making the final decisions on 
the goals, but this was preceded by discussion."  
”R&D engineers participated in making the plans. The participation was important for 
commitment and creating a good spirit. The plans were fairly good, but of course some 
surprises occurred as well. For example, the development in the technological field K did 
not proceed exactly according to plans. The R&D engineers decided on goals within 
smaller parts of the project.”  
"The titles were not important, what was important was that it was challenging and fun." 
"We just had the right group of people, I don’t know why you just don’t always get the 
same feeling. They were very committed, young but experienced." 
The responses reported in the questionnaire for Project A concerning the analytical 
quality of the decision-making process were quite low, around three, as was typical for 
all answers across the different cases.  This generally low level indicates that, in this 
type of innovative project, structured methods for enhancing the analytical quality of 
decision-making do not seem to be generally appreciated by companies. The responses 
were 2,6 for wide functional participation, 3 for financial analysis, and 3,6 for conflict. 
Of these, conflict is slightly higher than in the other cases because of the higher 
politicization around this project than encountered in the other ones; here, there were 
more conflicting goals driving the people’s agendas than in the other four cases, which 
were driven by an entrepreneurial spirit. These conflicts reduced the enthusiasm for the 
project somewhat and complicated the implementation. Participation on parties not 
directly responsible for the project was seen as detrimental for project results. The 
means of financial analysis were seen as incapable of accounting for the upside potential 
of such a strategically important project, and were therefore deemed as not very helpful 
due to their pessimism. 
”At that time, the finance guys of the firm did not have so much say, it was pretty much 
an engineer firm.” 
"Probably the finance guys made some [financial analyses]."  
"Projects are easily killed with too much analysis and payback schedules.” 
”The finance director was always pessimistic, as usual.”     
”In –91 an extensive feasibility study of the project was made. It focused on what was 
the market for the products, what were the needed investments and costs, and the 
development costs. Significant financial reserves were built for the factory, but they were 
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never needed. Therefore, the building of the factory was a bit cheaper than was 
expected. The feasibility study also included an analysis of the competitive situation in 
the market X and making the own goals based on this.”  
"Market studies were made. We had to keep a low profile to keep the project secret from 
competitors.” 
”There was no burden of bureaucracy with reporting or strict rules, because everyone 
was satisfied with how things were going.”  
”A system of monthly project reporting was used. The project was below the planned 
costs all the time. In the meetings of the project management group the business 
management, the local [plant] management and the business development manager 
were present.” 
”Another important success factor was the fact that the project was a clear project with a 
project organization, people committed to it and knowing that the project was their first 
priority and also showing the rest of the organization that the project had a high priority. 
Furthermore, the project had a concrete goal which was a factory catering the needs of 
market X with a competitive advantage due to the new technology. This concrete goal 
was clear although it was not clear at all that the technological solution would be found. 
Also, the project-character assured clear responsibilities. All this created a good spirit 
among the team. In –91, all components of the project were begun: process 
development, product development, investment analyses, and logistics development. 
About 50 people worked for the project in R&D, ten to twenty in making the investment 
analyses and hundreds building and operating the factory. This kind of a clear project 
launch and organization was unusual in Finland at that time.” 
”A person important in the concept development of the project was [a person with a 
cultural background very different from the Finnish], called B. B was the trusted man of 
[the champion], and worked as the R&D director of the business unit. The different style 
due to the cultural background caused some irritation.”  
“In the beginning of the project some Swedes tried to get support to their idea of using a 
technology developed by a prominent player in the industry instead of developing the 
new technology. The old technology proposed by the Swedes had been used in their 
factory, and it was simpler than the new technology to be developed. This conflict lived 
in the R&D department for a long time and caused even some proactive disturbing of the 
development work.”  
“Another conflict was, when the factory management identified an interesting product 
niche, and the center of excellence said they should not pursue this niche, because the 
market did not exist. The factory management went on with the product anyway and it 
became a success.”  
”All in all, there could be no serious conflict that could have harmed the project, because 
[the champion] advocated the project in the top management of the firm, and therefore 
the top management followed the project with great interest. It was well known to all that 
the project had the support of the top management.”  
The response reported in the questionnaire for Project A was 2 percent for growth 
expectations. Further growth projects based on this project were expected and partly 
already planned. Licensing the technology was planned from the start; accordingly, the 
technological solution was patented as it was developed. One reason for setting the 
immediate growth expectations on a moderate level was the unquestioned strategic 
importance of the project – no matter how much growth would be reached within the 
first years, it was seen that the project was necessary for the future. Another reason was 
the low risk, which allowed low return expectations. Even if the technological solution 
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had not been found, the investments in the plant could have been recouped in the 
traditional markets. 
"We never had to sell the product to the management, because we had a very strong 
champion in the top management. In addition, although large investments were made, 
they were not so big when compared to other investments in the group. Furthermore, 
the investments were recoverable in any case, because if we hadn't succeeded in 
combining the two technologies, we could anyway have used them separately in the 
factory.” 
"The reporting and goals were set so that we had a little bit of pressure to get things out 
and ready.” 
"A lot was expected of this project, because a search for a foreign partner was started 
early, telling the candidates about the new, good technology, even if the technology was 
not ready yet. However, the immediate sales goals were not stretched too much, [the 
champion] probably just pushed the project through in the top management.” 
"Even in the case of not succeeding with the technological solution, the firm could have 
used the two technologies separately as before, so the only loss would have been the 
R&D investment. The investments in the physical plants would have been recovered. 
The R&D investment was not perceived high, as so many people worked in R&D 
anyway, and it was only good that they were kept busy by a concrete project. Only the 
existing R&D personnel was utilized, so this wasn’t seen as a real extra investment.” 
Due to the familiarity of all components related to the project, be it market or 
technology related, the implementation of the project proceeded nearly exactly 
according to plans. The project spent all along somewhat less money than had been 
budgeted and was on time in all phases. This was due to the goals having been set with 
quite a lot of buffer. The most important negative surprise was some delay in the 
development of an important technological solution. The most important positive 
surprise was the good development of the licensing business. The responses reported in 
the questionnaire for project A were 3,5 for technology investments, 1 for marketing and 
sales investments, and 3,3 for technological learning.  
”The project was a large and important project for the firm with investments of about half 
a billion FIM, of which a bit more than 100 MFIM in development, and most of the rest in 
the plant. On the other hand, at the same time the firm was making other, even much 
larger investments and even the new head office cost 300 MFIM. So compared to these, 
maybe it wasn’t so big in the end.” 
All the goals of the project were reached on schedule during the project, and at the end. 
The project exceeded the expected sales goals by 100 percent. According to the 
interviewees, there were several reasons to this: First, top management was highly 
supportive even during turbulent times in the parent during the project. Second, 
surprise-free implementation followed from a familiarity with all components. It also 
was a result of having set moderate sales goals. There was no pressure to set them 
higher. 
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Figure 9: Project A 
7.1.2 Project B 
The opportunity for Growth Project B was discovered by following the emergence of a 
new, large market, and realizing that the firm already had a technology that could meet 
some of this market's urgent needs.  The technological fit was thereby perfect; the old 
technology was applied, while only a few interface technologies had to be learned. The 
marketing fit was weaker, as the market was at such an early stage that no one knew 
how it would develop and what the exact needs were. Further, the market required a 
new sales and marketing approach. However, this lack of sales and marketing fit was 
compensated through good contacts to the parent firm, which was one of the pioneers of 
the market. This helped by giving confidence to those concerned with developing the 
opportunity. The idea also faced opposition, mainly because of the newness of the 
market. This made it difficult for some employees to believe that the emerging market 
would ever reach volumes sufficient to make it a serious business. Until then the 
company had been a large volume commodity producer. It can be said that technology 
fit was important for the discovery of the opportunity, and lack of marketing fit was 
compensated through a good partner. The responses reported in the questionnaire for 
Project B were 6 for technology fit, and 2,5 for marketing and sales fit. The marketing 
and sales fit response is low. This lack of familiarity led to setting the goals markedly 
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too low, which caused some bottlenecks over the course of the project. Had these 
bottlenecks been even more severe, the firm would not have been able to grow as fast as 
the market. This could have cost the firm the position as one of the world leaders. 
”The product consisted in addition to the basic product also of some interface products 
that attached the product to a system – so we went more to a systems business. These 
interface products were developed with the help of some partners. The partners were 
found with the help of the parent firm’s contacts. We also had a good partner for 
materials development.” 
”We had a long term tradition of own [technological] competence, and the right 
development people. We also had the right partners, although they could have been 
some other firms as well. We managed to keep the scope of the project right, so we had 
no financing or credibility problems. We managed to keep going with the project so long 
that even the top management acknowledged the results.” 
"Of course there was some work in developing the business model, but there we had 
analogies from our old businesses as well. Selling was very similar as in old markets, 
but demands were higher and the business model was more one of selling solutions 
including installation etc." 
”Nobody had any experience of the market X. There was especially one employee at the 
parent firm, who developed the technology, had the right vision, and believed in it. Many 
others started believing in it because of him. Despite being so visionary, he had the 
other foot on the ground.” 
”We had a very munificient environment because were able to exploit the network of the 
parent.” 
The participation of top management seems important in a project like this where the 
results cannot be foreseen and uncertainty is very high. Yet, despite the active 
participation of CEO and top management, there was still some doubt in the project. 
Growth expectations were set as high as was possible without losing credibility, but still 
this was only a quarter of what was reached. Such an estimation error can have serious 
implications for implementation if, for example, resources are insufficient to satisfy the 
demand. The project did indeed face some problems of too fast a growth in the 
implementation phase. However, Project B did have sufficient top management support 
for guaranteeing most of the necessary resources for the implementation. The responses 
reported in the questionnaire for Project B were a relatively high: 5,2 for CEO and top 
management participation, and 4 for middle management participation. The 
participation of junior management could not be estimated separately because the roles 
of junior and middle management were very close to each other in the firm. Again, in 
this case factors very important for the success of the project were giving the decision-
making power to ones concretely responsible for achieving the results, and the existence 
of a tightly knit, extremely committed team believing in the idea.  
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”The goals and plans were pretty much set by the market X business unit directors, 
about six persons. From higher at the top there were no other persons involved, 
because this was a high enough group. The parent just sometimes commented on 
things like what the capital utilization should be or things like that.” 
”All organizational levels were very involved in making the plans and setting the goals, 
every level for their own areas of responsibility.”  
”The R&D engineers participated very much in the decision-making process all along, a 
couple of the were really the inventors of the most critical, patented technological 
innovations.”  
“It is essential that the ones responsible for implementing each part of the plans are also 
making the plans and decisions. They really know the resource, time and other 
requirements, and they must be committed to the plans so they can’t blame anyone else 
for having made bad plans.” 
”Culture of entrepreneurship was important: courage, responsibility, understanding that 
small failures are a normal part of all development. But if you try out ten ideas, and two 
fail, you’ll still have eight that succeeded. Too much caution is not good.”  
”You have to have both visionaries and realistic people: the visionaries never get 
anything done, and the realists try to slow everything down, but together in the right mix 
they work well. With this regard we had the right mix for this project to succeed.” 
”We already at that time had certain people in the firm and the parent firm with a strong 
vision of the market X. The top management wasn’t really that visionary, they were at 
one point even going to sell the division away.” 
The responses reported in the questionnaire for the analytical quality of the decision-
making process for Project B were at a level normal for all responses: 3 for wide 
functional participation, 2,7 for financial analysis, and 2,6 for conflict. Extensive 
planning and analysis was considered of limited use, as the market was so new that all 
prognoses were bound to be significantly off. However, all information that was 
available was carefully considered. The project group had direct access to the partners, 
which were a good source of information, and the best overall data. Therefore, 
information flow was informal. Conflict was seen as enhancing the quality of the plans 
in this situation that was very difficult to assess.   
”We had the best possible information in the leadership group of the X business unit. All 
who were responsible for the implementation were in the group. That group had in it all 
the knowledge of the market X that there was in the whole firm. There were also 
technical people in the group.”  
“It was helpful that we had the contacts to the machinery manufacturer within the group. 
From within the group we got profitability information and production information from 
the machinery manufacturers.”  
”The functional departments participating in the decision-making process were sales, 
R&D and production, but not finance, as there were no individual large investments.” 
”We did not make a business plan of the project. It was such a new market and there 
was no historical data or market reports, no references. The market did not exist, it is 
now three or four times of what it was.”  
 ”We did use all possible available market forecasts, and, of course, the parent firm was 
a very important source of information. But the market was so new that nobody knew 
how it would develop, so the information was not so useful.” 
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 ”Developing the business case and the product both proceeded well, and their 
development was summarized once a year.” 
”Of course there was normal disagreement and arguing, but it was mainly only fruitful. 
You have to have different forces pulling in different directions in order to discover all 
aspects of the issues. Discussion must be allowed even if it sometimes seems to go 
wrong. But this way you arrive at more accurate results, nobody is so smart that he 
would know everything, so its good to combine the viewpoints.”  
”Mostly the arguments were not personal, but of course some people always take it 
personally and don’t want to understand others.”  
”In the end we were able to show that the project was worth continuing and the parent 
should not sell the division yet. In order to do this we had to come up with really 
convincing arguments, which was fruitful for sharpening the focus of the project even 
more.” 
The response reported in the questionnaire for Project B was 5 percent for growth 
expectations. This was a grave underestimation caused by the unfamiliarity of the 
market. The dynamics are highlighted by the quotes below. 
”We budgeted enormous growth figures, as much as we thought we could without 
seeming ridiculous. This was in the budgets and long range planning of –93. In the 
industry annual growth figures were 3 to 5 percent, we budgeted in the range of ten 
percent. This was considered too aggressive, although it turned out that the market 
grew even many times so much. All in all, the goals were set really high, but we reached 
even much more.” 
”The goals were based very much on the parent firm’s predictions of the development of 
market X. Then we planned what would be a realistic market share to reach. We had a 
goal of being the third largest globally in market X and technologically always at least as 
good as the best. Both goals have been reached, and now we want to become second 
largest.”  
”Growth was limited by limits of organic growth: a global goal needs to be broken down, 
and tackled step-by-step. For example, we had one really good year and neglected to 
expand the organization during that year because we were getting the sales so easily. 
This caused a setback the next year. Its important to grow the organization continuously 
because you can’t speed up suddenly.” 
”The product has also all kinds of other applications in addition to the market X, so we 
weren’t so dependent on how market X would develop.” 
Investments were needed in the form of increased size of the sales force, managerial 
time, and developing a new sales approach. This project required a more system-
oriented sales approach than the traditional sales of the commodity products. The 
responses reported in the questionnaire for Project B were 4 for technology investments, 
5 for marketing and sales investments, and 4,8 for technological learning. The sales 
goals of the project were exceeded by 300 percent. According to the interviewees, this 
resulted from good implementation by the informal, un-hierarchical and empowered 
project team and by the dramatic market growth that could not have been foreseen as the 
market was only just emerging. 
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”The investments were mainly in developing new machines and building new production 
lines. We were able to use the existing buildings.” 
”All in all this was considered a very safe project because we did not invest in any new 
types of skills or capacity.” 
”The direction set ten years ago is still valid, actually everything has proceeded 
according to plan, we have been doing just the kinds of things we planned in the action 
plans at that time. No major changes in direction have been made. This was despite the 
fact that the market was completely new.”  
”Good partners are important for growing and developing towards excellence. Outside 
our group, we had partners in interface technologies. We were actively searching for 
partners, through our own external network and through the parent’s network.” 
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Figure 10: Project B 
7.1.3 Project C 
In Project C, marketing fit was essential for discovering the opportunity. The firm had 
exceptionally close ties to several layers of customers, which was essential for 
discovering the need for the product and for having faith in the existence of the demand 
for it.  
"The impulse from the clientele was completely clear: there was a market for the new 
product. We definitely wanted to participate in it."  
The management of the company had very close relationship to the client industries of 
the end users, and to all other stakeholders in the industry, this is how they got their 
development visions." 
"Good contacts to all stakeholders enabled monitoring of the development of the 
segment. We were wise to wait until we saw which solution would become the dominant 
one, because we were still able to develop a product that was so much better than those 
of the competitors, that we got a significant market share. We almost started to make a 
product with another solution, it was really good that we in the end decided not to do it."  
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"Electronic measurement instruments, and measuring as such were new in the industry. 
Being the first ones in this with a good product, we were able to steer the development. 
We had good contacts to the customers of the end users [end users are suppliers to 
them], and they told clearly about their needs. They told us in which direction we should 
develop the product so that it would be easier for them to utilize the produce of the end 
users. In addition, cooperation with the end users was important."  
“Even the owner was familiar with the usage of our products, even he had the end user 
perspective." 
Technology fit helped in discovering the technological solution for this new product. 
The firm had already experience in some of the technologies that were essential for the 
new solution. The responses reported in the questionnaire for Project A were relatively 
high: 5 for technology fit and 4 for marketing and sales fit. This high degree of 
familiarity was essential for discovering the idea, for developing the technological 
solution and for being able to fine-tune the product functionality to please the 
customers. Moreover, in this relatively ambitious development project requiring a high 
degree of innovativeness, the familiarity helped overcome some challenging situations, 
and was thus essential for reaching the results.   
"In Finland we were in close cooperation with the customers. Internationally we then 
started to offer the same solution that we had developed in cooperation with the Finnish 
customers."  
"We had the channels and the customers, we did not have to invest in developing them."  
"The project was pretty low risk, because we were so sure about the need for the 
product. We did not need a large market to justify the development and entry costs, 
actually we designed the production for small quantities. We proceeded with the feet on 
the ground, and the risk never grew large. We were so deeply rooted in the industry that 
we never doubted that we could develop the product so that it would become good. The 
industry is a very secure one; we could count on it that the products of this industry will 
sell around the world. In this industry it is safe to be a part of the chain.”   
"We already had competence in hydraulics and mechanics, and in the beginning we 
made the new products only based on these. Then, once we had entered the market 
and gone further in the development with the end users, we started developing 
competencies in automatics and measurement technology, and added product 
functionalities based on these. What we were able to offer in the beginning was a new 
technique using stronger materials, extra strong metals. What the customers needed 
was a strong but light tool. Before, we had already had competence in aluminum and 
extra strong steel, so we were well positioned to develop the product. Developing the 
measurement instrument and programs was quite difficult."  
"Critical was that we started the development of the electronics early enough, in this we 
cooperated with a university and a government organization for technological 
development."  
"The measurement development was speeded up by the development by one of the 
customer industries of the end users: this customer industry was developing 
optimization of production and our measurement systems were an essential link in this 
optimization. This optimization was important for the Finnish firm of the client industry to 
stay internationally competitive. One person in our firm was especially important in 
seeing the importance of this optimization and therefore our measurement systems."     
"In the implementation it was important to decidedly take the project further, have good 
relationships outside the firm, and let customers test the product. If there were any 
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problems they were fixed, and then it was important to have courage to enter into the 
test period. We did not have the testing resources ourselves." 
Project C demonstrates the importance of junior management when developing a truly 
new offering with significant innovation. Junior management had close contacts to 
customers, which supported them in innovatively discovering the unmet needs. This, 
together with their hands-on experience with technological development and 
independence in the development work, yielded a munificent environment for the 
success of the development work. Despite granting this independence, CEO and top 
management were also involved in a supportive role. Middle management had a less 
important role because structured, project-type, management in such an explorative 
venture seems, in general, to be difficult. The strong involvement of junior management 
had two impacts: the goals were set moderately, and the implementation was successful. 
On the other hand, the CEO’s and top management’s understanding of the importance of 
the opportunity led to planning several successive phases, the implementation of which 
depended on the success of the previous phases. In this way, it was possible to target 
large growth without at any time taking much risk. Furthermore, whilst targeting large 
growth, the sequences were manageable in scope, and the empowerment of junior 
management was possible. The whole company was involved in the project; the CEO 
and top management succeeded in making all employees excited about it. The responses 
reported in the questionnaire for Project C were relatively high 4,7 for the CEO and top 
management participation, low 1,6 for middle management participation and very high 
5,7 for junior management participation.  
"The management was monitoring the project all the time, it was considered very 
important. They were involved in the daily work, everyone was doing everything."  
"Top management was very committed, and achieved the commitment of everyone 
else."  
"It was clear to everyone that there was nothing that was more important. This project 
was always a priority at every level."  
"The management was setting goals and making decisions together with the 
stakeholder groups: the end users, their customers, and development institutes of the 
industry.” 
"The engineers were very involved in the decision making. Internally, the craftsmen with 
hands on experience had the say. The sales brought in feedback from the field and 
competitor comparisons.” 
"The company was small, everyone did everything, everyone was involved."  
"The atmosphere was good, everyone was developing the product, gave their input, and 
we also needed all ideas." 
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"We did also have difficult phases, for example, the first prototype did not work at all. 
Then the question was whether to forget about it or start from the beginning. We 
wondered what was causing the problems, and we fixed them. Here management 
support was very important, they always encouraged us to try once more."  
"In some difficult phases we worked night and day, when we had to do an improvement 
to a customer, and it caused that we had to change the entire system. Then we 
incorporated this change in the next batch of machines."   
"We made many mistakes along the way, but we persistently strove for our goal. The 
product became ready only with a lot of work. We had gathered our experts and learned 
our competencies before and along the way, and with intensive labor we got the 
development work ready." 
The technologically oriented personnel, more than anyone else, drove both market and 
technological innovation. Participation of other functional groups was limited. The 
project was driven by a discovered demand, which could be easily verified because the 
main customers were well known. No large initial investments were needed, because the 
project was implemented stage-wise, each stage being independently profitable. For 
these reasons, no extensive financial analysis was conducted. The responses reported in 
the questionnaire for Project C were 3 for wide functional participation, 1 for financial 
analysis, and 2,8 for conflict. An entrepreneurial spirit as well as direct and informal 
communication enabled through tightly knit teams was considered very important for 
the success of the project. Formal analysis or formalized information flows as well as 
formalized participation in the decision-making process were considered useless. Such 
factors were even considered potentially harmful for the project in restraining the 
entrepreneurial spirit through bureaucracy.  
"Everyone met daily, discussed, information was flowing well."  
"Production, after-sales, marketing, everyone was very committed to develop the 
business."  
"Inside the company the culture and communication is very open, we have absolutely no 
hierarchy. We try to really utilize 200-300 brains instead of only a few."  
"We also had very many external channels for information." 
"The finance department made profitability calculations."  
"Tekes was in the background, not in the daily work. They did help but also caused 
bureaucracy in order to find out the impact."  
"The work was not systematic, but followed more a blurred logic. We gathered 
enormous amounts of material [information and experiences] and then got a feeling of 
what is the right way. There were so many different inputs that it was impossible to 
somehow systematically handle them. The certainty came bit by bit when we saw what 
worked." 
"We did not have a business plan, we worked very much on intuition." "For Tekes we 
had to do project plans." "In the beginning we made extensive competitor analyses."  
"In the beginning we had a schedule for the pre-design and prototype. After that, we had 
setbacks. Thereafter, we proceeded one day at a time, making rough plans on the level 
of half a year." 
   151 
"We did not experience big conflicts, just some technical details, big picture was pretty 
clear. When something was decided, everyone committed themselves." "Any problems 
were discussed, and changes were decided upon, then it was not discussed or thought 
about any longer. We tried to learn from any mistakes."  
"Of course there were some conflicts and differences in opinion, but often we were able 
to make a common decision on the direction to take. We did not have conflict with 
regard to major questions or directions, more about details.” 
The response reported in the questionnaire for Project A was 15 percent for growth 
expectations.  
"The management was confident that we should go ahead with the development, so we 
did not need to sell the project to anyone. With regard to the sales expectations, we 
were confident that this is a product of the future and we want to be in the market early. 
The goal was to make a better product than what was available in the market at that 
time. The products of the competitors were inadequate in quality and function."  
"We didn't know what to expect of the market, the market size could not be foreseen. It 
was generally expected that these kinds of products would come, but they didn't really 
take off. Then suddenly the market really started to grow, and has grown fast all the 
time. Then the growth was unexpectedly high. Now in Finland 90% of the end users are 
using this new technology, but abroad as little as 10%, so there we have still a lot of 
potential."  
"Even the owner was involved in setting the goals for the project."  
"The goals were set in terms of product quality, utility and usability characteristics." 
Implementation of the project proceeded in an explorative manner. There were some 
negative surprises, such as the first prototype of the product not functioning at all. Such 
problems were resolved thanks to the commitment of the research and development 
engineers and good relationships with the first customers who were willing to act as the 
test market. Investments were made gradually as, for example, more space for 
production was needed. The responses reported in the questionnaire for Project C were 
3,5 for technology investments, 3 for marketing and sales investments, and 4,3 for 
technological learning. 
"The only upfront investments were the R&D investments, the production capacity was 
increased gradually.”  
"We enlarged the production capacity bit by bit. We enlarged the production hall, and 
increased the number of welding places."  
"In the beginning we had problems with the mechanical prototype. We started the serial 
production too early and then had to still make quite a few changes.” 
The project exceeded the expected sales goals by 33 percent. According to the 
interviewees, setting the growth expectations moderately for each phase and, in general, 
having a conservative approach, caused this. Eventually the company grew because of 
this project to a completely new size class. The company-wide commitment was key to 
success all along.  
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"It was good that the really fast growth only began a bit later when the development was 
completed. When we saw that the products began to sell, we thought that we might 
make them in serial production and even to abroad. We started to enlarge the 
production capacity, produce more, export. It was good to proceed with the feet on the 
ground: first develop the product ready, then the manufacturing process so that volume 
could be increased, then export."   
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Figure 11: Project C 
7.1.4 Project D 
Project D is an example of a systematic search for growth opportunities, where the 
existing technological and market competencies could be utilized and where a newly 
developed technological field, electronics, would be employed.  
“We had begun to systematically search for a related growth area. At that time, the fast 
technological development of microprocessors and sensors had taken off in general. 
Because of this general development, we thought that the growth project should in some 
way apply electronics.  It was clear that we would apply electronics into something." 
The customers of the entered product market had previously been a minor customer 
group of the firm, and therefore a basic understanding of the needs of these customers 
existed within the firm. More specifically, it was seen that the introduction of a 
physically small, electronic product would be the next major development in this 
product market. Furthermore, the firm’s main international distributor was one of the 
most important distributors for the new product market, which gave the firm further 
confidence that the discovered opportunity was a real one. The firm also had some of 
the central technological competencies needed, which was important for making the 
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project seem realistically achievable, as significant development resources were needed 
for the development of electronics competence. The responses reported in the 
questionnaire for Project A were a high 5 for technology fit and a moderate 3,7 for 
marketing and sales fit. The technological development was very demanding, as this 
was a new technological innovation. It was important that the firm’s existing 
technological capabilities were largely applicable. The lower marketing and sales fit was 
compensated for through active utilization of a distributor’s knowledge of the markets.   
"First we started to make a mechanical version of the new product and I came to the 
company to build up the product line. Then we got to know that someone had brought 
into the market a computer-based version of the product. This was about the size of a 
brick and we thought that it would be better if it would be about the size of a cigarette 
box. So we started developing such an instrument. The fact that we were able to 
succeed in this development also depended much on the fact that microprocessors had 
developed to an adequate level, and there were suitable sensors available, both for a 
price that they could be built in a consumer product."  
"We had to build the electronics competence from the beginning, because we knew it 
was the only way to grow. On the other hand, what we already knew were all the other, 
very demanding technologies that the product required."  
"It is important to have the basic building blocks in place and they must be certain 
enough. A lot of technology can also be bought, already incorporated into components.”     
"The end user market for the new product was already familiar because we had been 
making our core product also for these end users since the sixties, and had a very 
strong position in it. In the eighties there was a general willingness to make acquisitions 
so we acquired an American firm that manufactured one product for this new end user 
group and distributed all possible products for them. Through this acquisition we got 
even more information about the market, and became interested in it."  
"We went very deep in the study of the end user needs to really understand what the 
function of the instrument is and make sure the usability is good." 
"We did have a part of the distribution channels in place, but also new ones were born, 
especially through the contacts of our American daughter. In addition, we had 
experience of export, we had already until then been exporting 80% of our products."  
"The distribution was built bit by bit, first we had to look for distributors, then when we 
had become a brand, they started contacting us and we had to choose from them."  
"In the beginning the competitors were controlling the distribution better than we. They 
grew fast by producing to OEMs. We produced less and stuck to keeping our name and 
making our name a brand. We did not do marketing directly to consumers, but 
concentrated on distributors and product education. The distribution and brand have 
then been built bit by bit. "  
"We did not have money for mass marketing. Our life insurance has been our good 
products. When the products have come to the market, the customers have started to 
ask for them. For the distributors it’s not enough that we offer what competitors offer, we 
have to offer something more, more value added. This way we have become a leader of 
the industry."  
 "We invested much more in the visual design of the products than the competitors. In 
the beginning it was outsourced but now we have an own department for it."  
"The network of contacts was very important in order to assure we don't do anything 
silly."     
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"In the production we only do the final assembly, and that was similar for this product as 
for the previous ones. Testing and calibration were some new things we did ourselves."  
"In the beginning we outsourced even more of the production than otherwise. We 
outsourced also for example electronics design in order not to make mistakes in the 
beginning. Nowadays we have the competence for this ourselves.” 
As in Project C, junior management had a vital role in the decision-making process. 
However, in Project D the middle management also had an important role. In Project D 
the idea was found through a systematic search for a growth area and decision-making 
proceeded in a more structured manner. It was managed as a project.  Top management 
had a role in setting the expectations and monitoring the results, assuring a high 
ambition level. The responses reported in the questionnaire for Project D were high for 
the participation of all three groups: 4,9 for the CEO and top management participation, 
4,4 for middle management participation and 5 for junior management participation.  
"The first vision and push came from the CEO, and the project was started. Then for a 
long time the project just lived its own life."  
"Now the management is just receiving the results and getting puzzled about any 
difficulties. The group level is very far." 
"We never had to sell the project to the owners, they thought at that time that the 
company would earn its money just on stock trading anyway."  
"The board has been alternatingly interested, now, for example, even a bit too much." 
"In R&D and production there were especially motivated people who took responsibility 
even beyond their own tasks. With a nine-to five mentality we would not have got the 
product out."  
"The experts and junior managers are often over conservative in setting their goals; they 
want to play it safe.” 
"In marketing 2-3 people were very committed. They were partly middle management, 
partly experts". 
The responses concerning analytical quality of the decision-making process reported in 
the questionnaire for Project D were 3,3 for wide functional participation, 1,5 for 
financial analysis, and 2,3 for conflict. Here, especially the financial analysis was low, 
which did impact the implementation phase: as the firm encountered quality problems, 
its whole existence was at stake. A situation as dangerous as this might have been 
avoided through a better financial planning of the project. The possibility of such a 
financial bottleneck should have been predicted and prepared for. Because of the 
importance of the marketing fit in identifying the opportunity, the project was not as 
engineer-driven as Project C, but also marketing personnel had an important role.  
"The distributors and end users have been an invaluable source of information."   
"Now we use even Internet discussion groups for finding out needs and ideas of 
consumers." 
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"There were just 4-5 of us in the beginning, so we did not do many calculations. Now 
there is some internal competition for the same resources, so we need to analyze which 
projects  to invest in more carefully than before." 
"We did not have long-term budgets for the project."  
"We had no resources for market research.”   
“In difficult situations, everybody pulled together. Otherwise top management was a bit 
detached, and caused conflicts with demands and reactions that were detached from 
the business.”  
"The lack of hierarchy is a richness when managed right, because it assures a multitude 
of viewpoints.” 
The response reported in the questionnaire for Project D was 25 percent for growth 
expectations.  
"The market grew when the mechanic instruments were overtaken by the electronic 
ones."  
"The goals were not very clear, we just thought we would take what we can get and see 
what the competitors are doing. At some point in the nineties we got the idea that we 
want to be the biggest."  
"It is important to be able to set a relevant goal for yourself and for others without 
knowing all the details that will be needed along the way yet. This should, however, be 
based on things that do already exist. The longer the time period for the goals the 
better."  
"The goals were on the level of when do we want to get the new product out, we were 
almost always late of this goal, and that caused a huge panic."  
"Of course we also had traditional budget goals."  
"We did not have long term plans, just everyone had their own scenarios of life cycles 
and volumes etc."  
"Also the market grew because of our segmentation strategy."  
"It is also important that R&D does not have too much time for their projects. If they have 
too much slack they get unproductive."   
The responses reported in the questionnaire for Project D were 5 for technology 
investments, 1,5 for marketing and sales investments, and 4,3 for technological learning. 
The most demanding effort was, indeed, the technological development. 
"The R&D investments were the largest ones, there were no investments in production 
capacity as we used subcontractors like we had been doing before. One type of  
investment was inventory. At that time the firm was much smaller than now, so the 
investments could have been classified as significant, it was in the range of 2-3Mfim.” 
The project exceeded the expected sales goals by 32 percent. According to the 
interviewees, this was caused by the ambitious but realistic goals set by junior, middle 
and top management, and by the high commitment of some individuals that carried a 
disproportionately large responsibility during some critical times. The cooperation of 
marketing and engineers was a prerequisite for a competitive advantage of the firm in 
   156 
being one of the first in the market to combine top technology with top design. This 
position spun further projects. 
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Figure 12: Project D 
7.1.5 Project E 
In Project E, the discovery of the opportunity was promoted by knowledge of the 
disadvantages of the existing technologies, and by a basic knowledge of the new 
technology, which suggested that this kind of solution might be possible. Where 
technology knowledge was missing, external partners were actively used to consult and 
to co-develop.  
"We had an American consulting firm to make a study about whether the technology 
theoretically had anything to give. The result was positive but they said it would be a 
long way."  
"The idea originally came from one guy in the company. He knew the technology and 
had the vision. I had also become familiar with the technology during my studies. We 
thought that it would be worth a try."  
"At that time we had just finished a very large, many year project for a customer, which 
was the end of that business. We were wondering what to do next and a few ideas 
came about. A small, tight group of people was unanimous that this is what we should 
do and so we started pushing the idea forward." 
Lack of marketing fit hindered the customers’ acceptance of the new solution. The 
market was so new that hardly anyone believed in the advantages of the new solution, 
and it took a long time to mould these attitudes more positively. Here, a more 
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munificent and visionary parent firm, such as in Project B, could have helped by 
standing behind the innovation and marketing it to the whole value chain. The responses 
reported in the questionnaire for Project E were a relatively low 4 for technology fit and 
a low 1,5 for marketing and sales fit. This low degree of familiarity caused two things: 
First, the project was not considered a core growth project of the firm and did not get the 
appropriate management and financial resources, because it was such an uncertain 
“invention“-type of a project. Second, the technological as well as marketing and sales 
development proceeded slowly, and was possible at all only with the benefit of a good 
partner network. 
"We had to train the people. First, we searched through all Finnish universities and 
finally found a professor and his group of researchers who were willing to cooperate.” 
"Half of all dissertations made on this field of technology in Finland since the nineties 
has been made for us.” 
"We had to do a lot of marketing of just the methodology. This happened e.g. through 
national development projects." 
"Calculated with normal investment formulas the payback periods were so unbelievably 
short that it was difficult for us to convince the customers that the calculations were 
right. This is typical with innovation." 
"We had some first customers inside the group. This was of course an advantage as we 
received information on, for example, real lifetime costs, which we would not otherwise 
have received. On the other hand, family is sometimes worst. Often we found more 
excitement for the products outside the group."   
"The customers had to be carefully chosen according to profitability."  
Again, junior management had an important role in this very innovative project. The 
generally low responses for participation in the decision-making process can here be 
explained by the small size of the project team. The team consisted of five members 
who involved top management only when more investments from the parent were 
needed. It could have been beneficial from the perspective of reaching more growth 
faster if more parties had been involved in the decision-making process, because this 
could have assured larger efforts for the project, which could have helped in marketing 
the solution in the whole value chain with faster results. The responses reported in the 
questionnaire for Project A were 2,9 for CEO and top management participation, 2 for 
middle management participation and 3,8 for junior management participation.  
"The CEO of the group said that the boys are being silly." 
"We were at that time a tightly knit group of inventors, there were no managers really." 
The responses reported in the questionnaire for Project E were 1,2 for wide functional 
participation, 3,7 for financial analysis, and 2,7 for conflict. The response for financial 
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analysis is relatively high. This is because the project team had to proactively sell the 
idea both internally as well as externally in order to receive funds.  
"We were always trying to figure out how we can best sell the benefits of the future." 
"We were always anxious whether we had now shown enough future benefits and that 
the development had proceeded, whether they would now believe us."  
"We were always on minus as much as was tolerated." 
"We did not waste so much money, thanks to the networked business concept."  
"In the beginning we did all kinds of studies, but they were not so useful, pretty 
superficial. Then, we analyzed through the whole value chain, and were convinced that 
we were going in the right direction. We checked all kinds of opportunities and iterated 
between them, narrowing down the scenarios." 
"In the beginning we made very detailed competitor analyses and got their products in 
our hands."  
"There were two strong personalities in the leadership of the project and the discussion 
sometimes got loud. This was good, because it cleaned the air. Everyone should be let 
to do things in their own way."  
"In the beginning we were sometimes focusing on the wrong things. Now we are pretty 
much doing the things we then discussed." 
The response reported in the questionnaire for Project E was 60 percent for growth 
expectations. As said, growth expectations were set as optimistically as possible in order 
to receive financing.  
"We had to be optimistic because we had to promise a lot from the project in order to get 
the investment money, and then we had to try to believe we could fulfill those promises." 
"They never expected us to really generate growth. The parent had a principle at that 
time to be only in businesses with at least half a billion FIM sales and that were 
worldwide among the top three, so we weren't core."   
"The potential could be seen, but it was hard to prove." 
"We were too optimistic about the length and speed of the commercialization period. We 
thought that it couldn't be so difficult."  
"The basic research lasted longer than we had expected and the commercialization was 
slower than we had expected. "  
Implementation of the project can be characterized by a small team fighting against 
disbelief in the idea on the part of the parent, and against immaturity of the customer 
markets, to change their processes to benefit from the new solution. Only small 
investments were made, as not much money was available. All investments were made 
in the development of the technology. Due to the lack of money, a lean business model 
making extensive use of external partners was inevitable. Technological learning 
happened on a societal level; several external research groups and a university were 
involved in developing the technology. The responses reported in the questionnaire for 
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Project E were 4 for technology investments, 1 for marketing and sales investments, and 
5 for technological learning.  
"The parent firm gave us a certain amount of money, and told us not to come to ask for 
more."  
"We were very thin on money for a long time. We got some financing from Tekes, and 
were always asking for more money."  
"When we got further in the development, we just said, OK, kill us and then you won't 
get any of the benefits, or give us more money."  
"Even if we had had more resources, we could not have proceeded faster, because the 
market was developing so slowly. We needed the whole value chain to develop." 
"Our concept was new: we had no production, we were all networked. Also the R&D 
was partly made outside the house. We did not even have a finance director. We 
developed the best possible networks through trial and error, and have now been 
reducing the main partners. Now the cluster functions together like a company."  
"As we had no factory, we had very little risk. We had a warning example from a 
competing company that invested very much in a factory in the same technology and 
then they were wondering what to do with it."  
"The production partners were easy to scan, as there are not many possibilities in the 
world. Bit by bit we narrowed them to the right ones." 
The results of the project remained, for the first five years, beneath the expected sales 
goals. Only 58 percent of the sales goals was reached by that time. According to the 
interviewees, this was caused by having had to set the expectations at a rather optimistic 
level and by the slow development of the attitudes in the customer industries. The 
success in the development was due to the staying power of the team and the 
functioning business model based on the partner network. 
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Figure 13: Project E 
7.2 Cross-case analyses 
In this chapter, the cases are compared to each other along the studied variables 
impacting the success of the leveraging cases. The variables are type of project, firm 
characteristics, familiarity of the new market, and decision-making process 
characteristics. 
7.2.1 Firm level factors 
In Project A, the firm had an aggressive growth strategy together with a policy of large 
investments in growth in the form of research and development, new plants, and of 
trying to foster an innovative environment. The firm was large and capital intensive; 
making large-scale investments was an essential part of the business. Because of all of 
these reasons, the project had ample resources and support.  
”The firm was an excellent firm in the eighties. For example, there was an excellent 
internal innovation course, and a culture of innovation and visions, those were 
considered fine things. The personality of the group CEO probably had to do with this, 
he was a visionary guy, and then there was this studying mate of his in corporate 
development, who thought the same way. Additionally, there were these enormous 
growth goals, and one had to think of how to reach them.” 
Project B benefited from the fact that the parent was one of the forerunners of the 
entered market. Therefore, believing in this emerging market was easier than for many 
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competitors. In addition, being committed to finding growth opportunities, the firm had 
ample development resources. Furthermore, the firm perceived itself as one of the 
forerunners in technology in its traditional market, which gave the confidence that they 
could be pioneers and achieve world market leadership in the new market.  
”There was all the time enough money for development work, and it was our own 
money, so we didn’t need to explain to anyone what we were doing with it. We were 
able to finance the project staying within the normal development budgets. Nowadays 
we don’t have so much development resources anymore.” 
”You should not have annual development budgets, but they should be ongoing, the 
development work is ongoing as well. Of course its good to have some milestones.” 
”We had always been developing manufacturing processes ourselves, in addition to 
developing the product. So we had not been satisfied with just copying the 
manufacturing processes from others or with following some standards. It helped that 
also a division designing and manufacturing machinery we used was a part of the group. 
Through this development work a lot of competence had accumulated in the firm, as well 
as a certain way of thinking. That helped us to realize that we could reach the world 
leadership, so just go and do it.” 
In Project C, the industry was mature and this was the only growth opportunity for years 
to come. Therefore, there was no lack of certainty as to whether to seize the opportunity. 
The firm was quite small and very entrepreneurial and un-hierarchical, which was 
essential for the success of the development work. The small size of the firm in Project 
D, led to the project growing so large for the firm that the firm’s existence came to 
depend on it. In a few situations, problems that had occurred in the project had to be 
solved, or the firm would have gone bankrupt. This sense of urgency would seem likely 
to have helped in completing the project successfully.  
"A couple of times the old product had become outdated and we had to bring the new 
one to the market a bit too early. We had quality problems in the beginning. Fixing these 
quality problems was so expensive that the whole firm could have gone down. We did 
not know if we would ever recover these costs. In these cases we thought that if we can 
get through this we will get through anything."  
"E.g. with the very new type of product we saw immediately that the potential was 
enormous. The potential did not materialize immediately. We improved the product in 
several ways and achieved better results. Now this is our fastest growing segment."  
"The more product areas you have, the more you need to commit people to just thinking 
of the daily business. They must be able to see also broadly." 
In Project E, the varying management philosophies of a conglomerate had an impact. 
The case was started at a time when there was belief in developing technological 
competencies in general, and in investing in growth. This time was followed by a period 
of investment draught caused by the belief that the conglomerate should operate as a 
mere financial holding.  
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"You cannot invent growth ideas all of a sudden. Ideas are flowing all the time, you have 
to store them for when they are needed." 
"At that time we had a unit of about 50 people, half of them PhDs, whose job was to find 
future growth areas for the group. Afterwards, the development investments decreased 
because the group was developed more in the direction of a financial holding. For a 
while, we had for example no technology strategies."  
"Its important to keep working on innovations long enough for luck to have the time to 
impact: for opportunities to meet. A success feeds another success and people start to 
see the benefits." 
"When deciding about this project in the beginning of the nineties, the CEO said that the 
group was such a big company that we had to be able to afford technological 
frivolousness." 
"The unit had another field of high technology where the development was much further, 
they were already generating cash, and all R&D investments went to them."  
“The management was thinking, that as we did not consume so much money, they 
might as well let us continue, because it might turn out to be something."  
"Only now they see in the top management what a critical role we play in many 
products, that there is really growth potential."  
"After the period of draught we now have a different situation at the group level again: 
the group has different principles, they want to invest in technological competence."  
To summarize, Projects A and B benefited from the large size of the firms in the form of 
ample resources and a helpful network. Projects C and D, on the other hand, can be said 
to have benefited from the small size of the firms due to extreme entrepreneurialism and 
lack of hierarchy, as well as from the relative decisive importance of the projects. 
Project E benefited somewhat from internal customers of a large corporation. This 
benefit may have been decisive, although the case had also external co-development 
customers. The parent’s changing management philosophies, which may be 
characteristic of large conglomerates, may have disturbed the project through a lack of 
consistency from management, which is important for long-term development.  
It seems that corporate level managerial resources available for growth do not impact 
the success of the individual growth projects measured as percent of expectations 
reached because these corporate level resources are not in any way involved with the 
implementation of the projects. The responsibility for the success of the projects is 
transferred fully to the project team as soon as the team is founded. In the five cases, 
these project teams were founded at very early stages and they had a significant role in 
conceptualizing the projects. The role of the corporate level managerial resources 
available for growth was, firstly, in maintaining a munificient environment for starting 
such projects. This meant maintaining contacts to partners, which could provide 
financial resources and knowledge for the project. These were universities, Finnish 
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technology development foundations such as Tekes and Sitra, and other companies 
where development cooperation was maintained. Such a munificient environment 
enabled starting projects where lots of learning was required and the results were very 
uncertain on a small-scale. This small scale refers to low initial investments due to the 
utilization of the partner networks, and a small project team. Both aspects of small scale 
were seen as important factors promoting the project success, as is discussed below in 
more detail. Secondly, the corporate level managerial resources made the first drafts for 
investment plans that functioned as decision-making aids for the top management in 
considering launching a project team to work on the topic.    
“Without the aggressive growth goals that the corporate people were driving and their 
recognition of the strategic importance of this project, the project would never have been 
implemented. The investments were so big and the payback time so long“ Project A 
“Through our technology-development partnership we had an important contact which 
yielded the project its manager.” Project A 
“After the project group was founded it was clear the corporate people had nothing to do 
with the project anymore, except maybe just curiosity on how things were going. The 
people in the project were that ones that had been developing the idea for years, so they 
were really owners of the project.” Project A 
“The head of R&D had the vision and checked the feasibility through his contacts. His 
support for starting the project grew even stronger. This was essential in order for us to 
start preparing for mass production.” Project B 
“The corporate level employees who were involved in business development had 
developed some very important prerequisites, like the good contacts to the university. 
Without these we could not have started the project as such a low risk experiment. I 
would have been a much bigger decision, whether to start it, and I think we would 
probably have thought that it’s all too uncertain.” Project C 
“After the project group was appointed, no-one except they and the top management 
had anything to do with the project. The ones who had originally had the project idea 
were in the team, or part of top management. The corporate development guys had 
nothing to do with the project anymore, their job was done.” Project C 
“One resource dedicated a whole year for finding a technologically viable business 
opportunity in this area. Of course, without this investment it would never have become 
anything.” Project D 
“The corporate level business developers were very important in selling the project to 
the group management. We all knew that it would take very long before the project 
would generate any income, so this “preaching” for the project was essential. Without 
having had these guys put so much effort to convincing the management on the long-
term advantages we could never have started.” Proejct E 
“The consulting project ordered by the corporate level business developers to assess 
the viability of the technological solution was an important support in convincing 
everyone this was not just our crazy idea.”  Proejct E 
“The established relations to Sitra and the universities made the start at least a little less 
complicated. Additionally, of course, without their support we could not even have 
dreamt of the project. The company would never have given so much financing to such 
an uncertain project.” Proejct E 
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Table 34: Firm level factors 
Project A Project B Project C Project D Project E 
Firm growth aspiration 
”The firm had an 
aggressive growth 
strategy in the 
eighties, and this 
division in the 
beginning of the 
nineties. Several 
international 
acquisitions were 
made. Then the 
money started to dry 
out.”  
Parent had very high 
growth aspirations, but 
this daughter company 
rather low, as in a very 
mature business. 
The industry was 
growing slow and did 
not offer many growth 
possibilities. “It was 
good to proceed with 
the feet on the ground: 
first develop the 
product, then the 
manufacturing 
process, then export.”  
The firm was growth 
oriented, willing to look 
for growth 
opportunities outside 
the original market 
when that started to 
mature. Growth 
opportunities were 
searched from even 
unrelated areas.  
The firm was a growth-
oriented conglomerate, 
but has experienced 
strongly varying 
periods of leadership 
and direction. This 
project was considered 
too small and technical 
to be an important 
source of growth. 
Investments in growth 
In the eighties the firm 
invested a lot in R&D 
in general, in 
laboratories and other 
research equipment as 
well as in researchers. 
Even test factories 
were built, which were 
large investments. 
“There was all the time 
enough money for 
development work, 
and it was own money, 
we stayed within the 
normal development 
budgets. Nowadays 
we don’t have so much 
development 
resources anymore.” 
The investment in 
growth was the strong 
commitment to the 
project, and the 
employees’ 
entrepreneurial 
commitment, as well 
as management’s time 
in maintaining 
relationships with 
stakeholders.  
A few times correcting 
some quality problems 
was so expensive that 
if it had not succeeded 
the firm would have 
gone bankrupt. “The 
more product areas 
you have, the more 
you need to commit 
people to just thinking 
and out of the daily 
business.” 
In the beginning of the 
project the firm had a 
unit of about 50 people 
whose job was to find 
future growth areas. 
Later, the development 
investments were 
reduced as the group 
was developed to a 
financial holding. 
Firm innovativeness 
“The firm was very 
visionary and 
innovative in the 
eighties. This was due 
to the visionary CEO 
and a couple of other 
top managers, as well 
as to the aggressive 
growth goals.” 
The parent was very 
innovative, and in 
general in the group 
an entrepreneurial 
spirit had always been 
fostered. The business 
unit had always been 
developing technology 
itself. 
The firm was very 
entrepreneurial and 
thus willing to try out 
new ideas and well 
connected to all 
stakeholders of the 
industry and thus 
received a lot of ideas.
The visionaries of the 
firm were rather the 
middle and junior 
managers, the top 
management just set 
the goals such as 
growth.   
“When deciding about 
this project in the 
beginning of the 
nineties, the group 
CEO said that the 
group was so big that 
we had to be able to 
afford technological 
frivolousness.”  
Firm size 
Large. Deep pockets 
and generous 
investment policy. 
Large. Good internal 
customer, but not 
restrictive. Very good 
source of information 
about industry 
development. 
Small. Entrepreneurial, 
flexible, extremely 
unhierarchical, good 
flow of information. 
Small. Entrepreneurial 
and informal. 
Large. Investments in 
project relatively seen 
small. Internal 
customers not always 
cooperative but when 
willing to cooperate, 
supported in giving 
information about its 
real costs. 
7.2.2 Type of project 
Project A is an example of a project that required large investments in a factory. Yet, it 
was easy to decide upon and implement as all components were well known or even 
previously tested, and there was a strong champion in the top management. 
Furthermore, the firm was a part of a large group, so the investments were not so large 
in comparison to other investments, the group had a loose investment policy, and the 
investments were recoverable. The main impulse for the project came from the 
aggressive growth strategy of the group and from having successfully completed the 
development of one technological solution that was the base of the solution enabling 
this market entry. Project B is an example of being in the right place at the right time. 
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The firm had a technological competence and capital-intensive production facilities, 
which were needed by an emerging market that turned out to grow very large. What was 
needed was courage to believe in the market, but, even here, the firm was well 
positioned due to the parent firm’s prominent position in developing the market.  
"We had the machinery for production, if we had not discovered the market X we 
probably would have sold the machinery."  
”The manufacturing process for the product had been developed step by step since the 
seventies. The quality reached a world-class level by the beginning of the nineties. At 
that time the market X started to take off. The commercialization proceeded fast once 
the product was ready. So we were really in the right place at the right time.” 
”We had an insight that we have a technology that is needed in exactly this phase of 
development of market X. In large companies there are always various technologies 
”sleeping”. The skill is to dig the right ideas out when a market is going in the right 
direction for commercialization of the technology. Then you have to have a strong belief 
that this is the right direction in order to be able to be fast enough to skim the cream and 
impact the direction of the market.”  
”In general the idea for the project is more important than the implementation. A 
technological competence base is important for coming up with the ideas.”  
”We have also seen many unsuccessful projects here. The persons responsible for 
those just didn’t pull them through. Not enough people were invested in these projects; it 
wasn’t really a question of money. It is really irritating if you’re sure that it could have 
worked out, but I guess that’s a normal part of business.”   
”Systematic search for growth opportunities based on technological core competencies 
is a very important way of growing. But then of course you have to have the commercial 
skill as well for the markets you enter.” 
In Project C, good contacts with all stakeholders in the industry assured the firm both of 
the demand and that they would be able to develop the leading product, even if some 
new technological fields had to be learned. In addition, the firm proceeded step-by-step, 
making sure that the risk never grew too large. The idea came from customer demand, 
and the firm waited until it was clear what the dominant solution in the emerging market 
was going to be.  
Project D is an example of a proactive search for a new growth area based on previous 
technological competence. In addition, an important criterion in choosing which market 
to enter was the ability to utilize the existing distribution channels, as, in this business, 
they are time consuming to build. Moreover, the firm had decided it would grow into a 
market in which it could apply electronics, as this was a technological field that had 
matured to a point at which it was possible to utilize it in many more applications than 
had been possible previously. The firm had no previous competencies in electronics, and 
the electronics design was at the beginning partly outsourced. At that time even 
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unrelated diversification was not shunned, and therefore entering even unknown areas 
was not considered impossible.  
"At that time we had a need to grow: the markets we were active in at that time were not 
growing. So we thought we had to find growth opportunities in related fields, and there 
were a couple of alternatives. We chose this industry because we thought that we would 
face less competition there. In addition we seemed to have the basic requirements in 
place for this market.”   
As they proceeded, Projects C and D grew larger in scope than was originally expected. 
In Project C, the strategy was to proceed gradually; a large market was not needed to 
justify the initial investments. However, in the end the project became the firm’s main 
source of growth and enabled the firm to grow into a completely new size class. In 
Project D, the project was meant to be a new growth area, but the development turned 
out to be such an extensive task that it could have meant the end of the firm had it not 
succeeded. Nowadays, this product is what the firm is known for, and is a basis for new 
product types that together account for a larger part of the firm’s sales than the original 
product. These projects took the firms into a completely new era, and therefore it was 
probably not possible to imagine their scope at the beginning. Thus, the initially set 
growth expectations were exceeded. In Project C, this was due to a consciously chosen 
strategy of proceeding gradually, and, in Project D, it was due to a higher market 
growth. In Project D, a new niche was created with the help of recently matured 
technologies that gave new opportunities for functionality, and therefore it was probably 
difficult to predict the growth.  
Project E is an example of developing a completely new technology with limited 
previous experience. The only assets the project could benefit from were as follows: 
some partially reluctant internal customers who helped in studying the real benefits of 
the technology in question, an idea of a totally new solution, a consulting study that 
concluded the idea should work in theory, one employee who had experience with the 
technology, a five-person team who believed in the idea, and minimal financing. The 
team needed a lot of staying power in order to wait and relentlessly try to persuade to the 
whole value chain that they should change to enable sales to take off. The benefits of the 
technology had to be hard-sold to the management to keep the project alive, and 
therefore the stated growth expectations were reached more slowly than expected.  
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Overall, growth expectations were strongly influenced by management commitment and 
the strategic importance of the cases. In cases where the management was convinced of 
the importance of the case, the goals were not set to overly demanding levels, because it 
was clear that, for the sake of firm’s future, the project had to be undertaken. In such 
cases, the project was the only source of growth for the firm for years. In addition, 
investments perceived to be small allowed more modest growth goals. When it was 
difficult to convince the management to finance the project, the goals were stated at an 
optimistic level and reaching them was even more difficult. In Projects B and C, the 
ideas for the projects were induced by the development of markets, while the firms 
received the signals through good partner networks. In Projects A and D, the driving 
force was a need to find new growth areas. In Project E, one man’s idea for a superior 
technological solution was what set the project in motion. Small scale referring to low 
initial investments due to the utilization of the partner networks, and a small project 
team were considered important by the firms.  
“This was a large project in terms of investments and participating people. In order to get 
the financing, the corporate business developers had to do extensive groundwork and 
plans. The plans did materialize quite well, because all components were very familiar. It 
was just an implementation question of putting it all together.” Project A 
“Too many cooks spoil the soup [a Finnish saying]. If we had had more people in the 
project, nobody would have understood the big picture anymore. Too many 
compromises would have had to be made, as people see things differently. This would 
have lead to one big compromise and not a winning market entry.” Project B    
“One of the main success factors was that we were able to start the project in such a 
small scale. Had this not been possible we would not have started the project at all 
because the results were too un certain. Additionally, the small size allowed a small 
project team. For such a team it was possible to work in a very self-steered way. The 
small team was also very homogenic: everyone had the same vision and pulled in the 
same direction.” Project C 
“A large group could not have worked in such a good way: its hard to organize the work 
really effectively, communication gets more formal, and all members in a large group 
cannot be 100% motivated, so you cant trust that everyone is really giving their best.” 
Project C 
“In a large project scope you have to start to do too much guessing as you try to plan 
things you have no idea of how they will turn up.” Project C 
“We could not have started the project on a larger scale because nobody was interested 
about it before we could prove that the idea works and the customers want it.” Project D 
“Being able to start the project on a small scale was not self-evident. If we had not had 
the partner networks and the small group of people who were so convinced about the 
idea that they were willing to try it out even in uncertain conditions, starting the project 
this small would have lead nowhere. For starting the project in a larger scale we would 
never have received the financing.” Project E 
“The group has to be homogenic, if there are too many differing perspectives, ways of 
thinking or ways of working the whole work becomes really ineffective.” Project E 
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Table 35: Type of project 
Project A Project B Project C Project D Project E 
Nature of project 
Entry into a product 
market with the help of 
a new technology, 
which was based on 
combining two existing 
technologies, and 
gave the firm a 
competitive advantage 
in the entered product 
market. 
Adapting existing, 
expensive machinery 
from a product market 
that had begun to 
decline to a new, 
emerging market. 
A new product to cater 
the needs of an 
emerging segment. 
The firm knew the 
customers well but 
learning two previously 
completely unfamiliar 
technological fields 
was needed. 
The firm created a new 
market segment. 
Distribution channels 
and an initial customer 
contact were in place, 
as well as some of the 
needed technological 
competencies. 
Developing technology 
that the main 
businesses could 
utilize to become more 
competitive. The 
application of the 
technology to this type 
of usage was very new 
worldwide. 
Importance as source of growth 
The new market was 
seen as one of the 
main growth areas of 
the firm in the future. It 
was seen as very 
important to develop 
an own technological 
competence and a 
proprietary technology.
One of the very few 
growth opportunities in 
a mature market. Due 
to the newness of the 
market many 
managers did not 
believe in the 
opportunity but 
considered the niche 
too small to be worth 
an attempt. 
This product line was 
what enabled the 
growth of the firm to a 
totally different size 
class. The market was 
growing very slowly, 
and this was one of 
the few growth 
opportunities for a long 
time. 
The company was 
forced to find a new 
growth area, because 
the old market had 
come to maturity and 
there were no more 
growth opportunities. 
This seemed to be the 
only possible growth 
opportunity. 
For the parent firm, the 
project was very 
unimportant and it was 
left alive only because 
it was not consuming 
much resources. The 
driving force was the 
enthusiasm of a five-
person project team. 
Birth of idea 
The idea had been 
about for a long time. 
Its competitive 
advantages were 
highlighted by a small, 
acquired business. 
The technological 
solution was 
conceived after 
experiences in the 
critical fields. 
Insight that the firm 
had a technology that 
was needed in exactly 
the then current phase 
of development of 
market X was related 
to the parent firm 
being one of the first 
firms that discovered 
the growth market X. 
The impulse from the 
clientele was very 
clear, telling that there 
is a market for the 
product. Good 
contacts to all 
stakeholders enabled 
monitoring of the 
development and 
needs of the segment. 
In a systematic search 
for a related growth 
area the entry to 
several product 
markets was 
considered. Firm had 
decided that the 
growth project should 
apply electronics, a 
new field to the firm, to 
something. 
One employee who 
knew the technology 
originally had the idea. 
There was a need for 
new business ideas. A 
specialized consulting 
firm made a study 
about whether the idea 
was viable in theory.  
Growth expectations: how defined, why? 
There was no need to 
sell the product to the 
management, because 
it had a very strong 
champion in the top 
management.  
Enormous growth 
figures were budgeted, 
as much as was 
possible in a mature 
industry without 
seeming ridiculous. 
The explosive growth 
of the market X took 
everyone by surprise. 
The management was 
confident that the firm 
should go ahead with 
the development of the 
new product, so the 
team did not need to 
sell it to anyone. The 
market growth was 
unexpectedly high.  
“The goals were on the 
level of when we do 
want to get the new 
product out, we were 
almost always late of 
this goal, and that 
caused a huge panic.” 
“Of course we also 
had traditional budget 
goals.” 
“We had to promise a 
lot from the project in 
order to get the 
investment money.” 
“We were too 
optimistic about the 
length of the basic 
research and 
commercialization.” 
7.2.3 Familiarity of the entered market: technology 
In Project A, the innovation, which created the competitive advantage enabling the 
entry, required the combination of two already familiar technologies that had been in use 
in the firm. To combine these two main technologies, a technical solution was required 
from a field that was also, to an extent, familiar to the firm due to a previous 
unsuccessful project. Still, there were some difficulties in developing this combining 
solution. Overall, it was perceived that the project had very little technological 
uncertainty. In addition, in Project B, there was only little to learn technologically. In 
addition to applying the familiar main technology, only some new interface products 
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were needed, and these were developed in cooperation with several partners. In Project 
C, the firm already had competencies in hydraulics and mechanics, and in the usage of 
aluminum and extra strong steel, which were central competencies in the emerging 
market. Competencies in automatics and measurement technology had to be learned. For 
this, existing development capacity was used, and, in addition, some development was 
conducted together with partners. In Project D, the firm had competence in the special 
structure of the products, in certain required measurement aspects and in fine 
mechanics, which were essential for the development of the new product. The 
electronics competence had to be built from the beginning. For this, some new 
employees with a suitable background were hired. In addition, some of the electronics 
design was outsourced in the beginning to avoid mistakes and learn. In Project E, the 
engineers had to be trained in the new technology from the start. First, all Finnish 
universities were scanned and finally a professor with a group of researchers was found 
who was willing to cooperate. Research and development was partly outsourced, and, 
through national development projects, research was initiated in a network of 
institutions. 
The cases vary greatly as to how much new technological competence had to be learned 
and the extent to which the already familiar technologies could be used. Projects A and 
B are at one extreme, where the technological uncertainty was very low as the entry was 
directly based on familiar technologies and only very little needed to be adjusted and 
learned. The companies perceived these cases very low in risk; the companies were 
confident they would be able to develop the product. In this aspect, the projects also 
proceeded very closely according to the plans set for them. An exception to this is that 
in Project B, the market growth could not be predicted, as the market was very new. 
Because Project A was perceived as having low risk, there was no need for extensive 
selling of the idea of the project to management.  The expectations were set on a 
realistically reachable or even conservative level. In Project B, no investments outside 
the regular research and development budget were needed, and there was no need to 
overstate the expectations. In Projects C and D, demanding new fields of technology had 
to be learned, but the entry was also very much based on the competencies in the firm’s 
core technologies. This led to both projects facing some difficult times when the 
continuation of the project was at stake. These difficulties were caused by an initial 
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failure to solve technological challenges. In both cases, the entrepreneurialism of the 
project team was key to overcoming these difficulties. In Project C, top management 
support, gave the necessary confidence to the project team to keep searching for the 
solutions. The confidence in the idea was further strengthened by good contacts with all 
industry stakeholders. Project E represents the other extreme. Very little was known of 
the technology. The competence had to be built on a national level from almost nothing. 
The uncertainty of succeeding in developing the technological solution, and the 
uncertainty of whether the value chains would change so there would be a market made 
it necessary to be optimistic towards the stated goals in order to receive any investment 
funds at all. Additionally, there were setbacks in the basic research, which caused it to 
take longer than anticipated. The commercialization period was longer than expected as 
well. The following table summarizes the cases with regard to familiarity of the entered 
market in terms of technology. 
Table 36: Familiarity of the entered market: technology 
Project A Project B Project C Project D Project E 
Technology fit 
“The technology was 
just combining two old 
things. There weren’t 
many surprises in the 
project, because all 
components were 
familiar.”  
In addition to the basic 
product based on the 
traditional technology 
also some interface 
products were needed 
that attached the 
product to a system, 
which were developed 
with the help of a few 
partner firms. 
The firm already had 
competence in 
hydraulics and 
mechanics, and the 
usage of aluminum 
and extra strong steel. 
Competencies in 
automatics and 
measurement 
technology had to be 
learned. 
The firm had 
competence in the 
special structure of the 
products, in certain 
required measurement 
aspects and in fine 
mechanics. The 
electronics 
competence had to be 
built from the 
beginning.  
“We had to train the 
people from the start. 
First we searched 
through all Finnish 
universities and finally 
found a professor and 
his group of 
researchers who were 
willing to cooperate.”  
Technology investments 
Only the existing R&D 
personnel were 
utilized, and this 
wasn’t seen as a real 
extra investment. 
About 50 people 
worked for the project 
in R&D. 
”All in all this was 
considered a very safe 
project because we did 
not invest in any new 
types of skills or 
capacity.” 
Only investments were 
the R&D investments, 
the existing 
development capacity 
was used and 
development was 
done together with 
partners. 
The R&D investments 
were the largest ones, 
also new people with 
new skills were hired 
for R&D. 
All investments were 
in R&D, because there 
was so little money 
that prioritization was 
necessary. Even the 
R&D was partly 
outsourced. 
Technological learning 
“In developing the 
critical technological 
field X we should have 
more openly looked 
outside the firm for 
what has already been 
developed in this area. 
The team was too 
introverted.” 
Through partners 
especially in the 
interface components.
Automatics and 
measurement were 
totally new 
technological fields 
and were developed in 
cooperation with a 
university and a 
government 
organization for 
technological 
development. 
Electronics was a 
completely new field. 
The development was 
speeded up through 
hiring new people. 
The technology itself 
needed to be learned 
and developed, and 
many people even 
outside the firm were 
involved. “Half of all 
dissertations made on 
this field in Finland 
since the nineties has 
been made for us.” 
   171 
7.2.4 Familiarity of the entered market: marketing, sales and operations 
In Project A, the business logic was well known: it was clear to which markets and 
segments the products would be targeted. Previously, the firm had been producing other 
products for the same customers. Ten to twenty people worked in making the 
investment analyses. New salespeople were hired as the business grew. Some new 
capabilities needed to be learned for licensing and the related training. The firm had 
already built factories before, so the necessary project management capabilities were in 
place. Therefore, Project A is an example of a project where the entered market was 
familiar, and operational uncertainty was low. This helped in implementing the project 
according to plan without major surprises. The perceived familiarity and certainty of all 
the components of the project also helped in receiving the management commitment and 
financing, even with modestly stated growth expectations, which were not impossible to 
exceed. In Project B, the business logic was similar to the original market. Both the 
customers and the product, however, were more demanding than before, and this caused 
a need to develop more advanced selling methodologies. The size of the sales force had 
to be increased significantly. Other investments were directed towards developing 
improved production machinery and building more production lines. In comparison to 
Project A, Project B required somewhat more development of new marketing and sales 
competencies, especially as the market was only coming into being and therefore no one 
had experience of it. The newness of the market also meant that there were many in the 
firm who did not believe the project was worth the while, even if the downside was very 
small. Therefore, the growth expectations were set as high as possible without sounding 
ridiculous in a mature industry, but still the dramatic growth of the market took 
everyone by surprise. Operationally, the project proceeded according to plan. In Project 
C, the product was targeted to the existing customers using the existing channels and 
sales force. The production capacity was increased gradually as demand grew. In the 
marketing and operational aspects, the uncertainty was perceived very low, partly 
because of the familiarity, and partly because of the strategy of gradual entry. The 
strategy of gradual entry leads to perhaps slightly low growth expectations. In the 
marketing and operational aspects, the project experienced no surprises. In Project D, 
the end user market was familiar because the firm had been making their core product 
for this market also. A part of the distribution channels was already in place, but also 
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new ones were created. Some significant operative and marketing investments were a 
very deep study of the end user needs, more visual design than competitors, and 
maintaining and developing the own brand at the cost of slower growth than some 
competitors that followed an OEM strategy. Another significant investment was 
inventory. The firm had traditionally been outsourcing production. At the beginning of 
this project, even more was outsourced than usual. No new own production capacity was 
needed. Testing and calibration were new production steps that the firm completed 
internally. The existence of the distribution channels was seen as an important 
prerequisite for starting the project. They were also a good source of information about 
the end user needs and preferences. It seems likely that without having had the 
distribution channels in place the firm would not have started the project. The 
uncertainty would then have been too large. The familiarity of end users, distribution 
channels and production aspects assured that there were no surprises from this side. In 
Project E, only a few internal customers were familiar, otherwise all components were 
unfamiliar. The new methodology had to be marketed in the whole value chain, which 
was very slow and laborious. The project had no production, and not even a finance 
director; as much as possible was outsourced to keep the costs variable. Screening all 
potential partners, and gradually reducing the network to the best, created the network of 
partners. The marketing-related uncertainties led to underestimating the length of the 
commercialization period, and therefore to overstated growth expectations.  
Projects A, C and D, the marketing and operational aspects were very familiar and 
caused only positive surprises in the project implementation in that the demand was 
higher, or realized faster, than expected. In Project A, even the building of the factory 
was slightly cheaper than was expected. In Projects C and D, the market familiarity was 
even a prerequisite for initiation and success of the projects. In cases B and E, the 
markets were only just emerging, and no one knew accurately how they would develop. 
In Project B, the market turned out to be much larger than expected, and in Project E, 
the demand realized slower than expected. The following table summarizes the cases 
with regard to familiarity of the entered market in terms of marketing, sales, and 
operative aspects.  
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Table 37: Familiarity of the entered market: marketing, sales and operations 
Project A Project B Project C Project D Project E 
Marketing fit 
“The business logic 
was well known: we 
knew exactly to which 
markets and segments 
we would be targeting 
the products.”  
“For the business 
model we had 
analogies from our old 
businesses. Selling 
was similar, but 
demands were higher 
and the business 
model was more one 
of selling solutions 
including installation 
etc.” 
“We had already had 
the channels and the 
customers.” “We were 
so deeply rooted in the 
industry that we never 
doubted that we could 
develop the product so 
that it would become 
good.”  
“The end user market 
was familiar: we had 
been making our core 
product also for them 
since the sixties.” “We 
had a part of the 
distribution channels 
already in place, but 
also new ones were 
born.” 
Some advantage from 
internal customers. 
“We had to do a lot of 
marketing of just the 
methodology. This 
happened for example 
through national 
development projects.” 
“Business concepts 
are slow to change” 
Marketing investments 
Ten to twenty people 
worked in making the 
investment analyses. 
New salespeople were 
hired as the business 
grew. Some new 
capabilities were 
needed for licensing 
and the related 
training.   
“Sales channels and 
market logic were 
exactly same as 
before, but we had to 
make significant 
investments in 
increasing the size of 
the sales force.”  
There were none. Inventories, very deep 
study of the end user 
needs, more visual 
design than 
competitors, brand at 
the cost of slower 
growth than some 
OEM competitors.  
“Even if we had had 
more resources, we 
could not have 
proceeded faster, 
because the market 
was developing so 
slow. We needed the 
whole value chain to 
develop and only time 
helped in this.”  
Operations fit 
“We had experienced 
people to operate the 
factory, hundreds were 
needed to build and 
operate it.” “We had 
already been building 
factories so we knew 
how the process of the 
project proceeds.” 
“We had the 
machinery and 
buildings for 
production, but we 
also developed new 
machines and built 
new production lines.” 
“Investments in 
multiplying factories 
have some risk in 
whether the project is 
in schedule etc.” 
“We increased the 
production capacity 
gradually as demand 
grew (production hall, 
number of welding 
places).” “We had 
problems with the 
mechanical prototype, 
we started the serial 
production too early.” 
“We outsourced even 
more than otherwise in 
the beginning, such as 
electronics design. No 
new production 
capacity was needed. 
Testing and calibration 
were some new things 
we did ourselves.”  
“We had no 
production, it was 
outsourced. We did 
not even have a 
finance director. We 
developed the best 
possible networks 
through trial and error, 
and have now been 
reducing the main 
partners.”  
7.2.5 Decision-making process characteristics: participation 
In case A, the top management was very committed and secured ample resources for the 
whole four year development period due to the existence of a strong champion in the top 
management. The management set the goals for the products. The research and 
development engineers participated in planning, which was perceived as important for 
their commitment to the implementation. They also decided on goals within their 
specific parts of the project. The research and development engineers additionally 
developed solutions and products on their own that were not a part of the plan. The 
middle management participated in the project decision-making on the goals. This was 
preceded by discussion with the research and development engineers. Within the project 
team, the culture was un-hierarchical and open, which was perceived important for the 
success of the development work. In Project B, the top management did not have a very 
strong belief in the project. This did not cause much harm, as no large investments were 
needed. Stronger top management support and vision of the growth of the market could 
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have helped the firm to prepare for the enormous growth better, but as it was, the firm’s 
growth in this market was in some phases slowed down by limits of organic growth. It 
was seen as important for the success of the project that those in charge of specific parts 
also decided on the goals and plans in these areas. This was perceived important for 
assuring commitment to the plans and goals and sense of responsibility for taking them 
through, as well as for assuring that the best possible information was utilized. Six 
directors of the business unit, who essentially formed the project team, set the overall 
goals and plans. In Project C, the top management’s relentless belief in the project’s 
success was essential, especially in difficult phases of the technological development, 
as, for example, the first prototype of the product was a failure. The top management set 
the goals and made decisions together with the stakeholders. The research and 
development engineers, the shop floor workers and the salespeople were also very much 
involved in the decision-making. As the firm was small, the management was also 
involved in the day-to-day work.  
In Project D, the management essentially controlled the project only to keep it on track, 
but did not get involved in the details, nor did they exhibit support to the project. The 
junior management and expert levels of research and development and production were 
the driving force of the project; these also had a lot of freedom in setting the goals and 
deciding upon the plans. This was considered important for their commitment. One 
interviewee's experience was that research and development engineers might be overly 
conservative in their goals and plans due to the very fact that they are responsible for 
delivering the results. In Project E, the lack of management commitment, and the 
resulting need to continuously prove the project’s benefits, may even have been 
beneficial for clarifying the benefits to the project team itself, and therefore helping in 
external marketing. As an interviewee said, it seems unlikely that the commercialization 
would have proceeded faster, even with more resources, because whole value chains had 
to develop in the right direction before sales took off. This would have taken a long time 
in any case. The project team consisted of five persons, so roles were almost equal. The 
larger project team included external partners also, and, with them, communication and 
planning together were frequent, which assured being well informed about the state of 
the art of the technology.   
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In general, the commitment of top management, as well as the participation of junior 
management, was very important for the success of the projects. Top management belief 
in the project may have induced an overall optimistic attitude towards the project, and a 
tendency to set the growth expectations higher. According to one interviewee, junior 
management may have a tendency to set the expectations lower, due to their concrete 
responsibility for delivering the results. Middle management’s role was in structuring 
the plans and goals. Different managerial levels had different roles over the course of 
the project. Three different phases, in which these roles varied, were introduced by two 
of the interviewed firms. The differing roles can be identified in the other firms as well. 
1. In the phase before launching the project team, the corporate level managerial 
resources available for growth were on the driver’s seat, gathering the 
development ideas in the firm, assuring the munificient environment for starting 
projects, and making the initial project concepts for he top management to 
decide upon. Corporate level managerial resources available for growth as a 
driving force in this phase seems logical, as these full-time resources have an 
incentive to see to it that growth projects are started. This is the most concrete 
result of the work of these resources. 
2. The next phase, the development of the new solution to the new market, was 
characterized by intense learning, as the projects required significant 
technological development. Because of the deeply technical nature of this phase, 
junior management consisting mainly of R&D engineers was the driving force of 
this phase. Due to the explorative and dynamic nature of learning, it cannot be 
very well planned for or structured. According to the firms, this was the reason 
that middle management had hardly any role in this phase. Furthermore, the 
aspects of “analytical quality of decision-making” would not have been fruitful 
here, due to the dynamic nature of the learning process. Essential in this phase, 
according to the firms, was a homogenic, small, and empowered project team. 
As the projects were top priority in the firm, the top management was in directly 
involved in the work of the junior management. Communication between these 
two organizational levels was almost daily and on a very detailed level. Junior 
management as a driving force in this development phase is logical, a their goals 
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are often set in the form of intermediate goals such as development of a 
technically functioning solution and test customers’ satisfaction with it.  
3. The third phase was the full-scale commercialization of the product in the new 
market. The interviewees defined this phase to start at the point where the 
product was already mature in terms of the technical and commercial solution, 
and had even already proven itself at the marketplace. Here the middle 
management role gained significantly in importance, because this was the time to 
do more detailed plans on segments, channels, volumes and prices. Middle 
management was in these firms the level with the business responsibility, such 
as business heads. However, three of the companies (A, D, E) reckoned having 
failed to involve middle-management in this phase as effectively as they should 
have. At first, the middle management considered the new product somewhat 
problematic, because pushing it to the market meant a lot of work and the returns 
were uncertain. Additionally, it was felt that the communication between the 
engineers (junior management) and the middle management was not very 
effective, which harmed the handover. Because of this, the companies felt the 
full-scale commercialization did not start quite optimally. For example, price 
premiums were lost due to the fact that commercialization had been on a smaller 
scale started already earlier, selling first prototypes to good customers as test 
versions. Thereafter, taking the full price for the finalized product was difficult. 
Middle-management is the logical driving force here, as they are measured 
according to concrete business results and therefore only become interested as 
the new solution has already shown its potential. 
Top-management commitment was important all through the project: in the first phase 
to commit the resources and set a vision, in the second phase to show long-term 
commitment even through difficult times, and in the third time to set the goals high 
enough to assure the potential in the new market is fully utilized and so the return on the 
investments maximized. As to the interfaces between the three phases, the companies 
did not have problems in transitioning from phase one to phase two. Two factors could 
contribute to this: First, the roles were very clearly defined. It was in no way the task of 
the corporate level managerial resources available for growth to get involved in the 
implementation of the projects once the project team had been founded. Before 
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founding the project team, the people who had been developing the idea – and who then 
mostly became the project team – were more than willing to help the corporate level 
resources in making the first concept, as it was in their interests to start the project. 
Second, the first conceptualization done in the phase one as a basis for deciding on 
starting the project was not so detailed that it would have limited the actions in the 
phase two too much. The three companies (A, D, E) considered the problems of 
transitioning from the phase two to the phase three severe and harmful to the 
maximization of return on investments. 
“Top management vision was essential in the beginning, for getting the resources for 
such a big project, and later for the long term orientation of patenting the solution and 
starting the licensing business.” Project A 
“Middle management felt uneasy about the new product, they did not see tha potential 
and felt it was just more work.” Project A 
“We started to create a middle management as the sales started to take off. This middle 
management was the business management level, which meant a marketing and sales 
manager and later several of them and production manager.” Project B            
“Management had overall only little impact on the decisions or the course of the project. 
They did not even have content knowledge to be able to comment on what we were 
doing, and it is anyway hard to start telling someone how he should be doing his job, 
when it’s a question of difficult problem solving and creating something new.” Project C 
“Middle management had no impact whatsoever. Its involvement would just have meant 
steering the project as a line organization and that would have been way too slow 
moving bureaucratic.” Project C 
“Top management support was important all the time: they had the vision that we should 
get into this business and as we had problems we thought we could not solve, they just 
told us to keep working on it. Afterwards, top management then set the direction for 
further projects based on this one. Only these follow-up projects made later the 
business grow so big.” Project C 
“CEO’s support was essential all the time: he had the original vision and pushed us 
through tough times when we thought the firm would go bankrupt because of the project 
and all other departments hated us. Later, top management’s ambition was important to 
push us to create the next product generations. Business managers’ involvement would 
have been important when the market took up, but they were skeptical about the 
product in the beginning and did not see its potential. Here, we should somehow have 
involved them earlier to make sure they start the full-scale commercialization right from 
early on. Because we did this a bit unprofessionally and without a clear pricing etc. 
strategy, we probably lost some premiums.” Project D 
“Middle management got a role then when the business was up and running and it 
became a question of optimizing the strategy and operations for a maximum return.” 
Project E 
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Table 38: Decision-making process characteristics: participation 
Project A Project B Project C Project D Project E 
Top management participation and commitment 
“Top management was 
very committed and 
secured ample 
resources for the 
whole four year 
development period 
because of the strong 
champion.”  
“Management set the 
goals for the products”
”The top management 
wasn’t visionary, they 
were even going to sell 
the division away.” 
”The top management 
wasn’t always so 
involved, they were 
often slowing down 
and harming the 
development.” 
“Top management was 
very committed, 
monitoring the project 
continuously, and 
achieved the 
commitment of 
everyone else.” “They 
set goals and made 
decisions together with 
the stakeholders.” 
The management was 
not very interested. 
“The first vision to start 
the project came from 
the CEO. Then for a 
long time the project 
just lived its own life.” 
“The board has been 
alternatingly 
interested.” 
The top management 
did not take the five-
man development 
team seriously, hardly 
anyone believed they 
would reach 
something. “The CEO 
of the group said that 
the boys are being 
silly.” 
Junior management participation and commitment 
”R&D engineers 
participated in 
planning, which was 
important for 
commitment. They 
decided on goals 
within parts of the 
project.” “We had a lot 
of control and 
developed many 
things outside the 
plan.” 
”For commitment, 
information, and 
responsibility, it was 
really important that 
the ones who 
implemented, The 
R&D engineers, 
decided on the goals 
and plans.” ”There 
also has to be room 
for experimenting.” 
“The engineers were 
very involved in the 
decision making. 
Internally, the 
craftsmen with hands 
on experience had the 
say. The sales brought 
in feedback from the 
field and competitor 
comparisons.”  
“In R&D and 
production there were 
motivated people who 
took broad 
responsibility. With a 
nine-to-five mentality 
the product would not 
have been born.” 
“Often the R&D 
engineers can be over 
conservative.” 
“We were all at that 
time a tightly knit 
group of inventors, 
there were no 
managers really.” 
Middle management role 
“Middle management 
participated a lot in the 
project decision-
making. They had a 
greater role in making 
the final decisions on 
the goals, but this was 
preceded by 
discussion.” “The titles 
were not important.” 
”The goals and plans 
were set by the 
business unit 
directors, about six 
persons. The parent 
just sometimes 
commented on things 
like what the capital 
utilization should be or 
things like that.” 
A middle management 
is difficult to 
distinguish due to 
small firm size. 
“In marketing 2-3 
people have been very 
committed. They have 
been partly middle 
management, partly 
maybe junior 
management.” 
There were no middle 
managers. 
7.2.6 Decision-making process characteristics: quality 
In case A, the firm was engineer-driven, but the marketing department also participated 
in the decision-making. The finance department did not participate in the decision-
making. Financial analyses were made, but they do not seem to have impacted the 
project plan. The progress of the project was reported monthly in a meeting where 
project, business, and plant management together with the business development 
manager were present. No bureaucracy related to strict rules or procedures was 
experienced. An extensive feasibility study of the project was conducted at the outset. It 
comprised a market research, an analysis of the competitive situation in the entered 
market, and the investment case. Some negative conflict in the project was experienced. 
The atmosphere, according to the interviewees, was also very open for conflicting 
opinions. This may have contributed to the lower expectations, as employees 
responsible for certain goals did not shun outing their opinions when wanting to set 
goals on lower levels.  
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In Project B, the sales, research and development, and production departments 
participated in the decision-making. Finance department did not participate, as no major 
investments were made. Very few calculations were made, as the market was so new 
that no data was available. Action plans were made, and they were quite accurately 
followed. There was only little conflict, which may be due to the small and tightly knit 
project team with a clear common goal. It was possible for the team to set the goals as 
high as they considered would be credible to the top management. The small size of the 
project team, and the fact that only departments with concrete responsibility in the 
project implementation participated in the decision-making, seem to have contributed to 
the successful implementation.  
In Project C, the firm was so small that everyone who was needed to contribute 
something to the project, or who could contribute, was involved in a natural way. 
However, no departments without clear responsibility in the case were included in the 
decision-making, so the power to decide remained with the employees responsible for 
the implementation. This seems likely to have strengthened their commitment and 
improved success of the project. Minimal plans were made to an outside financier, 
which caused some experienced bureaucracy. Otherwise, the work proceeded day to day 
without much planning. No significant conflict was experienced, and therefore the goals 
were set in each phase as high as possible within the framework of the gradual strategy.  
In Project D, many firm external parties were involved in discussions about the project, 
but the decisions were made by only the parties with responsibility. Difficult situations 
along the way just increased the project team cohesion. As there was very little conflict, 
the goals were always set as high as possible.  In Project E, everyone was involved very 
naturally as the project team was so small. There was very little conflict and the growth 
expectations were set as high as possible.   
The active involvement of many functional departments in the decision-making seems 
to threaten the feeling of ownership of the plans and the goals on the part of those 
participating. It seems that only those parties that are responsible for the implementation 
should actively participate in the decision-making. This has not generally jeopardized 
the quality of the analyses or the information considered, because the ones responsible 
do assure that all resources that can help in the project are utilized as needed. On the 
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other hand, in Project A there were indeed some signs that the project team was slightly 
too closed: 
”The biggest mistake in the project was made in the development of the critical 
technological field K: here, we should have more openly looked outside the firm for what 
has already been developed in this area. The reason for not doing this was that the 
team just was like that, they wanted to just work by themselves.” 
All in all, the aspects of “analytical quality of decision-making process” were not 
considered important for promoting the success of the projects. The companies did 
consider such aspects useful in projects that are somewhat predictable, but these 
leveraging projects involved very much learning. Even if the basis was leveraging the 
firm’s existing technological competence in new product markets, so many enabling 
technologies had to be learned and completely new solutions developed, that the 
uncertainties even in developing the solution were large. Additionally, the product-
market was only being created by the firms, which made forecasting demand with any 
accuracy virtually impossible. 
“For the later involvement of the business managers [middle management] it would have 
been good if our approach had been more analytical. The business managers were 
alienated by our style of decision-making which was based on personal convictions and 
then decisive action based on that. ” Project A 
“Even if the others [the organization outside the project team] was interested in reading 
reports and seeing plans, there was anyway nothing they could do about the project. We 
were the ones who had to get it done and get the problems solved as they surfaced. So 
these steering mechanisms had really no impact on the project, because nobody took 
any action based on them.” Project C 
“Later, we noticed that it might have been good to involve other departments earlier on. 
The transition to full-scale production might have been more seamless. On the other 
hand, we did not have any really severe problems due to this.” Project D 
“In the full-scale commercialization period it would have been good if the business 
management [middle management] would have taken a stronger lead of the process 
and employed more structured and analytical project management. They did not do this 
because they felt no ownership for the product.” Project D 
“The project was so unconcrete that it was impossible to use any normal methods of 
project management. We just had solve problems as they came and believe we could 
do it. Otherwise, in our company, we usually employ very strict project management 
methods.” Project E 
Conflict in the decision-making process seems to reduce growth expectations because 
the more confrontatively the plans are discussed, the more inflated the expectations tend 
to get. A tightly knit project management team with a common view seems to be able to 
set the growth expectations on a higher level.  The alternative explanation would be that 
without conflict, the management that is not directly responsible for the implementation 
sets the expectations unrealistically high. This does not seem to hold true in these cases, 
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because here the project team that set the expectations was indeed very directly 
responsible for the implementation. Some differences in ways of thinking and goals 
existed in the projects, but did not seem to have a dramatic impact on the success. 
Reasons for these differences seem rather coincidential. It is difficult to think here of a 
systematic pattern that would be causing these differences. Rather, it seems here to have 
been a result of the specific environments of the firms.  
“This was a business-need driven project, the new part of the technology was only 
developed because no solution was possible with the existing technology. The 
implementation of the project then became very technology driven. Here we lost the 
business management, it was all too abstract for hem, they had no vision of how to 
concretely market the new product.” Project A    
“One driving force in the project was a guy from the university who was doing his PhD 
on this topic. He of course had to push the project further and make sure it was not 
terminated. Another impact of his involvement was that he wanted to make sure the 
solution could be patented. This lead us to do more fundamental development work, not 
just copy a product from the competitors.” Project C 
“The project leader’s motivation was to stay in the budget and to build a business area 
of his own out of this project. The department head was pushing the fine-tuning of the 
product characteristics to make sure the sales would take off. The salesmen wanted the 
product ready fast because customers were already asking for it.” Project C    
“One person at the subcontractor also became very involved in the project. His 
commitment was one of the important driving forces. He later made a great career 
based on the respect he got for this project.” Project D 
“There were no differences at all in perspectives goals or so. Even our education was 
about exactly the same.” Project E 
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Table 39: Decision-making process characteristics: qualitative aspects 
Project A Project B Project C Project D Project E 
Functional participation in all phases 
”At that time, the 
finance guys of the 
firm did not have so 
much say, it was pretty 
much an engineer 
firm.” Marketing did 
participate to an 
extent. 
”The functional 
departments 
participating in the 
decision-making 
process were sales, 
R&D and production, 
but not finance, as 
there were no 
individual large 
investments.” Also 
outside partners were 
involved. 
“Everyone met daily, 
information was 
flowing well.” 
“Production, after-
sales, marketing, 
everyone was very 
committed to develop 
the business.” “We 
also had very many 
external channels for 
information.” 
“The distributors have 
been an invaluable 
source of information, 
and also end users.”  
“Now we use even 
Internet discussion 
groups for finding out 
needs and ideas of 
consumers.” 
There were only the 
five people and 
outside partners, who 
were also tightly 
involved in the 
process. 
Financial analysis 
“Probably the finance 
guys made some” 
“Projects are easily 
killed with too much 
analysis and payback 
schedules.” 
Very little; the market 
was so new that any 
calculations would 
have been very 
theoretical. ”A risk 
analysis of course 
always has to be 
made.” 
“The finance 
department made 
profitability 
calculations.” “In 
addition we had to 
make minimal plans to 
an outside financer, as 
well as some reporting 
of proceeding.”  
“There were just 4-5 of  
us in the beginning, so 
we did not do many 
calculations. Now 
there is some 
competition of the 
same resources, so 
we need to do more 
analyses of which 
ones to invest in.” 
“We were always on 
minus as much as was 
tolerated.” 
Existing process 
”There was no 
bureaucracy, because 
everyone was satisfied 
with process.” “In 
monthly reporting the 
project, business, and 
local [plant] 
management and the 
business development 
manager were 
present.” 
None. ”The decision-
making process was a 
part of the annual 
strategic planning and 
an annual binding 
sales budget of every 
area. The sales budget 
was supported by a 
detailed sales plan and 
strategy.” 
“The external financier 
caused bureaucracy.” 
“The work was not 
systematic, but 
followed more a 
blurred logic. We 
gathered enormous 
amounts of material 
and then got a feeling 
of what is the right 
way.” 
None “We were always 
anxious whether we 
had now shown 
enough future benefits 
and that the 
development had 
proceeded, whether 
they would now 
believe us.”  
Business plan 
An extensive feasibility 
study: what was the 
market for the 
products, the needed 
investments and costs, 
the development 
costs, an analysis of 
the competitive 
situation, and own 
goals based on these. 
”We have been doing 
exactly what we 
planned in the action 
plans.” “We did not 
make a business plan 
of the project. Due to 
market newness there 
were no historical data 
or useful market 
reports.”  
“We did not have a 
business plan.” “For 
the external financier 
we made project 
plans.” “We made 
extensive competitor 
analyses.” “At the start 
we had a schedule, 
but after setbacks we 
proceeded day by 
day.” 
“We did not have long-
term budgets for the 
project.” “We had no 
resources for market 
research.”   
“We were always 
trying to figure out how 
we can best sell the 
benefits of the future.” 
“We made very 
detailed competitor 
analyses.” “We 
analyzed the whole 
value chain, which 
convinced us of the 
direction.” 
Conflict 
“There was conflict 
due to the style of one 
central manager with a 
different cultural 
background.” “Some 
promoted the use of 
an old technology, 
which caused even 
proactive disturbing of 
the development 
work.”   
“There was normal 
disagreement, but it 
was mainly only 
fruitful. Nobody knows 
everything, so its good 
to combine the 
viewpoints.” “Some 
people take it 
personally and don’t 
want to understand 
others.” 
“We did not 
experience serious 
conflicts, just some 
technical details. Big 
picture was clear.” 
“Any problems were 
discussed, and 
changes were 
decided, then it was 
not discussed any 
longer.” 
Difficult situations just 
increased the team 
cohesion. Top 
management had 
demands and 
reactions that were 
detached from the 
business. “The lack of 
hierarchy assures a 
multitude of 
viewpoints.”  
“There were two strong 
personalities in the 
leadership of the 
project and the 
discussion sometimes 
got loud. This was 
good, because it 
cleaned the air. 
Everyone should be let 
to do things in their 
own way.”  
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7.3 Summary and interpretation of the case analysis  
In the five cases, the following six aspects were especially important for success in the 
implementation phase of the projects:  
− Committed, homogenic team with power and responsibility, an un-hierarchical and 
flexible style of operating and open communication 
− Small project scope enabling small teams, less complexity and less uncertain 
investments  
− Availability of good partners in the critical parts of the value chain, especially where 
important aspects were unfamiliar 
− Results-oriented management of the project, both on the part of the firm 
management and of the project team, and with no political or personal agendas 
− Enthusiasm for the project on the part of the team, as well as a willingness to use all 
means to achieve results  
− Top management support for the project, especially in times of difficulty  
− Familiarity with all aspects: technology, marketing and sales, as well as business 
logic  
The following seemed rather indifferent with regard to project success:  
− Pre-determined rules and existing process 
− Project controlling mechanisms. These may be important to management in 
monitoring the progress of a project, but did not contribute to project success  
− Strict rules for planning: committed and empowered teams assured that all relevant 
information was used and plans were made in as far as they added value 
Two aspects seemed detrimental to success in implementation. The first of these was 
formalized, wide, functional participation, which may dilute the sense of responsibility. 
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Further, it does not seem to add value, as all parties that can contribute will be engaged 
in the process by the committed project team in any case. The second was conflict, 
which had the potential to inflate the important belief in the common vision. 
The cases highlight some factors important for finding technology-based growth 
projects and committing to a project. These are that the firm is “visionary” and has a 
high growth aspiration, because the need to grow sensitizes to opportunities and induces 
active search for them. Further important factors were partner networks for being well 
informed of developments industry-wide, and corporate level slack in the form of 
management time investments in growth. 
To conclude, the case analysis supports the first hypothesis concerning the impact of the 
firm level factors on the leveraging projects as firm investment in growth in the form of 
management time for active search of growth opportunities was an important factor for 
the projects to be conceived in Projects A, B, D and E. The cases also support the 
project level hypotheses three and four in highlighting the importance of the 
applicability of existing operational capabilities in the new market, and of top 
management commitment and junior management responsibility. Hypothesis 5 was not 
supported by the cases, just as it was not supported by the regression analyses. The cases 
provide an explanation as to why the “analytical quality” of the decision-making process 
does not seem to contribute to the success of the projects. The reason in the five cases 
was that the project teams were so committed, and so empowered, that they made sure 
that all possible relevant information was brought to the decision-making process and 
utilized. The teams also felt a great responsibility for the success of the projects and had 
high personal stakes in them, and therefore made sure that all analyses and viewpoints 
that could make the plans more accurate were used. Because of these committed and 
empowered teams, formal participation of many different functions in the process, 
process formalization, information intensity, requirement for a business plan, or 
financial analysis as such had no independent roles in the success of the projects. Too 
much conflict might have weakened the team’s common vision, which was very 
important for the staying power necessary for project success. Thus, the committed and 
empowered teams assured that everything that the measured aspects of “analytical 
quality” could have contributed was taken into account informally. In addition, the cases 
also point out another explanation as to why the aspects of  “analytical quality” had no 
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statistically significant impact on project success in the regression analyses. This is that 
the contribution of the aspects of “analytical quality” is very dependent on the context of 
the project. Projects B, C, D and E were targeted to markets that were unfamiliar to such 
a degree that most analyses, as well as formal planning, information gathering and 
functional participation would have been useless. Instead of planning and resorting to 
formalized processes, the firms controlled the risks by proceeding in as small steps as 
possible. In Project A, all the aspects were familiar, and a more formal approach was 
used. This usage of formal approaches in predictable contexts, and informal in 
unpredictable ones, brings further support to previous decision-making research 
suggesting such a conclusion525. 
The firms used various means to reduce risk in the projects, and seem to have proceeded 
rather conservatively. Risks resulting from technological and market unfamiliarity were 
reduced through active cooperation with partners along the whole value chain, through 
staged investments and small investments in general, and through outsourcing the most 
unfamiliar areas at least in the beginning. The firms were by no means unprepared when 
they started the projects. In Projects B, C, D and E, the firms did not even attempt to 
learn everything right at the start, or to do everything by themselves. This supports 
further the finding from the project-level regression analysis suggesting that smaller 
projects are better at reaching their goals.  
                                                 
525  See Chapter 4.2 Section 2 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
This research set out to contribute to the understanding of firm growth through 
technology-based product market entries and to the understanding of the managerial 
levers of exploiting this growth opportunity. The main contributions of this research are 
improved understanding of management of diversification process and understanding of 
technology-based product-market entries. Managerial levers that impact the success of 
leveraging technology have been identified.  
8.1 Theoretical and empirical contributions 
The theoretical and empirical contributions are summarized in two sections. First, the 
main three overall contributions are discussed. Then, contributions are reviewed one 
hypothesis at the time. The conclusions from the statistical analysis and the case 
analyses are presented in the figure below. 
Search
for leveraging projects
Implementation
of a leveraging project
Operation
of mature business
Managerial resources 
available for growth
Top management: vision
Junior management
Top management: 
commitment
Middle management
Top management: ambition
Creating munificient 
environment for starting 
small projects
Empowered, homogenic team 
involved in a dynamic learning 
process
Structured management of 
ongoing business, fine-
tuning of strategy
On the 
driver's seat
Important 
themes
Growth 
expectations
Percent 
reached
Reached 
growth
Managerial resources available for 
growth and familiarity of market 
create a munificient environment for 
starting small projects.
However, large projects get more of 
the important top management 
attention.
More financial analysis is done in 
large projects.
Top management and junior 
management participation, market 
familiarity, and technological learning 
promote reaching the goals.
Large project size and functional 
participation impede reaching the 
goals.
Analytical quality of the decision-
making process is not a useful tool 
for promoting technology leveraging 
project success.
Top management and junior management 
participation, and technological learning 
promote overall reaching more growth through 
the projects.
Financial analysis is associated with more 
growth reached even when controlled for growth 
expectations. Therefore, it does not seem to be 
just a feature of large projects, but actually 
contribute to success of large projects.
Market familiarity impacts even the project 
results: less growth is reached.
Functional participation has a negative influence 
to growth reached through the projects.
 
Figure 14: Conclusions 
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Overall contributions 
This dissertation has three main overall contributions that are related to diversification 
research, technology-based product market entries and resource-based view as explained 
below. 
The main contribution of this dissertation to diversification research is examining the 
process of diversification. The process of diversification is here explained from an 
internal perspective, focusing on managerial processes. As a result, factors that are 
under managerial control and that impact the success of growth through related 
diversification are identified. Diversification researchers have mentioned the importance 
of studying the “how?” question and the managerial process in future research526 527. The 
setting of this research is important in examining the impacts of firm-internal factors 
such as organizational dynamics and strategy on externally measurable factors such as 
growth. This link has not been achieved by the majority of diversification research, 
which has been conducted on the basis of information available from firm-external 
databases. In addition to examining data available from internal sources only, this 
dissertation takes externally available data into account as control variables.  
Throughout this dissertation, a reoccurring theme is that two main factors influence the 
success of a growth strategy building on technology-based product-market entries. 
These are effective identification of growth opportunities and successful implementation 
of market entry projects. The importance of these two factors is pointed out in the 
literature search, in broad interviews of nine companies for creating the questionnaire, in 
the survey results, and in the five cases. Furthermore, the case analyses revealed a third 
important overall factor: the transferring of the project to a phase of ongoing business 
and gaining the buy-in of the employees responsible for this.   
The contribution of this research is in explaining technology-based product market 
entries from the management perspective. The importance of investing some of the 
                                                 
526  Silverman, B. S. 1999. Technological resources and the direction of corporate diversification: 
toward an integration of the resource-based view and transaction cost economies. Management 
Science, pp. 1109-1124. 
527  Granstrand, O. 2001. The economics and management of evolutionary knowledge diversification. 
Working Paper, May, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden. 
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scarce managerial resources in growth instead of tying all of them up in the operative 
management of the existing, mature business is emphasized. The factors affecting the 
success of individual leveraging projects are explained from a management perspective, 
as these are factors consuming managerial resources available for growth. The 
management of individual leveraging projects is looked at from three aspects. These are 
the firm level growth constraints, the decision-making process, and closeness of the new 
market to the original ones. Different management levels have different roles according 
to the overall phase of project. High analytical quality of decision making does not seem 
beneficial until in the third phase, when focus turns to a mature business based on the 
project. Small project size can help implement the project successfully.   
The contribution to the resource-based view is in this dissertation studying factors 
influencing resource-based growth through exploring the role of managerial resources 
for firm growth. The managerial process of resource-based growth is studied through the 
decision-making process and the exploitation and acquisition of different 
complementary resources. The research adds to the discussion on the resource-based 
view concerning the characteristics and value of different resources. The results of this 
study suggest that the technological and managerial resources are slow to build and 
therefore critical. Operations are less critical. This division is supported by evidence 
from performance of the projects. It relates to the discussion on the tautology problem in 
defining resources. The definition can be made according to whether it is possible to 
acquire the resource fast through investments or not. The importance of the managerial 
resource has been previously in the resource-based view touched upon in many streams 
of research528, but has not been as explicitly studied as would seem justified for such an 
important factor impacting firm growth.  
Overall, the technology leveraging projects seem to be characterized rather by gradual 
development than structured implementation of a plan. In most cases, the studied 
leveraging projects required considerable building of new technological and marketing 
competence. Because of this, leveraging technology in new product markets seems to 
involve very much uncertainty that can only be tackled by effective learning processes, 
not by efficient project management.  
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Contributions by hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1 contributes to diversification research by clarifying the importance of 
managerial resources and other firm level growth constraints. The newness of this 
contribution lies in the deconstruction of managerial resources to their measurable 
impacts on technology-based growth, and in studying the impacts of firm level growth 
constraints on leveraging project success. These impacts are studied at project level and 
firm level. Analyzing the firms’ overall growth, it was found that investing management 
resources in identifying and planning technology leveraging projects may be important 
for growth. However, as explained in Chapter 6, this result must be considered tentative.  
The quantitative analysis of the survey data provides an overview of the impacts of 
different components of project characteristics, market familiarity and decision-making 
process on project success. Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5 clarify the growth project level, 
process, and managerial components of diversification, which are novel aspects in 
diversification research529. The impact of diversification on firm performance has 
previously been studied with regard to technological diversification, product-market 
diversification, and closeness of markets. The process of expanding a firm’s technology-
base and the set of product-markets where the technological competencies are deployed 
captures the essence of growth strategy in technology-intensive firms. Several case 
studies have described how this diversification process has led some of the most 
successful companies of the world to the position they have today.530 This dissertation 
contributes to diversification research with an internal perspective on the management 
of the diversification process as finding growth opportunities, making growth plans, and 
implementing growth projects successfully.  
Hypothesis 2 contributes to the discussion in corporate venturing literature on reducing 
project complexity. Resource based view also discusses this topic, as complexity of a 
growth project consumes the scarce managerial resources. Furthermore, in researching 
new product development, an important question is the impact of project complexity on 
                                                                                                                                               
528  See Chapter 4.1, Section 1 
529  See Chapter 4.1 
530  See Appendix 2  
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success of new product development projects 531. Smaller scale projects may be less 
complex and may therefore succeed better. A finding in the survey results supports this: 
projects that were smaller relative to firm size reached their expectations better. 
Therefore, it seems that it might, indeed, be beneficial to plan and implement growth 
projects stepwise. Having a stepwise structure for growth projects could even lead to 
firms becoming involved in more growth projects in total as the perceived risk and 
uncertainty of starting a growth project would be lower. According to the five cases, the 
growth expectations of a project do not seem to be set by an intrinsic size of an 
opportunity alone, as projects can be formulated in very different ways.   
The positive impact of the applicability of the existing capabilities in new markets on 
success of technology-based product-market entries is partly supported. The sources of 
uncertainty have been broken down into ones related to marketing and sales capabilities, 
ones related to technological competencies, and ones related to operative capabilities. 
The results verify especially the importance of the applicability of the technological 
competence, as well as the significance of the uncertainty related to marketing, sales, 
and technology investments. It is interesting that the applicability of the marketing and 
sales, as well as operative capabilities, does not positively impact the leveraging 
projects’ success. The finding that these capabilities are not critical to success of 
technology-based growth projects suggests that firms may be able to build, acquire or 
contract such capabilities with relatively little risk of failing. However, large marketing 
and sales investments did reduce the percentage of expected growth reached. Thus, 
when requiring large investments, building new marketing and sales capabilities does 
increase the leveraging projects’ risk. The type of uncertainty most affecting projects’ 
deviations from expectations was poor applicability of the existing technological 
competence in the entered market. This suggests that the technological competencies 
required for a technology-based product market entry are the most uncertain ones to 
learn when compared to marketing or operational capabilities. It must be kept in mind 
that the empirical material here consists of technology-based entries, where technology 
was the most important and complex resource.  
                                                 
531  Tatikonda, M. V. & Montoya-Weiss, M. M. 2001. Integrating operational and marketing 
perspectives of product innovation: The influence of organizational process factors and capabilities 
on development performance. Management Science, January, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 151-172. 
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Hypotheses 4 and 5 explore the factors contributing to the deviation from expected 
results of individual growth projects through managerial action. This is new because 
managerial resources were deconstructed to their measurable impacts on technology-
based growth on project level. This was achieved by studying their participation in the 
decision-making process and by studying the process characteristics. The support for 
Hypothesis 4 would seem to indicate the possibility of management to promote the 
success of technology leveraging projects by assuring involvement and commitment of 
top and junior management in the decision-making process. The fact that Hypothesis 5 
was not verified shows that the managerial levers of formalizing processes and 
formulating rules had no impact on the success of technology leveraging projects. The 
cases showed us that the reason for this may be the innovative and uncertain nature of 
technology leveraging projects, and the unfamiliarity always encountered in new market 
entries. 
A contribution of this dissertation to research on new product development is increasing 
the understanding of the organizational process and bringing in a management 
perspective, which have been recently suggested as the next important areas to research 
with regard to new product development532. This is accomplished through Hypotheses 4 
and 5. The project planning perspective has been suggested to be important because the 
variety and magnitude of uncertainties a development project faces in its execution are a 
function of the choices made in project planning. Setting the organizational process 
factors and the target levels of development outcomes are key managerial decisions. 
Therefore, according to Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss, research such as that reported in 
this dissertation is needed to investigate who in the organization makes these decisions, 
and the nature of their influence on the decision-making process. 533  
The case analyses bring more depth to the explanation of the complex social phenomena 
underlying the success of entry projects. Especially the importance of the project team 
as a driving force is highlighted, as well as top management’s long-term commitment. 
                                                 
532  Tatikonda, M. V. & Montoya-Weiss, M. M. 2001. Integrating operational and marketing 
perspectives of product innovation: The influence of organizational process factors and capabilities 
on development performance. Management Science, January, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 151-172. 
533  Tatikonda, M. V. & Montoya-Weiss, M. M. 2001. Integrating operational and marketing 
perspectives of product innovation: The influence of organizational process factors and capabilities 
on development performance. Management Science, January, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 151-172. 
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The five cases reveal two further interesting aspects with regard to the uncertainty 
related to applicability of existing capabilities in the entered markets. First, the firms 
were rather conservative in their approaches: either all parts of the project were very 
familiar or the investments were committed stage-wise to limit risk. Second, with regard 
to the parts of the projects that were unfamiliar, the firms actively sought support from 
partners who were experts in those parts. This support took the forms of product 
development in close cooperation with customers, outsourcing components of the new 
product that required technological competence not possessed by the firm, or 
cooperating with universities, for example.  
8.2 Managerial implications 
The most important managerial implication of this research stems from the finding that 
many firms have indeed successfully implemented technology-based product-market 
entries as a growth strategy. The findings of the research can help understand the risk 
and uncertainty related to individual leveraging projects.  
According to the findings of the study, technology-based growth is promoted by the 
availability of managerial resources for detecting and planning growth projects. Growth 
may be promoted by full time assignment of top, middle and junior managers to 
monitoring different technologies and the strategic implications of their development, as 
well as to taking part in developing business opportunities based on technological 
competencies.  
The success of technology-based product-market entries is linked to a decision-making 
process demonstrating active participation of especially the CEO and top management 
as well as junior management, empowerment of the project team, and avoidance of 
excessive formalization. Another factor linked to success of technology leveraging 
projects is choosing projects from markets that are as familiar as possible. When 
existing operational capabilities are not applicable in the new market, a wide range of 
possibilities for outsourcing and cooperation exists. These include outsourcing parts of 
research and development or, for example, manufacturing, and distribution. External 
and firm group internal partners also seem to have an important role in idea generation 
and maturation. Furthermore, having renowned partners seems to have decreased the 
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perceived risk and uncertainty of the projects. Finally, it seems beneficial to plan and 
implement the projects in subsequent, manageable parts, as this may reduce complexity.     
Contrary to contemporary practice, “technology strategy” should be determined in terms 
of both the front and the back-end. Back-end means the tasks and decisions currently 
often considered as technology strategy, such as targeting the research and development 
and other technology acquisition investments correctly. Front-end, which should also be 
included in formulating technology strategy, means planning leveraging of technological 
competencies. The following Table summarizes the suggested managerial implications. 
Table 40: Managerial implications 
 1. Evaluate the firm’s technological competence to detect growth opportunities  
 2.  Create a munificient environment for starting small and uncertain growth projects 
 3. Be prepared that the above activities consume managerial resources  
 4. Put together a team to implement a certain growth project and give it the power and 
support it needs to succeed. Do not burden the team with too much bureaucracy 
 5. Be prepared to assure a long term commitment to achieving success  
 6. Gather partners to support wherever own competencies are thin 
 7. Plan and implement the project in small stages to increase manageability and achieve 
results early 
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8.3 Limitations of the research and suggestions for further research 
The contributions of this study are limited by a causality problem and the limited 
possibility of controlling potentially relevant variables of the firm level of the model, as 
discussed earlier. With regard to the project level model, the contributions are limited by 
possible inaccuracies in reporting growth expectations and the small number of failed 
projects in the sample. Due to these limitations, and to the generally scarce research on 
the specific themes of this study, further research is needed on a number of topics in 
order to understand leveraging of technology even more deeply. Some of the topics have 
been previously touched upon, but would each deserve a dedicated effort. The topics 
listed below, as well as the main topic of this dissertation, could also benefit from a 
different type of a research approach. For example, in-depth case analyses of one to 
three companies could bring valuable understanding of the deeper complex social 
phenomena underlying the factors discussed here. 
− Impact of managerial services available for growth on firm growth: This research 
has brought tentative evidence to support the positive relationship, but research 
involving an even more thorough investigation with a larger sample, better 
controllable time-lag, and inclusion of an even more exhaustive number of control 
variables would be justified in order to examine this important relationship.  
− Further clarification of the role of technology management in technology 
acquisition, technology externalization, leveraging technology through spin-off 
businesses, as well as further clarification of the internal role described here. 
− Research on possible, employed, and effective measurements of the degree of 
leveraging of technology. This means the extent to which firms have utilized the 
opportunities available to them on the basis of a technological competence. 
− Relationship between research and development investments and technological 
competence.  
− Applicability of findings of this study, when the competence to be leveraged is not 
technology but, for example, a brand or a branding competence  
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− Outsourcing of operational capabilities when technology is leveraged internally: 
How commonly is such a strategy employed? What are the necessary conditions? 
What are the implications for the development of a firm’s competence base and for 
its dependence on the provider of the operational competencies? 
− Linking the firm level and project level of this study closer: studying project 
structures and decision-making process characteristics in all projects of a firm for a 
certain time period aggregated to a typical growth project management style for the 
firm, and the impact of this style on overall firm growth.   
− Studying whether firms follow distinct patterns of structuring their growth projects 
with regard, for example, to staged investments. Does having a stepwise structure for 
growth projects lead to firms becoming involved in a larger number of growth 
projects due to a lower perceived risk and uncertainty over starting a growth project?  
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9 SUMMARY 
The starting point for this dissertation was that entering new product markets on the 
basis of an existing technological competence is for technology intensive companies an 
important source of growth. From the literature review, it was concluded that more 
research is needed into managerial and decision-making process factors impacting the 
success of technology-based new product market entries.  
A framework on the impact of managerial resources and decision-making process 
characteristics on the success of new product market entries was developed. The 
framework is based on hypotheses derived from the resource-based view and decision-
making research. The framework and the underlying hypotheses were verified with data 
collected with a survey of 63 companies. The survey questionnaire was developed based 
on interviews with nine companies as well as a literature review of previous empirical 
research on diversification, and new product development. The empirical data support 
the main arguments of the framework. In order to further deepen the conclusions of the 
analysis, five of the survey respondent-companies were engaged in deepening case 
studies.   
Technology-based growth seems to be promoted by the availability of managerial 
resources for detecting and planning growth projects. The success of technology-based 
product market entries seems to be promoted by a decision-making process involving 
active participation of, especially, the CEO and top management, as well as junior 
management, empowerment of the project team, and avoidance of excessive structuring. 
Another factor possibly promoting the success of technology leveraging projects is the 
choice of projects from markets that are as familiar as possible. When existing 
operational capabilities are not applicable in the new market, a wide range of 
possibilities for outsourcing and cooperation exists. External and firm group internal 
partners can also have an important role in idea generation, maturation and 
implementation. Finally, it seems beneficial to reduce project complexity by planning 
and implementing projects in sequential, manageable parts.     
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This dissertation contributes to diversification research by studying the growth project 
level, as well as the process and managerial components of diversification. The main 
contribution to the resource-based view is the clarification of the role, and verification 
of the importance, of managerial services in resource-based growth. Additionally, the 
impact of familiarity with the new product markets on success of the entry is supported.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Summary of empirical research in new product development 
Issues that have been researched with regard to decisions within a project534 
Phase of new 
product  
development 
Issues that have been researched 
Concept development generally 
What are the target values of the product attributes, including price?  
What is the core product concept?  
What is the product architecture?  
What variants of the product will be offered?  
Which components will be shared across which variants of the product?  
Concept 
development 
What will be the overall physical form and industrial design of the product?  
Which components will be designed and which will be selected?  
Who will design the components?  
Who will produce the components and assemble the product?  
What is the configuration of the physical supply chain, including the location 
of the decouple point?  
What type of process will be used to assemble the product?  
Supply-chain 
design 
Who will develop and supply process technology and equipment?   
Product design generally.  
What are the values of the key design parameters?  
What is the configuration of the components and assembly precedence 
relations?  Product design 
What is the detailed design of the components, including material and 
process selection?  
What is the prototyping plan?  Performance 
testing and 
validation What technologies should be used for prototyping?  
What is the plan for market testing and launch?  Production 
ramp-up and 
launch What is the plan for production ramp-up? 
 
                                                 
534  Krishnan, V, Ulrich, K, T, Product development decisions: A review of literature, Management 
Science, January 2001, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 1-21 
   228 
Issues that have been researched with regard to decisions in setting up a project535 
Phase of new 
product  
development 
Issues that have been researched 
Overall What is the market and product strategy to maximize probability of economic success? 
What portfolio of product opportunities will be pursued?  
What is the timing of product development projects?  
What, if any, assets such as platforms will be shared across which 
products?  
Product 
strategy and 
planning 
Which technologies will be employed in the products?  
Organization generally – Will a functional project, or matrix 
organization be used?  
How will the team be staffed?  
How will project performance be measured?  
What will be the physical arrangement and location of the team?  
What investments in infrastructure, tools and training should be 
made?  
Product 
development 
organization 
What type of development process will be employed (e.g. stage-
gate)?  
What is the relative priority of development objectives?  
What is the planned timing and sequence of development activities? 
What are the major project milestones and planned prototypes?  
What will be the communication mechanisms among team 
members?  
Project 
management 
How will the project be monitored and controlled? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
535  Krishnan, V, Ulrich, K, T, Product development decisions: A review of literature, Management 
Science, January 2001, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 1-21 
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Appendix 2: Operationalizations of the variables 
Operationalization of extent of participation of different hierarchical levels in the decision-making 
process 
Factor loadings 
Variable 
Cron-
bach 
alpha 
Item 
1 2 3 
Generating growth ideas based on 
technological competence  0,619 0,046 -0,044 
Screening out ideas realistic 
technologically and from market potential  0,648 0,092 -0,028 
Evaluating and comparing the ideas 0,693 0,120 0,072
Making the final decision to enter the new 
market  0,852 0,013 -0,025 
CEO 
Choosing people responsible for 
implementation  0,678 -0,178 -0,109 
Generating growth ideas based on 
technological competence  0,830 0,190 0,005 
Screening out ideas realistic 
technologically and from market potential  0,885 0,136 0,060 
Evaluating and comparing the ideas  0,856 0,162 -0,081 
Making the final decision to enter the new 
market  0,592 0,409 0,230 
1 
CEO and top 
management 
 
0,936 
Top 
mgmt. 
Choosing people responsible for 
implementation  0,531 0,274 0,006 
Generating growth ideas based on technological 
competence  0,253 0,881 0,182 
Screening out ideas realistic technologically and 
from market potential  0,234 0,825 0,290 
Evaluating and comparing the ideas  0,216 0,835 0,277 
Making the final decision to enter the new market  0,012 0,625 0,086 
2 
Middle 
management 
0,887 
 
Choosing people responsible for implementation  -0,003 0,442 0,007 
Generating growth ideas based on technological 
competence  0,150 0,184 0,736 
Screening out ideas realistic technologically and 
from market potential  0,092 0,213 0,883 
Evaluating and comparing the ideas  0,096 0,197 0,929 
Making the final decision to enter the new market  -0,146 0,050 0,603 
3 
Junior 
management 
0,858 
Choosing people responsible for implementation  -0,136 0,041 0,427 
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Operationalization of wide functional participation and information intensity of the decision-
making process 
Factor loading 
Variable 
Cron-
bach 
alpha 
Item 
1 2 
Generating growth ideas based on 
technological competence  0,471 -0,063 
Screening out ideas realistic technologically 
and from market potential  0,658 0,062 
Evaluating and comparing the ideas  0,999 0,019 
Making the final decision to enter the new 
market  0,671 0,058 
1 
Wide 
functional 
participation 
0,820 
People 
from 
many 
functional 
departme
nts took 
part in this 
phase Choosing people responsible for 
implementation  0,308 0,024 
There were many meetings in this phase -0,060 0,483 
Information was actively collected from different -0,008 0,561 
Generatin
g growth 
ideas External sources of information were used -0,092 0,760 
0,081 0,721 
-0,082 0,596 Screening out ideas realistic technologically and from market potential -0,061 0,749 
0,205 0,700 
0,167 0,501 Evaluating and comparing the ideas 
0,039 0,595 
-0,058 0,530 
0,165 0,368 Making the final decision to enter the new market 
0,285 0,599 
0,019 0,492 
0,016 0,663 
2 
Information 
intensity 
0,917 
 
Choosing people responsible for implementation 
0,018 0,605 
 
Operationalization of existing process, usage of business plan and the financial reporting and 
analysis related to the process 
Factor loadings 
Variable 
Cron-
bach 
alpha 
Item 1 2 3 
A written guideline existed for this kind of a 
process 0,727 0,110 -0,025 
A set of criteria defining strategically fitting growth 
projects existed 0,768 0,061 0,079 
1 
Existing 
process 
0,799 
There was a certain process for the continuous 
screening for growth ideas 0,669 0,198 0,132 
In order to approve a decision like this, a business 
plan is always required  0,159 0,967 0,199 2 
Business plan 0,915 In our company a business plan must always 
include certain parts  0,264 0,745 0,260 
Income statement or balance sheet estimates of 
the project had an important role -0,021 0,388 0,605 
Detailed cost estimates concerning the project had 
an important role 0,076 0,185 0,536 
3 
Financial 
analysis 
0,625 
Plan on sources of financing had an important role 0,062 0,019 0,559 
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Operationalization of conflict 
Variable 
Cron-
bach 
alpha 
Item Factor loading
During the process coalitions with different objectives were 
formed within the company  0,760 
The central persons in the process went through many long 
negotiations  0,585 
There was a lot of disagreement regarding the objectives of 
the decision  0,851 
There was a lot of disagreement concerning what would be 
the correct procedure to follow in the process  0,723 
Conflict 0,875 
There was a lot of disagreement regarding the correctness of 
the conclusions  0,799 
 
Operationalization of applicability of existing operational capabilities in the new market 
Factor loadings 
Variable 
Cron-
bach 
alpha 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 
Sales and marketing department  0,557 0,126 0,155 -0,026 0,273
Distribution and after-sales networks  0,469 -0,276 0,001 
-
0,349 0,337
Knowledge of customer groups  0,856 0,127 0,040 0,261 -0,264
1 
Marketing 
and sales fit 
0,746 
 
Knowledge of sales methods  0,807 0,083 0,170 0,026 -0,025
Research and development department 0,085 0,979 0,024 -0,105 0,1452 Technology fit 0,694 Technological competence 0,100 0,539 0,064 0,195 0,044
Investments in sales and marketing 
department  0,184 0,198 0,960 0,017 0,0563 Marketing and sales 
investments 
0,820 Investments in distribution and after-sales 
networks  0,102
-
0,039 0,697 0,027 0,089
Investments in research and development 
department 0,054 0,166 0,011 0,478 0,0554  Technology 
investments 
0,282 Investments in technological competencies 
acquired from outside the company 0,146
-
0,104 0,199 0,292 0,119
Production plants  0,123 0,095 0,133 -0,539 0,479
Purchasing or sourcing department  0,124 -0,052 
-
0,042 
-
0,136 0,890
Knowledge of production technology  -0,080 0,091 0,223 0,009 0,474
5  
Operations fit 0,788 
Knowledge of purchasing / sourcing -0,002 0,177 0,031 0,289 0,879
 
As shown in the above Table, the variable “technology investments” has low factor loadings and 
a poor Cronbach alpha indicator. This is understandable, as the strength of factor loadings on 
one factor as well as the Cronbach alpha measure the convergent validity of the variable, that is 
to what extent do the questions measure the same issue. Here, the questions purposely do not 
measure exactly the same issue, but two aspects of one issue: the amount of investments in the 
own research and development department may even contradict investments in technological 
competencies acquired from outside the company. It is still, however, meaningful to measure 
how much the firm in general has invested in its technological competencies during the project. 
Therefore, on the basis of content validity, the variable “technological investments” will be used 
as the average of answers to these two questions. Furthermore, the factor analysis does verify 
the discriminant validity of the variable: the two questions do load much more on the factor 
“technology investments” than on any other factor. 
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Operationalization of technological learning 
Variable 
Cron-
bach 
alpha 
Item Factor loading
New technological fields were learned from the project 0,123 
Learning related to technological fields caused changes in the 
implementation plan of the project  0,123 
New patents or licenses were bought in order to implement 
the growth plan  0,999 
Technological 
learning 
0,503 
 
In the project new technological inventions were made 
internally, that were patented  0,498 
 
The above Table shows a factor analysis for the variable “Technological learning”. Here, neither 
the results of factor analysis nor the Cronbach alpha confirm convergent validity. However, 
learning completely new technological fields, having to change the project plans due to such 
technological learning, buying new patents or licenses during the project and patenting own 
inventions resulting from the project are important aspects describing how much radically new 
technological learning happened in the project. They also reflect how much the firm’s 
technological competence base grew because of the project. It seems natural that the answers 
to these questions do not converge, as it is not to be expected that firms that for example 
learned new technological fields from the project always would have also bought new patents or 
licenses. Still, a firm that would have answered giving high scores to all of the four questions 
would be likely to have had a more intense learning experience in the project than a firm that 
would have given a high score only to one of the questions. Therefore, on the basis of content 
validity, the variable “technological learning” will be used as the average of answers to these four 
questions.  
 
Operationalization of growth aspiration 
Variable 
Cron-
bach 
alpha 
Item Factor loading
We wanted to grow the company as fast as we could  0,524 
We were prepared to sacrifice the profitability of the company 
for some years if that way we could get the company to grow 
fast  
0,441 
We wanted to keep the company's operations on the same 
level as they were  0,623 
Trying to make the company grow fast was pointless  0,683 
Growth 
aspiration 0,694 
We wanted to keep the company small  0,562 
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Appendix 3: Questions from the questionnaire 
Managerial services available for growth 
How many people at each of your company's hierarchical levels takes part in technology 
management part- or full-time (estimate!)? Technology management means here the monitoring 
of different technologies and the strategic implications of their development, as well as taking 
part in developing business opportunities based on technological competencies.  
Organizational levels 
Involved in technology-
management part-time (at 
least ~5% of working 
time)  
Involved in technology-
management full time 
(main task) 
Managing director                              Persons                              Persons
Top management Persons Persons
Middle management                              Persons                              Persons
Junior manager / group leader / expert 
level Persons Persons
Other employees Persons Persons
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Applicability of existing operational capabilities in the new market 
 
To what extent was the project able to use the existing operational functions within its first year 
of operation? Please circle the right answer with regard to the following functions.  
Existing function Not applicable at all  
Do not 
know 
Fully  
applicable 
Sales and marketing department  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Distribution and after-sales networks  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Production plants  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Purchasing or sourcing department  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Research and development department -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
To what extent was the project able to use the existing competencies or knowledge within its first 
year of operation? Please circle the right answer with regard to the following areas.  
Existing competence or knowledge Not applicable at all  
Do not 
know 
Fully  
applicable 
Knowledge of customer groups  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Knowledge of sales methods  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Knowledge of production technology  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Knowledge of purchasing / sourcing -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Technological competence -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
Were significant investments made within the first year of operation? 
Function or competence No invest-ments at all  
Do not  
know 
Very 
significant 
investments 
Sales and marketing department  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Distribution and after-sales networks  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Production plants  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Purchasing or sourcing department  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Research and development department -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Technological competencies acquired from outside the
company -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
Please respond to the statements concerning the results of the growth project.  
Statement 
Fully 
dis-
agree 
Do not 
know 
Fully 
agree
New technological fields were learned from the project -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
Learning related to technological fields caused changes in the implementation 
plan of the project  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
New patents or licenses were bought in order to implement the growth plan  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
In the project new technological inventions were made internally, that were 
patented  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
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Wide participation in the decision-making process 
In each of the five phases of the decision-making process, how much did each of the 
hierarchical levels participate in the decision-making process?  Please circle the correct answer.  
How active was the managing director? 
Not 
involved 
in any 
way 
 
Do 
not 
know
Very 
active and 
important 
role  
Generating growth ideas based on technological competence  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Screening out ideas realistic technologically and from market potential -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Evaluating and comparing the ideas  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Making the final decision to enter the new market  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Choosing people responsible for implementation  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
How active was the top management? 
Not 
involved 
in any 
way 
 
Do 
not 
know
Very 
active and 
important 
role  
Generating growth ideas based on technological competence  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Screening out ideas realistic technologically and from market potential -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Evaluating and comparing the ideas  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Making the final decision to enter the new market  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Choosing people responsible for implementation  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
How active was the middle management?  
Not 
involved 
in any 
way  
 
Do 
not 
know
Very 
active and 
important 
role  
Generating growth ideas based on technological competence  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Screening out ideas realistic technologically and from market potential -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Evaluating and comparing the ideas  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Making the final decision to enter the new market  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Choosing people responsible for implementation  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
How active was the junior manager / group leader / expert level?  
Not 
involved 
in any 
way 
 
Do 
not 
know
Very 
active and 
important 
role  
Generating growth ideas based on technological competence  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Screening out ideas realistic technologically and from market potential -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Evaluating and comparing the ideas  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Making the final decision to enter the new market  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Choosing people responsible for implementation  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
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Wide functional participation and information intensity 
Please evaluate the following statements concerning each of the five phases of the decision-
making process.   
Phase of decision-making process: 
Generating growth ideas based on technological competence 
Fully 
dis-
agree 
 
Do 
not 
know
 Fully agree 
There were many meetings in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Information was actively collected from different sources in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
External sources of information were used systematically in this phase -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
People from many functional departments took part in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
Phase of decision-making process: 
Screening out ideas realistic technologically and from market potential 
Fully 
dis-
agree 
 
Do 
not 
know
 Fully agree 
There were many meetings in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Information was actively collected from different sources in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
External sources of information were used systematically in this phase -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
People from many functional departments took part in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
Phase of decision-making process: 
Evaluating and comparing the ideas 
Fully 
disagre
e 
 
Do 
not 
know
 Fully agree 
There were many meetings in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Information was actively collected from different sources in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
External sources of information were used systematically in this phase -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
People from many functional departments took part in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
Phase of decision-making process: 
Making the final decision to enter the new market 
Fully 
dis-
agree 
 
Do 
not 
know
 Fully agree 
There were many meetings in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Information was actively collected from different sources in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
External sources of information were used systematically in this phase -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
People from many functional departments took part in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
Phase of decision-making process: 
Choosing people responsible for implementation 
Fully 
dis-
agree 
 
Do 
not 
know
 Fully agree 
There were many meetings in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Information was actively collected from different sources in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
External sources of information were used systematically in this phase -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
People from many functional departments took part in this phase  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
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Existing process, usage of business plan and the financial reporting and analysis 
related to the process 
Please evaluate the financial reporting related to the project based on the following statements.  
Statement 
Fully 
dis-
agree 
 
Do 
not 
know
 Fully agree 
Income statement or balance sheet estimates of the project had an 
important role  -3 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Detailed cost estimates concerning the project had an important role  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Plan on sources of financing had an important role  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
Did exactly predefined guidelines for this kind of a decision-making process exist? Please 
evaluate on the basis of the following statements.  
Statement 
Fully 
dis-
agree 
 
Do 
not 
know
 Fully agree 
A written guideline existed for this kind of a process  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
A set of criteria defining strategically fitting growth projects existed  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
There was a certain process for the continuous screening for growth 
ideas  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
In order to approve a decision like this a business plan is always 
required  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
In our company a business plan must always include certain parts  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Conflict 
How much disagreement caused by the differing objectives of different groups or individuals was 
there related to the decision-making process? Please estimate on the basis of the following 
statements.  
Statement 
Fully 
dis-
agree 
 
Do 
not 
know
 Fully agree 
During the process coalitions with different objectives were formed 
within the company  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
The central persons in the process went through many long 
negotiations  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
There was a lot of disagreement regarding the objectives of the 
decision  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
There was a lot of disagreement concerning what would be the correct 
procedure to follow in the process  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
There was a lot of disagreement regarding the correctness of the 
conclusions  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
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 Dependent and control variables 
 
What percentage of the whole company's turnover was the project expected to bring in the end 
of its fifth year of operation (estimate)? _______ % The first year of operation is defined to be 
the first year that the project had sales.  
 
After how many years of operation was the project expected to reach the profitability level 
(operating profit) that was expected from it (estimate)? After _______ years of operation. 
 
Please evaluate the following statements concerning the expectations from the project.  
Statement Fully disagree 
Do not 
know 
Fully  
agree 
A significant amount of new turnover was expected from the project  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
The project was expected to be the most important source of growth 
for the company in the following years  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
The project was expected to create the base for the transition of the 
whole company to a new market  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
New technological fields were expected to be learned from the project  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
New contacts were expected to be gained from the project  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
It was expected that a certain rising cycle could be exploited through 
the growth project  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
Estimate how large part of your company's turnover has been used for research and 
development during the last three years (1997-1999)? ________%  And how large part of the 
turnover was used for research and development in the years 1985-1987? ________% 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements concerning the growth aspirations of 
your company at the time of starting the growth project?   
Statement 
Fully 
dis-
agree 
 
Do 
not 
know
 Fully agree 
We wanted to grow the company as fast as we could  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
We were prepared to sacrifice the profitability of the company for some 
years if that way we could get the company to grow fast  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
We wanted to keep the company's operations on the same level as 
they were  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Trying to make the company grow fast was pointless  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
We wanted to keep the company small  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
 
What was the annual targeted growth rate of your company at the time of starting the growth 
project? ___________% per year.  
 
How large percent of the whole company's turnover did the project bring in the end of the fifth 
year of operating (estimate)? _______ % What about in the year 1999 (estimate)? _______ % 
After how many years of operation did the project reach the profitability level (operating profit) 
that was expected from it (estimate)? After_______ years of operation. 
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Has there been any attempt in your company to estimate the value of the whole company's 
technology competencies? Please respond to the following statements. 
Statement 
Fully 
dis-
agree 
 
Do 
not 
know 
 Fully agree 
In our company we have a commonly known list or description of the 
most important areas of technological competence  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
In our company we have a list or description of all documentable 
technological assets, such as patents, licenses, etc.  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Documentable technological assets have been grouped into different 
areas of strength in technological competence  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
In our company we have a list or description of "soft" technological 
assets, such as different persons' areas of specialization  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
"Soft" technological assets have been grouped into different areas of 
strength in technological competence  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
In our company we have evaluated the competitive advantage in each 
area of technological competence  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
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Appendix 4: Dendrogram of the cluster analysis 
